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SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AS SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
D. Fenton Adams*
The principal focus of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) has always dealt with transactions intended by the parties to
create security interests in personal property. Prior to the revision of
the Article in 1998,1 section 9-102(1) provided: "[E]xcept as otherwise
provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article ap-
plies to (a) any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended
to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures., 2 The
term "security interest" was defined in section 1-201(37) of the UCC
as meaning, primarily, "an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation." That such
interests were created by contract may have been implicit in section 9-
102(1)(a), but any doubt was removed by subsection (2), which pro-
vided that "It]his Article applies to security interests created by con-
tract."3 These provisions did not say how a security interest worked to
provide security, but a study of later provisions of Article 9 made it
apparent that the person entitled to payment or performance of the
obligation secured had rights to resort to the personal property subject
to the security interest, in the event of default on the obligation, to
collect payment of, or compensation for nonperformance of, the se-
* Professor Emeritus, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkan-
sas at Little Rock. A.B., Dickinson College 1947, LL.B., Dickinson School of Law
1949, J.D. 1968.
1. In this article there will be frequent references to Article 9 as revised in 1998
and to its text and comments prior to the 1998 revision. Article 9 as it stood imme-
diately prior to the 1998 revision will be referred to as "former Article 9" and the 1998
revision (as somewhat modified since) will be referred to as "revised Article 9."
2. The application of the Article to security interests in "fixtures" did not really
extend the scope of the Article beyond security interests in personal property, as a
"fixture" (or at least the type of fixture to which Article 9 applied), was a hybrid type
of property, having both real property and personal property characteristics, and
Article 9's application to fixtures was to security interests in them as personal proper-
ty. See D. Fenton Adams, Security Interests in Fixtures Under Mississippi's Uniform
Commercial Code, 47 Miss. L.J. 831, 836-841, 898-900 (1976).
3. Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the principal draftsmen of the original ver-
sion of Article 9, has written that former UCC § 9-102(2) (1972) "repeats the same
idea [as subsection (1)] in different language." GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, vol. 1, § 10.1, at 296 (Little, Brown & Co. 1965)
[hereafter Gilmore].
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cured obligation, and also priority over some or all rival claimants to
the property.
In 1998 the sponsors of the UCC' approved a sweeping revision
of Article 9; however, the main focus of the Article was not changed.
Section 9-109(a)(1) of revised Article 9 provides: "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this Article applies to (1) a
transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in
personal property or fixtures by contract,"5 and section 1-201(37) of
the Code, though modified to conform to some changes made in Ar-
ticle 9, retained the general definition of security interest quoted
above without change.6
Nevertheless, Article 9 continues to apply to some transactions
that are not intended to create security interests. Section 9-102(1) of
former Article 9 provided that, except as otherwise provided in sec-
tion 9-104, "this Article applies... also (b) to any sale of accounts or
chattel paper." A "sale" of property is a transaction by which owner-
ship is transferred from one person to another for a price.7 Even if the
4. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The latter has recently been renamed the Uniform Law Con-
ference.
5. There is a subtle shift in wording in revised Article 9. Instead of saying that
the Article applies to "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures," as former U.C.C. § 9-
102(1)(a) (1972) had it, the revision makes the Article applicable to "a transaction,
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures"
(emphasis added). Why this change? A comment to revised U.C.C. § 9-505 (1999)
explains that the phrase "intended as security" misleadingly "created the erroneous
impression that the parties to a transaction can dictate how the law will classify it...
and thus affect the rights of third parties. This Article deletes the phrase wherever it
appears." Revised § 9-505, Cmt 3, 2. Still, whether an interest in personal property or
fixtures "secures an obligation" is a matter of contract, controlled by the agreement of
the parties. Apparently, the draftsmen of the revision were concerned about the pos-
sibility that the wording used in former Article 9 might be taken to mean that how the
parties label the transaction conclusively establishes its nature, rather than the sub-
stance of the agreement as found by accepted techniques of contract interpretation.
One might have supposed that "regardless of its form" in former Article 9, it was
adequate to avert such misreading of the statute, but the draftsmen of the revision
were not satisfied that such wording was sufficient.
6. In 2001, a revision of Article 1 was approved by the Code's sponsors. The
definition of security interest now appears in § 1-201(b)(35), and a portion of the text
that was formerly in § 1-201(37), has been transferred to revised § 1-203. The section
of the passage quoted above in the text of this article remains unchanged in revised §
1-201(b)(35).
7. Section 2-106(1) of the UCC provided: "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price." Article 2 is concerned with sales of "goods,"
not sales of "accounts" or "chattel paper," but § 9-105(3) of former Article 9 provided
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intent of the parties was for the buyer to acquire complete ownership
of the property and the seller to retain no interest in it, if the subject
matter of the sale was accounts or chattel paper, the transaction was
one within the scope of Article 9 (unless excluded by section 9-104).
Furthermore, section 1-201(37) defines security interest to include
"any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject
to Article 9.,8
The 1998 revision of Article 9 extended the reach of the Article
to some additional sales.9 Revised section 9-109(a)(3) provides that,
subject to exceptions in subsections (c) and (d), the Article applies to
"a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory
notes."1 °
This article has two objectives: (1) to explore the reasons for in-
cluding some outright sales of personal property within the scope of
Article 9 and the effect of such inclusion on the status of buyers and
sellers of such property, and (2) to identify the differences between
the two versions of the Article in their treatment of sales of personal
property as secured transactions.
I. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS OF SCOPE
Why should an article of the UCC that is primarily concerned
with transactions intended to create security interests also be applica-
ble to some sales that, by definition, are not transactions of that type?
The comments to former Article 9 merely said that the purpose was
"to avoid difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions
intended for security and those not so intended.""
Professor Gilmore has explained that the extension of the scope
of Article 9 to sales of accounts followed the precedent of pre-Code
"accounts receivable statutes."'2 These statutes were designed to pro-
tect the interests of persons engaged in the business of financing the
operations of sellers of goods and services on credit, with the financers
taking assignments of their debtors' contract rights to payment for
that the definition of "sale" in § 2-106 also applied when the term was used in Article
9.
8. U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(1998).
9. In addition, revised Article 9 applies to consignments and agricultural liens, as
well as many security interests arising under other articles of the UCC. Revised § 9-
109(a)(2), (4), (5) and (6).
10. Subsection (b) of § 9-102 in revised Article 9 incorporates by reference the
definition of "sale" in § 2-106.
11. U.C.C. § 9-102, cAt, 1 (1972).
12. Gilmore, supra note 3, vol. 1, § 10.5 at 308.
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goods sold or services (accounts receivable) rendered as security for
advances made. In its typical form, the advances made by the financ-
ers were repaid by the debtors from the payments made to the debtors
from their credit customers, who were not notified that their accounts
had been assigned; if credit customers defaulted on their obligations,
the debtors were liable to their financers for the deficiencies. 3 Ac-
counts receivable statutes were widely enacted during the 1940s and
1950s to protect the financers' interests from invalidation by the deb-
tors' trustees in bankruptcy.'
These statutes, however, were usually broad in coverage so that
they were also applicable to financers who operated in a different
manner. These financers were "factors" who typically took "non-
recourse" assignments of accounts receivable in exchange for their
advances to credit sellers (they bought the accounts). 5 The persons
obligated on the accounts were notified to make payments to the fac-
tors, and in the event of defaults by the persons obligated on the ac-
counts, the sellers were not liable to the factors for the deficiencies."6
The application of former Article 9 of the Code to a "sale of ac-
counts" (an "account" being defined as "any right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced
by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned
by performance") 7 is thus explainable as following the precedent of
the accounts receivable statutes which Article 9 replaced. 8
Professor Gilmore noted that the broad coverage of the accounts
receivable statutes gave trouble because many of them, if taken literal-
ly, would cover numerous assignments that were not part of financing
arrangements.' 9 Presumably conscious of this history,20 the drafters of
13. Id. at vol. 1, § 5.2, at 132. The history of this type of financing is related in
Chapter 8 of Professor Gilmore's text.
14. See id. at vol.1, § 8.6.
15. Id. at vol. 1, § 5.2, at 132.
16. Id. at vol. 1, § 5.2, at 132. Professor Gilmore explained the statutory coverage
of these "factoring" arrangements (which, in their usual form, were not in danger of
invalidation by trustees in bankruptcy) were designed to protect non-typical factors
who took assignments without notifying the account debtors of their assignments. The
non-notification feature would expose the factors to the danger of losing out to their
debtors' trustees in bankruptcy unless the statute protected them. Id. at vol. 1, § 8.7, at
276.
17. Former U.C.C.§ 9-106 (1972).
18. Gilmore, supra note 3, vol. 1, §10.5, at 308.
19. Id. at vol. 1, § 8.7, at 276.
20. Id. at vol. 1, § 10.5, at 309.
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Article 9 cut down the coverage of sales of accounts by exclusions
which, in former Article 9, appeared in section 9-104(f):
[tihis Article does not apply. .. (f) to a sale of accounts ... as part
of a sale of the business out of which they arose, or an assignment
of accounts ... which is for the purpose of collection only, or a
transfer of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who
is also to do the performance under the contract, or a transfer of a
single account to an assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a
preexisting indebtedness.
In retrospect, Professor Gilmore concluded that this list of exclu-
sions was too narrowly drawn, and he urged courts construing the list
to treat it as "illustrative, not as exhaustive" and to be guided by the
underlying objective of excluding from Article 9 coverage all sales of
intangibles not made in connection with "institutionalized financing
transactions (such as factoring)."'"
The pre-UCC accounts receivable statutes generally did not apply
to transfers of what Article 9 refers to as "chattel paper," which was
defined in former Article 9 as "a writing or writings which evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of spe-
cific goods."23 Sales of chattel paper were, however, included within
the coverage of Article 9 from its earliest version.24 Professor Gilmore
did not explain the reason for this additional coverage. Professors
Summers and White, however, have attributed it to the practice of
some "floor plan" financers of dealer inventory to make advances
partly in exchange for chattel paper arising from the sales of the inven-




23. Former U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(b) (1972). The definition continued: "[b]ut a char-
ter or other contract involving the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a
transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an in-
strument or series of instruments the group of writings taken together constitutes
chattel paper." Id.
24. Gilmore, supra note 3, vol. 1, § 10.5, at 308-309. The relevant provision in
former Article 9 was in § 9-102(1)(b).
25. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 21-
10, following n. 11 (3rd student ed., West 1988) [hereafter WHITE & SUMMERS 3d]. For
further discussion of reasons for the application of Article 9 to sales of accounts and
chattel paper, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised U. C.C.
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947, 948-949 (1999) [hereafter Schwarcz].
UALR LAW REVIEW
The definitions of "chattel paper" and "sale" were broad enough
to bring many transfers of such paper which were not made in a fi-
nancing context within the coverage of Article 9. In an attempt to con-
fine Article 9 coverage to that context, two of the exclusions in section
9-104 of the former text of the UCC were expressly made applicable
to sales of chattel paper, as well as to sales of accounts. The section
stated that "[t]his article does not apply . .. to a sale of ... chattel pa-
per as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose, or an as-
signment of... chattel paper that is for the purpose of collection on-
ly.",26 As was true of these exclusions in their application to sales of
accounts, Professor Gilmore's urging that the specific exclusions be
treated as illustrative only' would presumably be applicable here as
well. He added the practical advice that in case of any doubt as to
whether a sale of an account or chattel paper was within Article 9 cov-
erage, the assumption should be made that the Article and its re-
quirements did apply.' Revised Article 9 also provides that it applies,
generally, to sales of "accounts" and "chattel paper." The correspon-
dence in wording is deceptive because the meaning of both terms is
broader in the revision than it was in former Article 9.
The definition of "account" has been substantially expanded in
coverage. It now appears in section 9-102(a)(2), which defines the
term (except when it is being used as a verb) as
a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned
by performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold,
leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services
rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or
to be issued, (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be in-
curred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided, (vi) for the use
or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii) arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained
on or for use with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other
game of chance operated or sponsored by a State, governmental
unit of a State, or person licensed or authorized to operate the
game by a State or governmental unit of a State. The term includes
health-care-insurance receivables...."
26. The exclusion of former U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1972) for "a transfer of a right to
payment under a contract to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the
contract" could apply also to a sale of chattel paper if it was made on such terms.
27. See also former U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1972), Gilmore, supra note 20.
28. Gilmore, supra note 3, vol. 1, § 10.5, at 309.
29. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(2000).
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Compare this with the much simpler previous definition of "account"
as "a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services ren-
dered.., whether or not it has been earned by performance. '
Sales of all accounts, as revised Article 9 defines them, are within
the coverage of the revised Article, except those excluded by subsec-
tions (c) and (d) of section 9-109. Subsection (c) excludes transactions
governed by federal law that preempts Article 9 and secured transac-
tions governed by certain other state statutes." Subsection (d)(4)-(7)
tracks subsection (f) of former section 9-104 in its exclusions of ac-
counts almost verbatim.
3 2
The term "chattel paper" has been given significantly broadened
scope as well. A general definition of the term in revised Section 9-
102(a)(11) is
a record or records which evidence both a monetary obligation and
a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in specific
goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specific
goods and a license of software used in the goods, a lease of specif-
ic goods, or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in
the goods. In this paragraph 'monetary obligation' means a mone-
tary obligation secured by the goods or owed under a lease of the
goods and includes a monetary obligation with respect to software
used in the goods.
3
The elaborateness of this definition is primarily due to the draf-
ters' decision in the revision to treat computer software that is colla-
teral for an obligation as part of the goods for Article 9 purposes.'
30. Former U.C.C. § 9-106(1972). This section also expressly included rights to
payment under charters or other contracts for use or hire of a vessel.
31. Former Article 9 contained the equivalent of revised § 9-109(c)(1) (federal
preemption) in § 9-104(a), and of course both merely state what would be so even
without an express provision. Paragraphs (2)-(4) of revised § 9-109(c) are new and
replace an exclusion from UCC coverage of all transfers by governments or govern-
mental subdivisions or agencies which appeared in former § 9-104(e).
32. See also U.C.C. § 9-104(f), Gilmore, supra note 20.
33. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11). The definition continues:
[t]he term does not include (i) charters or other contracts involving use or hire of a
vessel or (ii) records that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit
or charge card or information contained or information on or for use with the card. If
a transaction is evidenced by records that include an instrument or series of instru-
ments, the group of records taken together constitutes chattel paper.
34. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 5(b) (1999). See also Steven 0. Weise, An
Overview of Revised Article 9, in ABA, The New Article 9, 1, 2 (Corinne Cooper, ed.,
2d ed., ABA 2000).
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A more notable change in the definition is that the revision
speaks of "a record or records," although the former definition re-
ferred to "a writing or writings." The significance of the change is that
revised Article 9 treats some computerized records and communica-
tions as the legal equivalent of writings. The term "record" is defined
in revised section 9-102(a)(69) as "information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium
and is retrievable in perceivable form." Similarly, whereas former Ar-
ticle 9 referred to "signed" writings, revised Article 9 uses the adjec-
tive "authenticated" to describe the records, where authenticate
means to sign or to take steps to identify the person whose electronic
record it is and to "adopt or accept" the record.35
"Chattel paper" under revised Article 9, can be paper, as it has
previously been, or it can be paperless, recorded only electronically.
The difference between the two types of chattel paper is substantial
enough to require some variation of the rules applicable to their use,
and for this purpose revised Article 9 gives us two new terms: "tangi-
ble chattel paper" and "electronic chattel paper." Tangible chattel
paper is chattel paper of the traditional sort,36 and electronic chattel
paper is the new paperless variety of chattel paper.37
Whether tangible or electronic chattel paper is involved, sales of
it are generally within the coverage of revised Article 9. There are
some exclusions, found in subsection (d)(4)-(7) of revised section 9-
109, and they follow those of subsection (f) of former section 9-104
without substantial change.38 The exclusions of subsection (c) of re-
vised Section 9-109"9 are also applicable to chattel paper.
The coverage of sales of personal property in revised Article 9
has been further broadened by inclusion of sales of two other types or
35. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (1999).
36. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(78) (1999). This term can be a source of confu-
sion as traditional chattel paper has often been referred to as a type of intangible
property, because the essence of the property is a contract right, which cannot be seen
or felt. The paper serves as evidence of a right, as contrasted from goods, where the
property focuses on movable physical objects. It is true that the paper evidence of the
contract rights, which were the focus of chattel paper and some other types of intan-
gibles, had come to be treated as so closely associated with the contract rights that a
transfer of the chattel paper was often affected by delivery of the paper. For that rea-
son, the term "semi-tangible" was sometimes used. In Article 9, the term "tangible
chattel paper" refers to what traditionally would be thought of as "semi-tangible" at
best.
37. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(31) (1999).
38. See revised U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1999), supra note 25.
39. See revised U.C.C. § 9-109 (1999), supra note 31.
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property: "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes." The term
promissory note is not novel and is defined in revised section 9-
102(a)(65) as "an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a mone-
tary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not con-
tain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for de-
posit a sum of money or funds." 40 The idea of a "note" is that of a
written promise to pay money in such form that the obligation it
represents is treated, to some degree, as merged into the writing so
that if a transfer of the right to payment is intended, the writing is
usually delivered to the transferee to effect the transfer. Notes are to
be distinguished from drafts and checks (orders to pay money) and
from certificates of deposit (promises by banks to repay sums of mon-
ey which have been deposited with them).
The term "payment intangible" is one coined by the drafters of
revised Article 9. It is defined, in section 9-102(a)(61) as "a general
intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a
monetary obligation." To understand this definition, one must know
the meaning of "general intangible" and "account debtor."
The effect of Article 9 is to break down the field of personal
property within its scope into defined subcategories. Such classifica-
tion is necessary to cope with variations in the rules of the Article
based on differences in the characteristics of the several types of per-
sonal property and in the way they are customarily used. There is a
basic distinction between tangible and intangible personal property.
All tangible personal property is referred to as "goods" (and the cate-
gory of goods being further broken down into inventory, equipment,
consumer goods, and agricultural products). Intangibles are divided
into numerous categories (even more so in revised Article 9 than in
the former version of the Article), such as accounts and chattel paper,
instruments, documents, investment property, and a final category,
general intangibles, which is a catchall that includes all forms of per-
sonal property that do not fall into any of the other defined categories.
In both Article 9 and the revised version, general intangibles is de-
fined as including: "any personal property.., other than" followed by
a listing all of the other defined categories of personal property.41 The
list of "other-thans" in revised Article 9 is longer than that of former
40. The term "instrument" is defined by revised section 9-102(a)(47) as "a negoti-
able instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, is not itself a security agreement or a lease, and is transferred by delivery
with any necessary indorsement or assignment."
41. See former U.C.C. § 9-106,(1972); see also revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42)
(1999).
UALR LAW REVIEW
Article 9 because the scope of the definition was broadened under the
revision to include more distinct types of personal property. "General
intangible means any personal property, including things in action,
other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit
accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-
of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals
before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and soft-
ware. ,,42
Defining general intangible in an affirmative way by describing
what it is, rather than what it is not, is a practical impossibility because
of its catch-all nature. "Payment intangible," on the other hand, is a
more limited concept than general intangible, although it is a type of
general intangible. It is a right to payment of money, which is not
within the definition of any other defined category of intangible per-
sonal property. A simple example would be a right to repayment of a
loan which is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument.43 Even
the broadened definition of "account" does not apply to it.
The term "account debtor" refers to "a person obligated on an
account, chattel paper, or general intangible."" The term is needed
because a secured transaction involving an account, chattel paper, or a
general intangible as collateral has two debtors involved. The first is
the person whose obligation is represented by the account, chattel
paper, or general intangible, and the second is the person who enters
into the secured transaction with the secured party, transferring a se-
curity interest in the account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The
simple term "debtor" could apply to both of them; "account debtor"
serves to distinguish the debtor whose contract is being used as colla-
teral from the debtor who so uses it.4"
Subsections (c) and (d) of revised section 9-109 carve out some
exceptions to the general rule that sales of payment intangibles and
promissory notes are governed by Article 9. Those of subsection (c),
42. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (1999).
43. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 5(d) (1999). See also In re Wiersma, 324 B.R.
92 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (where an action arguably in tort was settled by agreement
of the parties, the right to payment arising from the settlement was a "payment in-
tangible").
44. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (1999).
45. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 5(h) (1999). The term "account debtor" is
not applied to the person obligated on a promissory note that serves as collateral be-
cause some of the rules of Article 9 that deal with rights and duties of account debtors
are inappropriate for application to a person obligated to pay a promissory note, at
least if the note is a negotiable one, as Article 9 generally defers to Article 3's rules
governing the rights and duties of persons obligated on promissory notes.
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excepting cases governed by federal law which preempts the rules of
Article 9 or governed by certain other state laws, apply to all forms of
property which otherwise would be within the scope of Article 9.
Those of subsection (d), paragraphs (4) through (7), which follow the
pattern of former section 9-104(4), 4 specifically mention sales of
promissory notes and payment intangibles in all paragraphs except the
section referring to assignments of contract rights to assignees who are
also obligated to perform duties under the contracts.
Why does revised Article 9 expand the types of personal property
and sales that are treated as secured transactions? The comments to
the revision explain the continuation of the prior coverage of sales of
accounts and chattel paper on the ground that such coverage "general-
ly has been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing
between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and
those in which the receivable has been sold outright. In many com-
mercial financing transactions the distinction is blurred."47 The expan-
sions of coverage to include sales of payment intangibles and promis-
sory notes is noted, but not explained, in the same comment.48 Steven
Weise, an American Bar Association (ABA) Advisor to the revised
Article 9 drafting committee, has attributed these expansions to
awareness that the types of obligations involved are often sold in the
course of financing transactions. 9
The broadened scope of revised Article 9 appears to reflect a
consensus among the revisers that modernization of the law to adapt
to changing business practices called for making the Article applica-
ble, as much as was practicable, to all financing based on rights to
payment, whether the rights were intended to serve as security for
obligations or were subjects of outright sales, and that called both for
making the Article applicable to additional categories of personal
property and for coverage of sales of more types of receivables."0 The
46. See supra note 23.
47. Revised U.C.C. § 9-109, cmt. 4, 1(1999). The term "receivable" is used in
this comment as a short-form way of referring to the types of property of which the
sales are within the scope of revised Article 9. In this article, the term will be used the
same way.
48. Revised U.C.C. § 9-109, cmt. 4, 2 (1999).
49. STEVEN 0. WEISE, AN INTRODUCTION TO REVISED U.C.C. ARTICLE 9, West,
Selected Commercial Statutes, 1396 (West, 1999 ed.).
50. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revi-
sion of U.C.C. Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHi-KENT L. REV. 1357,
1368-69 (1999) [hereafter Harris & Mooney].
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rapid growth in recent years of a financing device called "securitiza-
tion" seems to have been a prime example of need for such revision."
Professor Gilmore's urging that the specific exclusions of certain
sales of intangibles be treated as illustrative only and that courts con-
strue them as designed to exclude from the Article all sales not occur-
ring in an institutionalized financing context52 has not found favor with
subsequent draftsmen of Article 9. Neither the text nor the Official
Comments of former Article 9 contained language suggesting that the
specific exclusions of the Article were merely illustrative, and an opi-
nion of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC issued in 1994
suggested that the Board had the view that the only exclusions were
those expressed in section 9-104. 3 The 1998 revision also appears to
adopt this position. One comment points out the distinction between
full sales of receivables and transactions that are intended to create
security interests in such property, but it asserts: "This article applies
to both types of transactions," though it does distinguish between
them in some of its rules.' The impact of this comment is that unless a
sale of a receivable is excluded by the express language of section 9-
109(c) or (d), it is governed by Article 9; whether the transaction in-
volved is conducted in a commercial financing context is immaterial.
Such a reading is consistent with the revisers' general objective to pro-
vide rules of more certain application than some of the rules of the
prior text."
II. ATTACHMENT OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
The creation of an Article 9 security interest is termed its "at-
tachment" to the property that serves as the security (the collateral).
Section 9-203(1) of former Article 9 provided that
a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third
parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless: (a)
51. See Schwartz, supra note 25, 948-50; See also John C. Murray, Rechristening
Issues in Participating Loans, 19 PROB. & PROP. 36, 40 (Sept./Oct. 2005); See also
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 21-6 (5th
student ed., West 2000) [hereafter WHITE & SUMMERS 5th].
52. See discussion supra Part I., Gilmore, supra notes 19 & 21.
53. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary
No. 14 (1994).
54. Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 5 (1999).
55. See Steven 0. Weise, An Overview of Revised U.C.C. Article 9, in ABA, The
New Article 9 Uniform Commercial Code, 1 (Corrine Cooper, ed., ABA, 2d ed. 2000);
Schwarcz, supra note 25 at 950-51.
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the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement . . . , or the debtor has signed a security agreement
which contains a description of the collateral ... ; (b) value has
been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.56
Subsection (2) of the same section stated that, "[a]ttachment oc-
curs as soon as all of the events specified in subsection (1) have taken
place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching." Did
these rules apply to sales of accounts and chattel paper? As section 1-
201(37) expressly declared that the term security interest included
''any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject
to Article 9" and nothing in the language of section 9-203 or any other
section suggested that the security interests of buyers of accounts and
chattel paper were not subject to the normal rules for attachment; pre-
sumably those rules did apply.
The requirement that value have been given was unlikely to cause
trouble in a sale of receivables. 7 The same would be true of the re-
quirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral. A sale, by de-
finition, is a transfer of title from seller to buyer for a price. 8 The re-
maining requirement, found in section 9-203(1)(a), is in the nature of a
Statute of Frauds and might, at times, catch a buyer unaware, though
the probability was very likely small. "Accounts" are pure intangibles;
there is no realistic way in which a buyer could take possession of
them. Therefore, to have an enforceable security interest, he would
have to obtain a signed security agreement from the debtor that de-
scribed the property sold. That requirement would have been satisfied
as a matter of routine in professional financing transactions and trans-
actions involving collateral of considerable value, but there was no
56. The omissions from the quoted language are not relevant to sales of recei-
vables.
57. "Value" is defined in § 1-201(44), which treats several specific types of action
as a giving of value and adds "any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract." That definition was moved in 2001 to § 1-204 without change in substance.
58. See supra note 8. If the seller had transferred ownership to someone else be-
fore the sale to a buyer, the seller would not have rights in the collateral at the time of
the sale. Nevertheless, he might, under the law, have power to transfer rights in the
collateral, and perhaps such a power could be treated as the equivalent of having
rights in the collateral. As will be shown, the 1998 revision of Article 9 expressly al-
lows attachment if the debtor has either rights in the collateral or power to transfer
rights to a secured party. Revised § 9-203(b)(2). Such power was conferred on the
debtor by the prior version of Article 9; arguably, the requirement that the debtor
must have rights in the collateral should be construed as satisfied if the debtor has
such a power. This power will be dealt with in the following text under the heading
"Priorities."
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minimum value specified in the statute to make the signed writing re-
quirement inapplicable. A buyer of chattel paper could satisfy the
formality requirement by taking possession of the paper, 9 and if the
buyer did not take possession, the signed writing requirement would
apply. While the statute required a written "security agreement," pre-
sumably a written contract for the sale of described accounts or chattel
paper would satisfy the requirement. 6°
Under revised Article 9, similar rules apply. Section 9-203(a) pro-
vides that: "[a] security interest attaches to the collateral when it be-
comes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral,
unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment."
Subsection (b) of that section provides that, as a general rule,
[a] security interest is enforceable against the debtor or third par-
ties with respect to the collateral only if: (1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer
rights in the collateral to a secured party; and (3) one of the follow-
ing conditions is met: (A) the debtor has authenticated a security
agreement that provides a description of the collateral ... ; (B) the
collateral... is in the possession of the secured party under Section
9-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement; ... or (D) the
collateral is . . . electronic chattel paper and the secured party has
control under Section ... 9-105. . . pursuant to the debtor's securi-
ty agreement.61
As under former Article 9, the term "security interest" is expressly
made applicable to the interest of buyers of receivables for sales with-
in the scope of Article 9.62
This version of the rules on attachment further articulates what
was at best implied by former Article 9, that even if the debtor does
59. The text of former Article 9 did not say that it was so, as to chattel paper for
attachment purposes, but the rules on perfection of security interests provided that a
security interest in chattel paper could be perfected by the secured party's taking pos-
session of the collateral (former § 9-305), and it would be anomalous to treat chattel
paper as deliverable for perfection purposes, but not to effect attachment of the secu-
rity interest.
60. Former U.C.C. § 9-105 (1972) defined security agreement as "an agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest." A written agreement for sale of
described receivables would create a security interest, given the definition of "security
interest" as including the interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper. Former
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) since the 2001 revision of Article 1.
61. The omitted portions of this subsection would not apply to cases involving
sales of receivables.
62. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) as it read prior to the 2001 revision of Article 1; re-
vised U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (1999).
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not have an interest in the collateral, a security interest can attach if
the debtor has power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured
party.'
Another difference between the two versions of section 9-203 is
the substitution of the term "authenticated" for "signed" in the re-
quirement that a formalized security agreement have been made if the
collateral is not in the possession of the secured party or, in the case of
electronic chattel paper, if the debtor does not have control of it.6
A third difference is the provision for a third type of formality;
"control" of the collateral as an alternative to an authenticated securi-
ty agreement or possession of the collateral, applicable where the col-
lateral is electronic chattel paper.65
A fourth difference is the inclusion of a reference to Section 9-313
in connection with possession of the collateral as a means of formaliz-
ing a security agreement. Subsection (a) of that section provides that
Aa secured party may perfect a security interest in instruments.., or
tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral." Thus,
the revision makes it clear that a "possession" which will perfect a se-
curity interest is also a means of making the security interest enforce-
able, a point not explicitly made in prior Article 9.66 Possession, as a
means of making a security interest enforceable, as far as sales of re-
ceivables are concerned, is available only with respect to tangible chat-
tel paper and promissory notes (a promissory note being an "instru-
ment"). An authenticated security agreement is required for attach-
ment of a security interest in an account or a payment intangible; ei-
ther an authenticated security agreement or possession will suffice for
tangible chattel paper or a promissory note, and either an authenti-
cated security agreement or the secured party's having "control" of
the collateral is required when the collateral is electronic chattel pa-
per.
A final observation about the differences between the two ver-
sions of section 9-203 is that the revision makes it clearer than the ear-
lier version that a security agreement is a requirement for attachment
of any security interest. In cases where attachment is based on posses-
sion or control of the collateral, the agreement need not be in an au-
thenticated record, but there must be a security agreement and the
63. See supra note 56.
64. See supra note 36.
65. The concept of "control" as a means of formalizing a security agreement with
respect to electronic chattel paper is also a means of perfecting a security interest in
such property; it will be discussed in more detail. See infra Part III.
66. See supra note 59.
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secured party's possession or control is required to be pursuant to the
debtor's security agreement.
III. PERFECTION
Even though a security interest has attached to certain collateral
and is enforceable against the debtor, it might not be effective to bar
claims to the collateral by third persons. These third persons may be
persons to whom the debtor has undertaken to transfer ownership of
the collateral or some more limited property interest in it, or they
might be creditors of the debtor who have acquired interests in the
property by operation of law. For purposes of dealing with conflicts
between a secured party and rival claimants to the collateral, the Code
employs the concept of "perfection" of the security interest. If a secu-
rity interest is "unperfected" it is substantially more vulnerable to
third-party claims to the collateral than it would be if it were "per-
fected."
A. How Perfection is Achieved
There are several ways in which a security interest might be per-
fected under Article 9. The principal method is the filing of a public
notice by the secured party, so that persons interested in the collateral
can learn of the secured party's interest in it, by searching the record
and following up on the notice. This method of perfection brings out
the basic idea of perfection, avoidance of secret liens that may harm
third-party purchasers of the collateral or creditors of the debtor. The
predominance of filing for purposes of perfection of Article 9 security
interests is emphasized in both former Article 9 and its successor by
rules which prescribe it as the general rule for perfection. Former Sec-
tion 9-302(1) declared that "[a] financing statement must be filed to
perfect all security interests except the following," and revised Section
9-310(a) provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (b)
and Section 9-312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all
security interests."
The type of filing that Article 9 calls for is "notice filing." A filing
of a copy of the security agreement or a detailed account of the se-
cured transaction is not required; indeed, a filing can be made before
any security agreement has been made. All that is required is a notice
that a particular person may, now or in the future, have a security in-
terest in a certain type or types of personal property owned by a des-
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ignated person.67 If a searcher of the record finds this notice and de-
sires further information of what security interest, if any, actually ex-
ists, then the searcher must inquire about the parties named in the
filing.' Should the secured party designated in the filing prove uncoo-
perative, the Code provides means by which disclosure of information
can be compelled.69
The first questions to be addressed are: 1)whether this method of
perfection is a required, or at least permissible, method of perfecting
the security interests of buyers of receivables whose purchases are
within the scope of Article 9; and 2) what other methods of perfection
are available as alternative or exclusive means of perfection. The ap-
plicable rules vary depending on the type of receivable involved.
1. Perfection of Security Interests in Accounts
Filing was, and is, the sole method of perfection available with re-
spect to most sales of accounts covered by Article 9. Former Article 9
excepted from the general requirement of filing only "an assignment
of accounts which does not, alone or in conjunction with other assign-
ments to the same assignee, transfer a significant part of the outstand-
ing accounts of the assignor"' and "an assignment for the benefit of all
of the creditors of the transferor, and subsequent transfers by the as-
signee thereunder."" In revised Article 9 the same exceptions are
made to the general rule, though in a somewhat more roundabout
72way.
The 1998 revision also exempts from the filing requirement "a se-
curity interest created by the assignment of a health-care-insurance
receivable to the provider of the health-care goods or services. 73 The
term "health-care-insurance receivable" is defined in revised section
9-102(a)(46) as "an interest in or claim under a policy of insurance
which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health-care
67. Former U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2 (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (1999).
68. Id.
69. Former U.C.C. § 9-208 (1972); revised U.C.C.§ 9-210 (1999). Filing of a copy
of a security agreement was expressly authorized by former Article 9 as a substitute
for a simple notice filing, but that encouragement has been eliminated from the revi-
sion. See former U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). See also revised U.C.C. § 9-502, cmt. 4
(1972) (saying that the authorization in former § 9-402(1) has been omitted because it
seems unnecessary and unwise).
70. Former U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e)(1972).
71. Id. § 9-302(1)(g).
72. Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-309(2) & (12), 9-310(b)(2) (1999).
73. Id. §§ 9-309(5) & 9-310(b)(2).
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goods or services provided."74 This is a type of collateral not recog-
nized as original collateral by former Article 9, as all transfers of in-
terests in or claims under insurance policies were expressly excluded
from the scope of the Article except when the interests or claims were
proceeds of original collateral. 5 Revised section 9-102(a)(2) declares
that a health-care-insurance receivable is a type of "account. 76 Hence,
sales of such receivables are within the scope of the Article, as well as
transfers of such receivables intended as security.
The exemption from filing made for assignments of health-care-
insurance receivables is limited to assignments made to the providers
of the goods or services which are the bases for the receivables. 7 For
example, the exception would apply in a case where an insured under
a health-care insurance policy had received goods or services from a
health-care provider (a doctor, hospital, supplier of wheel chairs, or
the like) and, as a result, had a right under the policy to have the in-
surer pay for the goods or services, and the insured assigned his right
under the policy to the supplier of the goods or services either as a sale
or as security. No filing would be required as to that assignment. If the
supplier of the goods or services in turn made an assignment of the
account to another person, however, either as a sale or as security, the
normal filing requirement for security interests in accounts would ap-
ply to perfection of the security interest of that assignee."
Another innovation in the revised version of Article 9, is an ex-
emption from the filing requirement for "a sale by an individual of an
account that is a right to payment of winnings in a lottery or other
game of chance., 79 The general requirement of filing with respect to
sales of accounts was explained in a comment to former Article 9 as
following the precedent of about half of the pre-Code "accounts re-
ceivable" statutes; it was considered the sounder precedent because
"there [was] no valid reason why public notice [was] less appropriate
for assignments of accounts than for any other type of nonpossessory
interest."' The exception for assignments of accounts which do not
transfer a "significant part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor"
was explained by a comment to former Article 9 as intended Ato save
from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated assignments ...
74. Former U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(46) (1972).
75. Id. § 9-104(g).
76. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(1999).
77. Id. § 9-309 cmt. 5.
78. See id. § 9-309, cmt. 5.
79. Id. § 9-309(14).
80. Former U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5 (1972).
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which no one would think of filing,"'" and this comment is echoed in
the comments to revised Article 9.' Similar reasoning may account for
the exception made in revised Article 9 for an assignment of a health-
care-insurance receivable to the provider of the goods or services.
As to the exception for sales of rights to payment of game or lot-
tery winnings, a comment explains that payments of accounts of this
sort "typically extend for periods of twenty years or more. It would be
unduly burdensome for the secured party, who would have no other
reason to maintain contact with the seller, to monitor the seller's whe-
reabouts for such a length of time."'3 How are the assignments of ac-
counts that are excepted from the general filing requirement per-
fected? They are automatically perfected; i.e., the buyer need do noth-
ing to perfect them other than to acquire an attached security interest
in them. Former Article 9 did not say that; it had to be inferred from
the facts that such assignments were expressly exempted from the fil-
ing requirement and no other rule which required action of the se-
cured party to achieve perfection was applicable. In revised Article 9,
automatic perfection is expressly stated."4
2. Perfection of Security Interests in Chattel Paper
Under former Article 9 a security interest in chattel paper could
be perfected by filing,' but there was an alternative method of perfec-
tion available: "the secured party's taking possession of the collater-
al."' If the secured party had possession of the collateral, filing was
unnecessary,8 but the perfection so achieved would last only as long as
possession.' This alternative method of perfection was apparently
approved because the secured party's possession of the collateral
would serve as notice to third parties of the secured party's claim to an
interest in the property. Perhaps more importantly, the debtor's lack
81. Id. § 9-302 cmt. 3, 3.
82. Revised U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4, 1 (1999).
83. Revised U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4, 13 (2007). If filing of a financing statement is
required to perfect a buyer's security interest, the buyer would need to keep track of
the debtor's location because of the possibility of need to make a new filing if the
debtor moves to another state. The applicable law will be discussed a bit later in this
article.
84. All numbered parts of revised U.C.C. § 9-309 (1999) are prefaced by the
words: "The following security interests are perfected when they attach."
85. Former U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1972).
86. Id. § 9-305.
87. Id. § 9-302(1)(a).
88. Id. § 9-305.
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of possession would serve as a warning to anyone contemplating pur-
chasing the chattel paper or an interest in it that inquiry should be
made of the one in possession as to what claim that person had to the
property." The term "possession" was not defined in the statute,
though a comment indicated that possession by an agent of the se-
cured party could qualify as the equivalent of possession by the se-
cured party.9°
In revised Article 9 we must deal with the extension of the con-
cept of "chattel paper" to include a computerized record evidencing
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or lease of specif-
ic goods, termed "electronic chattel paper."9 When chattel paper of
the traditional written type ("tangible chattel paper")' is involved, the
methods of perfection recognized by former Article 9 continue to be
authorized in the revision. A security interest in tangible chattel paper
may be perfected by filing,93 but taking possession of the paper by the
secured party is a permissible alternative.94 The revision deals in some
detail with situations where goods in the possession of a third person
may be treated as possessed by the secured party.9
When electronic chattel paper is involved, filing is a permissible
method of perfection.96 Possession of such "paper," in any realistic
sense, is not possible, since there is nothing physical to possess, but
revised Article 9 supplies another alternative method of perfection
called "control" of the collateral.97 Revised section 9-105 defines "con-
trol" of electronic chattel paper in terms of the characteristics that the
electronic record must have:
A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record
or records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and as-
signed in such a manner that: (1) a single authoritative copy of the
record or records exists which is unique, identifiable and, except as
otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), unalterable; (2)
the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee
of the record or records; (3) the authoritative copy is communi-
cated to and maintained by the secured party or its designated cus-
89. See WHITE & SUMMERS 5th, supra note 51, § 22-1, 3.
90. Former U.C.C. § 9-305, cmt. 2 (1972).
91. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11) & (31) (1999).
92. Id. at § 9-102(a)(78).
93. Id. at § 9-312(a).
94. Id. at § 9-313(a).
95. Id. at § 9-313(c), (f)-(i).
96. Id. at § 9-312(a).
97. Revised U.C.C. § 9-314(a) (1999).
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todian; (4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified as-
signee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the partici-
pation of the secured party; (5) each copy of the authoritative copy
and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not
the authoritative copy; and (6) any revision of the authoritative
copy is readily identifiable as an authorized or unauthorized revi-
sion."
"Control," as a method of perfection of a security interest, seems
to have been visualized as the functional equivalent of possession of
tangible or semi-tangible property where pure intangibles are in-
volved.99 From the standpoint of the secured party, it seems to be a
quite satisfactory equivalent to possession. From the standpoint of a
person contemplating purchase of the intangible from the debtor,
however, doesn't it differ in visibility? If tangible chattel paper were
involved, the prospective purchaser could say, "Show me the paper,"
and follow up on that if the debtor is unable to produce the paper. Is
the same true of electronic chattel paper? Probably so. If the secured
party can gain control of the electronic chattel paper in the manner
described in revised section 9-105, it would have to be done with the
cooperation of the debtor-or the seller in the case of a sale of the
property-and a "Show me" statement addressed to the debtor would
lead to a computer record which shows that the property has been
transferred to another.
3. Perfection of Security Interests in Promissory Notes and Pay-
ment Intangibles
How does a buyer of a promissory note or a payment intangible
perfect the security interest? This question arises, of course, only un-
der revised Article 9, and the answer there is clear and simple. The
buyer doesn't have to do anything at all beyond obtaining an attached
security interest; the security interest is automatically perfected upon
attachment.' Why is this? The only explanation offered by the Offi-
98. Id. § 9-105. For a study of methods to satisfy these requirements, see ABA
Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable Records, Emulating Docu-
mentary Tokens in an Electronic Environment: Practical Models for Control and Prior-
ity of Interests in Transferable Records and Electronic Chattel Paper, 59 Bus. LAW. 379
(2003).
99. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9:
Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055, 1055-70 (1999).
100. Revised U.C.C. § 9-309(3)-(4) (1999).
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cial Comments is that this "reflect[s] the practice under former Article
9. Under that Article, filing a financing statement did not affect the
rights of a buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes, inas-
much the former Article did not cover those sales."' '
That explanation is not very informative and is, in fact, mislead-
ing. A more enlightening explanation has been provided by Steven L.
Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., who were Reporters for the Ar-
ticle 9 revision Drafting Committee." In their account of the commit-
tee's work as it related to the scope of the Article, 3 Professors Harris
and Mooney explained that the expansion of Article 9 coverage to
include payment intangibles was part of an effort to bring sales of
most contractual rights to payments within its scope.'O Initially, the
committee expected to require filing for perfection of buyers' security
interests in payment intangibles, but bankers opposed the requirement
because their sales of loan participations would be sales of payment
intangibles, and they feared that a filing requirement would seriously
interfere with their way of doing business.' The Drafting Committee
sought to overcome the bankers' opposition by providing for automat-
ic perfection of security interests in payment intangibles but narrowing
the scope of the "payment intangible" concept by expanding the defi-
nition of "account" to make it include as follows:
nearly every type of payment stream the Committee could think of,
other than payment streams represented by chattel paper or in-
struments. Treating these rights to payment as accounts had the ef-
fect of imposing a filing requirement for both outright sales and as-
signments that secure obligations. It also had the effect of leaving
in the residual category of 'payment intangibles' the right to re-




Subsequently, when the Drafting Committee decided to bring
sales of promissory notes into the coverage of Article 9, such sales
were also treated as automatically perfected "so as not to interfere
with the loan-participation market."'0 7
It may seem that treating sales of promissory notes and payment
intangibles as automatically perfected is inconsistent with the goal of
101. Id. § 9-309 cmt. 4.
102. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 50.
103. Id. at 1368-73.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 1370-1373.
106. Id. at 1372.
107. Id. at 1374 n. 68.
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requiring public notice of financing transactions involving receivables.
The exception for sales of loan participations does little harm as a
practical matter, however, since the business was transacted before the
revision of Article 9 without public notice of such transactions and
caused little dissatisfaction." Thus, the revision's automatic perfection
rule does not make matters worse than they were before.'"
The provision for automatic perfection of security interests of
buyers of promissory notes and payment intangibles could give auto-
matic perfection to buyers of such receivables in cases where loan par-
ticipations were not involved. It has been suggested, however, that in
most cases involving sales of promissory notes and payment intan-
gibles, the buyers would be wise to file financing statements even
though they are not required to for perfection in order to protect
themselves if courts were later to conclude that the transactions were
not sales of the receivables, but were intended to create true security
interests.1
Another reason why a buyer of a promissory note might be reluc-
tant to rely on the automatic perfection rule is that there are circums-
tances in which the holder of such an automatically perfected security
interest could lose priority to another purchaser who has taken posses-
sion of the note."' To guard against that possibility, it could be wise
for the buyer to take possession of the instrument himself. Thus, al-
though buyers of promissory notes and payment intangibles do not
have to file or (in the case of a note) take possession of the collateral
in order to obtain perfected security interests, it might be in their best
interests to take such steps for increased security.
One other point should be made with respect to perfection of se-
curity interests in all cases involving sales of receivables that are with-
in the scope of Article 9. Perfection cannot be achieved until the secu-
rity interest has "attached" to the collateral. Former section 9-303(1)
provided: "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been tak-
en.... If such steps are taken before the security interest attaches, it is
perfected at the time when it attaches."". Revised Section 9-308(a),
slightly differently worded, is to the same effect. The principal situa-
108. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 50 at 1371-72.
109. See id. at 1372-73.
110. See John C. Murray, Recharacterization Issues in Participating Loans, 19
PROB.& PROP. 36, 40 (Sept./Oct. 2005) (referring to buyers of promissory notes,
though the same caution would be appropriate if payment intangibles were involved).
111. See infra Part IV.
112. Former U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972).
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tions where perfection would be postponed despite the fact that the
steps necessary for perfection have been taken would be where filing
preceded attachment of a security interest.
B. The Filing System
A filing to perfect a security interest requires a written or elec-
tronic message called a "financing statement." ' 3
1. Form of Financing Statement
Former section 9-402(1) prescribed the form of a financing state-
ment and, by implication, seemed to call for a written document be-
cause it required that the statement be "signed. 11 4 It provided:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the deb-
tor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address
of the secured party from which information concerning the securi-
ty interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor
and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral."5
Subsection (3) of the same section offered a specimen form of fi-
nancing statement, which it declared would "comply with subsection
(1)."1'6 The form suggested that if the filing was made with respect to a
sale of receivables, the financing statement did not have to show that a
sale was involved." The form called simply for "Name of debtor (or
assignor)" and "Name of secured party (or assignee)"1"8; in the case of
a sale, the seller would be the "assignor" and the buyer would be the
"assignee."
As has been explained before, the type of filing contemplated is
"notice filing," which could be made before any security interest in
specific collateral came into existence. The notice was required to
show no more than that a specified person might have a security inter-
est(s) in property of one or more types belonging to a specified person
113. Revised U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2003).
114. Former U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972). However, a Commentary of the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code took the position that electronic
filing could be valid under the 1995 Official Text. See Id. § 9-502 cmt. 3.
115. Former U.C.C. (1972).
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(although, if a security interest had already arisen, the statement
could, but was not required to, describe the particular items of colla-
teral subject to the security interest).' 9 This requirement differed from
the kind of description of collateral which was required in a written
security agreement. In a security agreement, the UCC called for "a
description of the collateral";1 2° a description of the specific property
that was to be subject to the security interest, specifically one ade-
quate to permit identification of the collateral for the interest. Though
former section 9-110 provided that, "[flor the purposes of this Article
any description of personal property.., is sufficient whether or not it
is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described,' 2 ' what had to
be described in a security agreement was "the collateral," not merely
the type of collateral, and the description had to be adequate to "rea-
sonably identify" the collateral. The purpose of section 9-110 was to
encourage courts not to be excessively strict in their application of the
"description of the collateral" requirement.
122
Revised Article 9 section 9-502(a) prescribes the form a financing
statement must take: "[A] financing statement is sufficient only if it:
(1) provides the name of the debtor; (2) provides the name of the se-
cured party or a representative of the secured party; and (3) indicates
the collateral covered by the financing statement."" This differs sub-
stantially from former section 9-402(1). Gone is the requirement of
signature by the debtor, as well as the requirements that the statement
give addresses for the debtor and secured party; additionally, the de-
scription of the collateral required is worded differently. There is also
the insertion of an alternative to supplying the name of the secured
party; the name of a representative of the secured party may be pro-
vided instead.'
The deletion of the signature requirement is explained in a com-
ment as facilitating paperless filings."n Although some argue that the
elimination of the requirement would facilitate fraudulent filings, un-
der former Article 9 a person could forge the debtor's signature and
119. Id. at § 9-402(1).
120. Former U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1972).
121. Former U.C.C. § 9-110 (1972).
122. See id. § 9-110 cmt.
123. Revised U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (1999).
124. Id. § 9-502(a)(2).
125. Id. § 9-502, cmt. 3, 2. See John J. Eikenburg, Jr., Filing Provisions of Revised
Article 9, 53 SMU L. REV. 1627, 1641 (2000). (The change "will eliminate the inconve-
nience of obtaining an actual signature from the debtor and the expense of developing
software for a digital signature.")
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file the forged financing statement, for the filing office would have no
way to check the validity of the signature.1 6
The 1999 revision replaces the debtor's-signature requirement
with a debtor's-authorization requirement.'2 Revised section 9-510(a)
provides that "a filed record is effective only to the extent that it was
filed by a person that may file it under section 9-509. '12 Revised sec-
tion 9-509(a) provides that "[a] person may file an initial financing
statement... only if: (1) the debtor authorizes the filing in an authen-
ticated record."129 Subsection (b) of that section provides that a debtor,
"[b]y authenticating or becoming bound ... by a security agreement,.
. authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement.., covering:
(1) the collateral described in the security agreement. '1" °
The deletion of the former requirements that addresses of the
debtor and secured party appear in the financing statement has not
eliminated the requirements from the Article, as a watered-down ver-
sion of them appears in sections 9-516 and 9-520. Revised section 9-
520(a) declares that, "[a] filing office shall refuse to accept a record for
filing for a reason set forth in Section 9-516(b)."'' 1 Revised section 9-
516(b) provides that "[fliling does not occur with respect to a record
that a filing office refuses to accept because [of a variety of defects,
including] (5) in the case of an initial financing statement . . . , the
record does not provide a... mailing address for the secured party of
record; [or] in the case of an initial financing statement..., the record
does not: (A) provide a mailing address for the debtor.', 2 But section
9-520(c) provides that "[a] filed financing statement satisfying Section
9-502(a) ... is effective, even if the filing office is required to refuse to
accept it for filing under subsection (a)." 3 Thus, addresses of the deb-
tor and the secured party (or his representative) ought to appear in a
financing statement, and the filing office has a duty to reject a state-
ment that does not contain these addresses. If the filing office does
refuse, the refusal prevents an effective filing, but if the filing office
fails to perform its duty and accepts the statement for filing, there is an
126. STEVEN 0. WISE, An Introduction to Revised U.C.C. Article 9, IN THE NEW
ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1, 7 (Corinne Cooper ed., 1999)..
127. Revised U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 3 (1999)
128. Id.§ 9-510(a).
129. Id. § 9-509(a).
130. Id. § 9-509(b). There is also a special provision in subsection (c) applicable
only to security interests in agricultural liens.
131. Id. § 9-520(a).
132. Id. § 9-516(b).
133. Revised U.C.C. § 9-520(c) (1999).
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effective filing despite the absence of these addresses. Professors
Summers and White have suggested that eliminating the addresses of
the debtor and secured party from the unconditionally required con-
tents of a financing statement is justified because such information
would not likely be of critical importance to searchers for filings
against particular debtors; given the name of the secured party or his
representative, the searcher would normally be able to find that per-
son's address, and the searcher would probably already have the ad-
dress of the debtor.TM
The change in the wording of the description of the collateral re-
quired in a financing statement was rather puzzling until amendments
were made in the text and comments of the revision after its initial
publication. The comments to revised section 9-502 suggested that no
change in meaning was intended.'35 Comment 2 described the filing
system as one of "notice filing" and its subsequent discussion indicates
that the description of collateral need not be sufficient to enable iden-
tification of particular items of property as collateral as long as the
description given "is sufficient to cover the collateral concerned.',
136
Section 9-504 of revised Article 9, however, dealt specifically with
the meaning of "indicates the collateral covered by the financing
statement,' 37 and provided that "[a] financing statement sufficiently
indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement pro-
vides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108; or
(2) an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all
personal property." '' This was puzzling.
Section 9-108(a) echoes former section 9-110 in providing that, "a
description of personal ... property is sufficient, whether or not it is
specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.' '139 This is fol-
lowed by several new subsections, however, that are clearly addressed
to what sort of description of collateral in a security agreement is ac-
ceptable, and it continues the idea that the description must be ade-
quate to enable identification of the particular item or items of prop-
134. WHITE & SUMMERS 5th, supra note 51, §§ 22-11, 22-12 at 783-787. For a more
thorough exploration of the complexity of rules in revised Article 9 on required con-
tents of financing statements and the duties of filing offices in relation thereto, see
Jean Wegman Bums, New Article 9 of the UC.C.: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 29 (2002) [hereafter Burns].
135. Revised U.C.C. § 9-502, cmt. 2 (1999).
136. Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2.
137. Id. § 9-502(a)(3).
138. Id. § 9-504.
139. Id. § 9-108(a).
UALR LAW REVIEW
erty constituting the collateral.'" Subsection (b) indicates that the de-
scription may take any of several forms, provided that "the identity of
the collateral is objectively determinable."'.'. Furthermore, subsection
(c) declares that, "[a] description of collateral as 'all the debtor's as-
sets' or 'all the debtor's personal property' or using words of similar
import does not reasonably identify the collateral."'4 2  Confusingly,
section 9-504 called for the description of collateral in a financing
statement to either comply with the requirements of section 9-108 for
security agreements or take the form of the extremely broad "super-
generic" descriptions that section 9-108 condemns, and nothing else
would do.43
Fortunately, the problem quickly came to the attention of the
sponsoring organizations and changes were made. In 1999, section 9-
504 was amended by deletion of the word "only" from the section, the
change being accompanied by an explanation that the purpose of the
section was merely to provide safe harbors, without rendering ineffec-
tive any description that would have been effective under former Ar-
ticle 9.'44 In the following year Comment 2 to revised section 9-504 was
amended to provide that
[a] financing statement sufficiently indicates collateral claimed to
be covered by the financing statement if it satisfies the purpose of
conditioning perfection on the filing of a financing statement, i.e., if
it provides notice that a person may have a security interest in the
collateral claimed .... In particular, an indication of collateral that
would have satisfied the requirements of former Section 9-402(1)..
. suffices under Section 9-502(a). An indication may satisfy the re-
quirements of Section 9-502(a), even if it would not have satisfied
the requirements of former Section 9-402(1).
14
1
The reason for changing the wording of the description require-
ment applicable to financing statements may have been that the for-
mer wording was considered too restrictive in requiring either a de-
scription adequate for a security agreement or a description of colla-
teral by type.
140. Id. § 9-108(b)(1)-(6).
141. Revised U.C.C. § 9-504 (1999).
142. Id. § 9-102(c). There are several other more specific provisions applicable to
investment property, commercial tort claims, and consumer transactions.
143. Id. § 9-504.
144. See ABA, THE NEW ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 433 (Corrine
Cooper, ed., ABA, 1999).
145. Revised U.C.C. §9-504 cmt. 2 (2000).
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Turning to another aspect of the form of a financing statement,
former section 9-408 recognized that whether a "lease" was really a
transaction creating a security interest or was a true lease might be
doubtful, and that the lessor might wish to file for safety even though
he considered the transaction a true lease.'" The section therefore
provided that a lessor of goods could file a financing statement using
the terms "lessor" and "lessee," rather than "secured party" and "deb-
tor," and that if it should later be determined that the "lease" was ac-
tually a secured transaction, a filing made in this manner would per-
fect the security interest.14'7 The fact that a filing was made, however,
should not be a factor in classifying the transaction's true character. A
similar problem could arise in connection with a consignment, and
section 9-408 applied the same principle to it, allowing the use of the
terms "consignor" and "consignee.""x In revised Article 9, section 9-
505 follows the lead of former section 9-408, but it expands its cover-
age to include, inter alia, sales of payment intangibles and promissory
notes, allowing the use of the terms "buyer" and "seller," rather than
"secured party" and "debtor."' 49
A buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes may be un-
certain whether a court would hold the transaction to be one intended
to create a security interest rather than a sale, even though the buyer
considers the transaction a sale. If it is a sale, no filing is needed to
perfect the security interest; however, if it is held to be a true secured
transaction, some action is necessary to perfect the security interest;
filing is one method of perfection for notes, although it is the only me-
thod of perfection for payment intangibles. Thus, it may be wise for
the buyer to file for full protection, and section 9-505 permits that to
be done, using the words "seller" and "buyer" to describe the parties
but being assured that if a true secured transaction is found to have
been entered into, the security interest will be perfected but the filing
will not be treated as an admission that the transaction is other than a
sale.
2. Place of Filing
Two aspects must be considered when questioning where the fi-
nancing statement should be filed in order to perfect a security inter-
est in certain collateral: (a) which state's or country's law governs per-
146. Former U.C.C. § 9-408 (1972).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Revised U.C.C. § 9-505 (1999).
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fection of the security interest, and (b) in which office of that state or
country the governing law requires that filing be made.
a. Which jurisdiction's law governs
When a secured transaction has contacts with two or more states
of the United States, or with one or more states of the United States
and a foreign country, a choice may have to be made by the court in
which suit is brought to enforce or challenge the security interest as to
which jurisdiction's law is to be treated as governing the relations of
the parties. Significant multiple contacts may be found, for example,
where the parties to the transaction have their residences or places of
business in different jurisdictions; or because the security agreement
was formed in a jurisdiction other than that of the residence or place
of business of one or both parties; or because the collateral is located
in a jurisdiction different from that in which the security agreement
was made or different from the residence or place of business of one
or both parties.
The method of determining which jurisdiction's law is to be
treated as controlling may vary from one jurisdiction to another.
Moreover, the law of one jurisdiction may be treated as governing
some aspects of the transaction and that of another jurisdiction as the
controlling law for other aspects of it. No attempt will be made here to
explore these choice-of-law questions comprehensively, but if we as-
sume that a court finds that the Article 9 of a particular state's Uni-
form Commercial Code is generally to be treated as the governing law
of the transaction, we should note that Article 9 itself may direct the
court to apply the law of some other jurisdiction to resolve questions
relating to perfection of the security interest involved.
Former section 9-103(5) dealt with security interests in accounts
arising when minerals were extracted from a well or mine and were
sold at the time of extraction. "' The subsection provided that the law
governing "[p]erfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection"
of a security interest in such an account was "the law (including the
conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction wherein the wellhead or
minehead is located."'51 Perfection of security interests in all other ac-
counts was governed by subsection (3) of the same section, and its
basic rule was that the "law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the
150. Former U.C.C. § 9-103(5) (1972).
151. Id.
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jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs the perfection and
the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security interest.
1' 2
As to chattel paper, subsection (4) of former section 9-103 pro-
vided that "[t]he rules stated for goods in subsection (1) apply to a
possessory security interest in chattel paper. The rules stated for ac-
counts in subsection (3) apply to a non-possessory security interest in
chattel paper, but the security interest may not be perfected by notifi-
cation to the account debtor."'53 The basic rule of subsection (1) for
goods was that perfection questions were "governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where the collateral is when the last event occurs on which
is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unper-
fected." 4
Obviously, these rules were quite complex and in some respects
difficult to understand and apply. They have now been superseded by
a complex set of rules-revised section 9-301 through 9-307-that are
quite differently presented and somewhat simpler in operation, at
least where receivables are the collateral. The most general of the
rules appears in revised section 9-301(1): "[W]hile a debtor is located
in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection,
the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security
interest in collateral."1 5 This rule is supplemented by revised section 9-
307, which deals with how to determine the debtor's "location."'56
Subsequent subsections of section 9-301 and sections 9-302 to 9-
306 appear to greatly complicate the choice-of-law problem by setting
152. Id. § 9-103(3)(b). Subsections (3)(c) and (e) also contained special rules for a
case where the debtor was located in a jurisdiction not part of the United States whose
law did not provide for perfection of the security interest by filing or recording in that
jurisdiction, and for a case where a security interest was perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the debtor was located and the debtor's location changed to anoth-
er jurisdiction. Id. § 9-103(3)(c) & (e). Subsection (3)(d) also provided rules for de-
termining the "location" of a debtor. Id. § 9-103(3)(d).
153. Id. § 9-103(4).
154. Id. § 9-103(1)(b). Again, the basic rule was supplemented by some special
ones, for a case where a transaction created a purchase money security interest in
goods that were in one jurisdiction at the time the security interest attached but the
parties understood that the goods would be kept in a different jurisdiction, and for a
case where collateral was brought into and kept in "this state" while subject to a secu-
rity interest perfected under the law of the place from which the goods were removed.
Id. § 9-103(1)(c)-(d).
155. Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1999).
156. Id. § 9-307. The references to "local law" in this and the other rules of revised
Article 9 dealing with choice of law are meant to refer to the substantive law of the
specified jurisdictions, not to their conflict-of-laws [choice-of-law] rules. Id. § 9-301
cmt. 3.
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up different rules of narrower application. Most of these rules will be
largely irrelevant to sales of receivables. Revised sections 9-302
through 9-306 deal with security interests in other types of collateral;'57
they can be ignored, except as the law of "proceeds" may require ref-
erence to them. The same can be said of revised section 9-301(3)(A)
and (B) dealing with perfection of security interests in goods where
fixture filing is employed as a method of perfection or where the colla-
teral is timber to be cut.
5 8
That leaves three special rules to be considered. One appears in
revised section 9-301(4), which provides: "The local law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection,
the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security
interest in as-extracted collateral.' 5 9 Since the definition of "as-
extracted collateral" in revised section 9-201(a)(6) includes "accounts
arising out of the sale at the wellhead or minehead of oil, gas, or other
minerals in which the debtor had an interest before extraction,"' 6 this
rule could apply to a sale of accounts which is within the scope of Ar-
ticle 9. This exception to the general rule is of very narrow scope and
is readily accounted for by the real-property-related character of the
collateral.
Subsection (2) of revised section 9-301 provides that "[w]hile col-
lateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction go-
verns perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the
priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.' 16' Here we
have an echo of the location-of-the-collateral basis for choice of law
which was prominent in former Article 9, but it is another narrowly
limited rule. First, it applies only to collateral which can be "pos-
sessed," tangible or semi-tangible collateral. The only sales of recei-
vables that are within the scope of Article 9 that fall into this class are
promissory notes and tangible chattel paper. Second, the rule applies
to such collateral only if it is in the possession of the secured party. In
addition, choice of the relevant law in cases covered by the rule is like-
ly to be of small importance as the revision of Article 9 becomes gen-
erally adopted throughout the country, for the rules on perfection and
157. Id. §§ 9-302 to 9-306 (agricultural liens, goods covered by certificates of title,
deposit accounts, investment securities, and letter-of-credit rights, respectively).
158. Id. § 9-301(3)(A)-(B).
159. Id. § 9-301(4).
160. Id. § 9-102(a)(6)(B).
161. Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1999).
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the effect of perfection or nonperfection, including the rules of priori-
ty, are likely to be nationally uniform.62
The remaining special rule is in section 9-301(3)(c), which pro-
vides: "[W]hile negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or
tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that
jurisdiction governs ... the effect of perfection or nonperfection and
the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral."' 63
This rule, applicable to promissory notes and tangible chattel paper, if
not carefully read, appears to make subsection (1) a dead letter where
these types of collateral are involved, even if the collateral is not in the
secured party's possession. But what subsection (3)(C) does not say is
that the law governing "perfection" of the security interest is that of
the jurisdiction where the collateral is located. Choice of law as to per-
fection rules for such collateral is governed by subsection (1) of re-
vised section 9-301, and that rule invokes the law of the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located. 64 Again it can be argued that as the re-
vised version of Article 9 becomes enacted on a nation-wide basis, the
rules as to the effect of perfection or nonperfection and as to priorities
are likely to become nationally uniform, so that choice of law as to
such questions will be of little or no importance.' 6'
Because of the likelihood that the rules of law governing perfec-
tion and its effects, including priorities, are likely to become nationally
uniform, Professors Summers and White contend that the "real func-
tion" of the choice-of-law rules of the Article "is to answer a single
question: where to file. ' ' Most of the rules, if they are identical in all
jurisdictions, will work the same way regardless of which jurisdiction's
law is applied. One type of rule will not, however. Each enacting juris-
diction's local law as to where a filing should be made in order to per-
fect a security interest will call for filing in one or another office in that
jurisdiction. Therefore, there will continue to be a need to select the
state or other jurisdiction whose law governs where to file, and the
answer will be, in most instances, the jurisdiction where the debtor is
located.67
It should be noted also that if the debtor's location changes to
another jurisdiction, the law of the new jurisdiction will govern perfec-
tion, and filing in that jurisdiction will probably be required in order to
162. Id. § 9-301, cmt. 5(a); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 51, § 22-15, at 801-802.
163. Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(3)(c)(1999).
164. Id. § 9-301 (1).
165. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 51, § 22-15, at 802.
166. Id. § 22-15, at 799.
167. Id.
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continue the perfection achieved in the first jurisdiction. Section 9-
316(a) of revised Article 9 will usually have the effect of continuing for
a limited time perfection achieved in the place of the debtor's former
location, but another filing, in the new jurisdiction, will usually be
called for within four months after the change of location occurs.
Thus, the secured party, having filed in the state of the debtor's cur-
rent location, needs to keep track of any changes in that location.
b. Where filing is proper
Under the former version of Article 9 there were three sets of
rules in section 9-401(1) governing the place to file a financing state-
ment, and any legislature enacting the Code as the law of its state was
invited to choose the option it preferred. 69 Under the first option,
most accounts collateral filings were made in a central state office,
typically the office of the Secretary of State.7° The only exception was
for accounts arising from sales of minerals at the wellhead or mine-
head, as to which filing was to be made in the office where a mortgage
on the real estate where the wellhead or minehead was located would
be filed or recorded. Under the second option, filing of accounts was
to be: (a) in the case of accounts arising from or related to the sale of
farm products by a farmer, in a designated office of the county of the
debtor's residence or, if the debtor did not reside in the state, in the
county where the farm products were kept; (b) in the case of accounts
arising from sales of minerals at the wellhead or minehead, in the of-
fice where a mortgage on the wellhead or minehead land was located
would be filed or recorded; and (c) in all other cases of filing as to ac-
counts, in a central state office.'71 Under the third option, the rules as
to accounts arising from sales of farm products by farmers and ac-
counts arising from sales of minerals at the wellhead or minehead
were the same as under the second option.' As to all other accounts,
filing was to be made in a central state office, and if the debtor had a
place of business in only one county of the state, in an office in that
county, or if the debtor had no place of business in the state but it was
a resident of that state, then in an office of the county of the debtor's
residence.' With regard to chattel paper filings, filings were to be
168. Revised U.C.C. § 9-316(a)(2) (1999).
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made in a central state office under all three options and, under the
third option, also in the county offices where filings as to accounts
would be made under the catch-all rule of that alternative. Subsection
(5) of former section 9-401 provided a special rule for filings as to col-
lateral of transmitting utilities."' All such filings were to be made in a
central state office, even if subsection (1) would call for local filing.'75
Former section 9-401(2) provided that "[a] filing which is made in
good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places required by
this section is nevertheless ... effective with regard to collateral cov-
ered by the financing statement against any person who has know-
ledge of the contents of such financing statement.'
7 6
The 1999 revision of Article 9 simplifies the place-of-filing rules,
as there are no alternative versions of the rules." With respect to ac-
counts arising from sales of minerals at the wellhead or minehead,
revised section 9-501(a) follows the lead of the earlier version by re-
quiring filing in the office where a mortgage on the related real estate
would be filed or recorded.' In all other cases of filing as to accounts
and all filings as to chattel paper and other types of collateral, section
9-501(a) calls for filing to be made in a central state office.'79
The provision in former Article 9 that a good faith filing made in
the wrong place or not in all places called for by section 9-401 was
nevertheless effective against a person who had knowledge of the con-
tents of the financing statement was not carried over into the 1999
version of the Article because it was deemed unecessary.'O It seems
likely that the rule was considered unwise, rather than unnecessary, as
it was inconsistent with the race-to-the-filing-office rule' for deter-
mining priority between perfected security interests because this rule,
under a party's knowledge or ignorance of a rival claim, is irrelevant."
174. Id. § 9-401(5). "Transmitting utility" was defined in former U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(n) (1995).
175. Former U.C.C. § 9-401(5) (1972).
176. Id. § 9-401(2).
177. Revised U.C.C. § 9-501 (2000).
178. Id. § 9-501(a)(1).
179. Id. § 9-501(a)(2). "Transmitting utility" is defined in revised § 9-102(a)(80) in
somewhat broader terms than it was in the prior version of Article 9. Compare re-
vised U.C.C. 9-102(a)(8) (2000) with former U.C.C. 9-105(1)(n) (1995). With respect
to property of a transmitting utility, subsection (b) of section 9-501, like its predeces-
sor, calls for central filing for all security interests in all property of such a utility. Id. §
9-501 (2000).
180. See revised U.C.C. § 9-501(1999).
181. See infra Part IV.
182. See also Burns, supra note 134, at 40 (Asserting that former § 9-401(2)
"caused nothing but trouble as courts tried to determine how much knowledge trig-
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c. Duration of effectiveness of filing
Under both versions of Article 9, a filing remains effective, as a
general rule, for five years;'8 however, a filing as to collateral of a
transmitting utility is effective until a "termination statement" is
filed."4 Filings other than those of transmitting utilities can also be
terminated at any time by the secured party's filing of a termination
statement, and the secured party can be required by the debtor to do
so when the secured obligation has beenis discharged." On the other
hand, the effectiveness of a filing can be extended for additional pe-
riods of five years each by the filing of a "continuation statement" by
the secured party within six months before any prior period's expira-
tion.'"
Former section 9-404(1) contained a general rule that the secured
party was to send the debtor a termination statement "whenever there
[was] no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to make
advances ... or otherwise give value," if the debtor made demand for
such a statement.187 Taken literally this rule, when applied to most ac-
counts and chattel paper sales filing would have permitted the seller to
demand a termination statement as soon as a financing statement was
filed because there would be neither a secured obligation nor any
commitment to give future value.' 88 Under revised section 9-513(c), a
termination statement is required after the debtor's demand regarding
financing statements covering sold accounts or chattel paper only
when the obligations represented by the accounts or chattel paper
have been discharged by the persons obligated on them, or if the deb-
tor did not authorize the filing of the financing statement.'89
There are numerous additional rules relating to the filing system
and its operation in both versions of Article 9 that will not be re-
viewed here. The purpose of this summary was simply to provide an
introduction to the system.
gered it, when knowledge was relevant, and whether the section might apply to financ-
ing statements filed in the wrong state. With the elimination of this section, not only
do these issues disappear, but also diligent creditors who do their searches are now
not penalized.").
183. Former U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1972); revised § 9-515(a) (1999).
184. Former U.C.C. § 9-403(6) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-515(f) (1999).
185. Former U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-513 (1999).
186. Former U.C.C. § 9-403(3) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-515(d)-(e) (1999).
187. Former U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1972).
188. See revised U.C.C. § 9-513, cmt. 4 (2000).
189. Id. § 9-513(c)(2) & (4).
[Vol. 31
2008] SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9 37
IV. PRIORITIES
In dealing with the rules on priorities, Article 9 treats the buyer's
interest in a receivable whose sale is within the scope of the Article as
a "security interest."' Hence priority rules applicable to security in-
terests apply to the interest of such a buyer unless an exception is
made for such an interest. Priority contests may develop where the
seller has undertaken to grant a security interest in the same recei-
vables to another person or otherwise to transfer a property interest in
them to another person, or where a creditor of the seller asserts a
claim to them to enforce his contract rights against the seller.
A. Priorities Where a Buyer's Security Interest is Unperfected
An unperfected but attached security interest is not worthless.
Former section 9-201 laid down a general rule that "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according
to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors."1 91 Revised section 9-201(a) contains the same
rule in nearly identical terms."9
The term "purchaser" is a very broad one. Section 1-201(32), as it
stood in 1998, defined "purchase" as including "taking by sale, dis-
count, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or any
other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. '93 There-
fore, it is assumed that an attached security interest is good against the
debtor and third parties unless an exception is found in other text of
the Code. Former section 9-301(1) stated a number of exceptions ap-
plicable to unperfected security interests.1 94
First, an "unperfected security interest [was] subordinate to the
rights of (a) persons entitled to priority under section 9-312."' 9' Section
9-312 dealt with priorities among conflicting security interests in the
same collateral, and it gave priority to some perfected security inter-
ests over previously perfected security interests in the collateral.1 96 The
rule of 9-301(1)(a) thus made an unperfected security interest subor-
190. Id. § 9-109.
191. Former U.C.C. § 9-207 (1972).
192. Revised U.C.C. § 9-201 (2000).
193. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1994). Section 1-201 was revised in 2001 and the definition of
"purchase" now appears in subsection (b)(29) but its substance is the same.
194. Former U.C.C. § 9-301 (1994).
195. Id. § 9-301(1)(a).
196. Id. § 9-312.
UALR LAW REVIEW
dinate to the rights of another secured party who would have priority
even if the security interest was perfected. Furthermore, section 9-312
incorporated by reference rules of other UCC sections which enabled
some purchasers of interests in collateral to gain priority over pre-
viously perfected security interests.1" The section also provided that,
as between unperfected security interests, the first to attach had prior-
ity.
198
Second, an unperfected security interest was made subordinate to
the rights of "(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the se-
curity interest is perfected."' 19 The term "lien creditor" was defined in
subsection (3) of section 9-301 as "a creditor who has acquired a lien
on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like," i.e., through
a judicial proceeding. 2°° However, the definition went on to provide
that the term included "an assignee for benefit of creditors from the
time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the
filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appoint-
ment., 201 The greatest impact of this priority rule was that an unper-
fected security interest could not stand against the claim of the deb-
tor's trustee in bankruptcy.
2 1
As applied to a case where the unperfected security interest was
the interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, this rule meant
that sold property, in which the seller no longer had a property inter-
est, was treated as still reachable by the seller's creditors to satisfy
their claims against him, provided that they could obtain judicial liens
on the property before the buyer perfected his "security interest," and
the seller's trustee in bankruptcy had the same power. This is a signifi-
cant practical consequence of bringing some sales of personal property
within the coverage of Article 9.
Subsection (2) of former section 9-301 qualified the rule of sub-
section (1)(b) by providing that "[i]f the secured party files with re-
spect to a purchase money security interest before or within ten days
after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority
over the rights ... of a lien creditor which arise between the time the
197. Former U.C.C. § 9-312(1) (1972).
198. Id. § 9-312(5)(b).
199. Id. § 9-301(1)(b).
200. Id. § 9-301(3).
201. Id.
202. See WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25, § 23-3, following note 3. The ex-
press inclusion of a trustee in bankruptcy in the definition of Alien creditor" in Article
9 was made merely for emphasis, as the Bankruptcy Code itself gave the trustee that
status. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
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security interest attaches and the time of filing."203 "Purchase money
security interest" was defined in former section 9-107 as a security
interest "to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of
the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person
who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to en-
able the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if such
value is in fact so used."2' This special rule was inapplicable to sales of
intangibles, as the buyer was the "secured party" in such a case,0' and
the buyer's interest could not fit the definition of "purchase money
security interest. ''2 6 Moreover, that term was arguably a concept pecu-
liar to sales of goods-tangible personal property2W-and the article's
focus here is on sales of intangibles and semi-tangibles.
What would be the status of a lien creditor who acquired a lien on
a receivable before a sale within the scope of Article 9 occurred? That
lien should have had priority over the buyer's security interest, wheth-
er the security interest was perfected. The rule of former section 9-
301(1)(b) could be applied to reach that result because the lien would
have been acquired before the security interest was perfected.2 8 The
more basic reason for the lien creditor's priority, however, was that
the property was already subject to the lien when it was sold, and the
seller could not transfer a better interest to the receivable than the
seller had.209 That is the general principle of property law, and al-
though former Article 9 made some exceptions to this general rule,
210
none were applicable here.
A third exception to the general rule of invulnerability of security
interests, applicable where the security interest was unperfected, was
that "in the case of ... chattel paper, a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary
course of business... [has priority] to the extent that he gives value
203. Former U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1994).
204. Former U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972).
205. Former U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (1995).
206. See Former U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972).
207. That the concept was limited to sales of goods was, at best, implied in former
Article 9. A comment to § 9-107 (cmt. 1, 2) seemed to assume that it was so limited.
But see BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 3.09[2][b] (rev. ed., A. S. Pratt & Sons
2002).
208. Former U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1994).
209. See revised U.C.C. § 9-203, cmt. 6 (2000).
210. Id. For example, as will be shown below, after the sale the seller would have
the power to transfer a security interest to a third person, despite the fact that he no
longer had a property interest in it.
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and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the secu-
rity interest and before it is perfected., 21' This provision gave priority
to some transferees to whom the seller undertook to sell interests in
chattel paper that had already been sold. What sort of transferees it
referred to is a bit difficult to understand. A comment explained that
the purpose of this and the subsequent paragraph of section 9-301(1)
was to protect from unperfected security interests innocent purchasers
for value who would be subordinated to perfected security interests
21 1
This rule would not likely trouble a "secured party" who was a
buyer of chattel paper, if such buyer had acquired possession of the
paper, for a subsequent purchaser would probably be unable to satisfy
the stated conditions for priority. Even if the buyer/secured party did
not have possession, this priority rule did not apply if the second pur-
chaser was a buyer also, for Article 9 would treat the second buyer's
interest as a security interest and this rule did not apply to a purchaser
who acquired a security interest in the chattel paper. If the second
purchaser was a "secured party," the applicable priority rules would
be those of section 9-312, and the first buyer would prevail if both se-
curity interests were unperfected. The second buyer, however, would
probably have priority if the security interest of that buyer was per-
fected. Only a buyer whose purchase would not be treated as a se-
cured transaction could use this rule to acquire priority over the prior
buyer. For example, a buyer whose purchase was excluded from the
scope of the Article by section 9-104 could use this rule.213
An implication in this rule applied to buyers of chattel paper
whom Article 9 treated as secured parties. The implication was that,
although such a buyer had acquired title to the paper, and the seller
might have lost all property rights in the paper, as long as the buyer's
security interest remained unperfected the seller still had power to
transfer property interests in the paper to third-party purchasers, just
as would be the case if the seller had merely transferred a security in-
terest in the paper to the first purchaser and had remained the owner
of the paper. The same observation could be made with respect to the
next priority rule to be discussed.
211. Former U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1994). The quotation has been trimmed to elim-
inate language not pertinent to sales of receivables.
212. Former U.C.C. § 9-301, cmt. 4, 1 (1972). The description of the type of
purchaser protected by the rule had been drawn to exclude purchasers of security
interests, who were covered by the first rule discussed above, and also to exclude pur-
chasers who could gain priority over perfected security interests under other sections
of Article 9.
213. See supra note 26.
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The fourth special rule of former Section 9-301(1) applied to cas-
es involving accounts and general intangibles.2 1 4 It gave priority over a
security interest to "a person who is not a secured party and who is a
transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected."2 '5 This rule speaks of
"transferees" rather than "buyers," but it would surely include buyers.
The only significant difference between it and the third rule seems to
be that there is no requirement in this rule that the transferee acquire
delivery of the property before the security interest is perfected. The
reason for its omission is obviously that pure intangibles cannot be
"delivered" in any realistic sense."6 Since transferees who are secured
parties were excluded from the scope of this rule, the only sort of
second buyer who could take advantage of it would be one whose pur-
chase was not treated as a secured transaction under Article 9 because
of the exclusions of section 9-104.17
In light of these exceptions from the general rule of invulnerabili-
ty of attached security interests, the general rule remained that a buy-
er of accounts or chattel paper had superior rights if the subsequent
buyer had not perfected his security interest. 8 Such parties included:
(1) the debtor (the seller of the property); (2) unsecured creditors of
the debtor; (3) a holder of an unperfected security interest in the same
collateral if that person's security interest attached later than that of
the buyer; (4) a buyer of chattel paper (other than a secured party or a
buyer in ordinary course of business) who did not both give value and
receive delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the original
buyer's interest; and (5) a buyer of accounts (other than a secured par-
ty) who did not give value without knowledge of the original buyer's
interest.
In revised Article 9, the counterpart of former section 9-301 is
section 9-317. Its rules are similar to those of section 9-301, but not
identical. First, "[a] security interest.., is subordinate to the rights of.
. a person entitled to priority under [s]ection 9-322. ",219 Revised sec-
tion 9-322 deals with priorities between conflicting security interests in
the same collateral.2 Like former section 9-312, revised section 9-322
gives some perfected security interests priority over earlier-perfected
214. Former U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d)(1994).
215. Id.
216. See former U.C.C. § 9-301, cmt. 4.
217. See supra note 25.
218. Former § 9-207 (1994).
219. Revised U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(1) (2000).
220. See id. § 9-322.
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security interests,22 1 and it also contains a rule that as between unper-
fected security interests, the earlier to attach has priority. M The sec-
tion also makes explicit what may have been implied in section 9-312,
that a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected
one.' Section 9-317 simply adopts the rules of section 9-322 for de-
termining priorities between conflicting security interests."'
Second, a security interest is subordinate to the rights of, "except
as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a person that becomes a lien
creditor before the earlier of the time: (A) the security interest ... is
perfected; or (B) one of the conditions specified in [s]ection 9-
203(b)(3) is met and a financing statement covering the collateral is
filed."2  Section 9-203(b)(3)(B) requires that a security agreement be
made and the formality requirement for an attached security interest
be satisfied.226 To rephrase the rule as it would apply to sales of recei-
vables, a buyer's security interest is subordinate to the rights of a per-
son who becomes a lien creditor as to the collateral, unless the security
interest has already been perfected, or unless the buyer has made a
proper filing and (i) the seller has signed a security agreement cover-
ing the collateral, or (ii) in the case of tangible chattel paper, the se-
cured party took possession of it pursuant to a security agreement, or
(iii) in the case of electronic chattel paper the secured party has taken
control of the paper pursuant to a security agreement (the "security
agreement" in each of these cases being the agreement of sale).2' The
"except" clause of the rule prescribes a special priority rule for pur-
chase-money security interests, however, this rule is irrelevant to secu-
rity interests of buyers of receivables because, under revised Article 9,
the definition of "purchase-money security interest" in section 9-103
221. Id. § 9-322.
222. Id. § 9-322(a)(3).
223. Id. § 9-322(a)(3).
224. Id. § 9-317(a)(1).
225. Revised U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2000). The quotation is of the text of the rule as
it was amended in 2000. Prior to the amendment, the section gave priority to a person
who became a lien creditor before the earlier of the time the security interest was
perfected or the time a financing statement covering the collateral was filed.
226. Id. § 9-203(b)(3).
227. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) defines "security agreement" as its predecessor
did-"An agreement that creates or provides for a security interest"-and a comment
to the section underscores the point that it does not matter what the parties call their
agreement; if the interest transferred fits the definition of "security interest," the
agreement "creates" a security interest and is a "security agreement." See revised
U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 3(b) (2000).
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restricts it to interests in "goods" collateral and software closely asso-
ciated with electronic goods.2
The chief significance of the departure from the wording of the
corresponding rule in former section 9-301 is that the holder of an un-
perfected security interest can now gain priority over a lien creditor,
even though the security interest had not attached to the collateral
when the lien arose, because the secured party had not yet given val-
ue; even if he had made a security agreement, satisfied the formality
requirement for an attached security interest, and filed as to the colla-
teral. This is a notable change in the law. The explanation for this
change given in the comments is that the former version of Article 9
treated a secured party's first advance differently than subsequent
advances to the same debtor on the security of the same collateral.29
The revision corrects this discrepancy."
This comment points out that under former section 9-301(4), a
person with a perfected security interest who made advances to the
debtor could gain priority as to those advances over a person who be-
came a lien creditor after the security interest was perfected but be-
fore the advances were made, provided that the secured party made
the advances within forty-five days after the creditor acquired his lien
or the advances were made without knowledge of the lien or pursuant
to a commitment made without knowledge of the lien. 3' If the security
interest had not been perfected when the creditor acquired his lien,
however, because the secured party had not yet made any advance
and the security interest had not yet attached, the lien creditor would
have priority under former section 9-301(1)(b) over the security inter-
est insofar as the secured party's first advance was concerned (because
the security interest would not be perfected until that advance was
made), although the secured party could be protected under former
section 9-301(4) as to future advances.232
In revised Article 9, section 9-317(a)(2)(B) gives the secured par-
ty priority over a person who becomes a lien creditor before the secu-
rity interest is perfected if the secured transaction then has advanced
to the point where a security agreement is made and formalized in a
manner permitted by the rules on attachment and there was a proper
228. Revised U.C.C. § 9-103 (2000).
229. See id. § 9-317 cmt. 4.
230. Id. § 9-317 cmt. 4.
231. Id. (citing former U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1994).)
232. Id.
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filing.23 Thus the secured party is protected as to the first advance to
the same extent as with regard to future advances. T3
It would seem unlikely that buyers of receivables treated as se-
cured parties would make future advances on the security of the recei-
vables they bought. If such a buyer satisfied the requirements of sec-
tion 9-317(a)(2)(B), the buyer would have a perfected security interest
because the only thing left for the attachment of the security interest
and perfection would be assigning value, the debtor's having rights in
the collateral, and a sale.2 35 The new rule is thus not likely to improve
the status of a buyer of receivables.
The third rule of revised section 9-317 corresponds to former sec-
tion 9-301(1): "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buy-
er, other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper ... takes free
of a security interest ... if the buyer gives value and receives delivery
of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest ... and
before it is perfected." 6 (The rule also refers to buyers of "instru-
ments" and a promissory note is an "instrument.",37A sale of a promis-
sory note produces a security interest that is perfected automatically
as soon as it attaches,23 however, this priority rule could not apply to
the interest of a buyer of a promissory note.) Subsection (e), referred
to in this rule, gives special priority to a holder of a purchase-money
security interest. The rule is irrelevant to security interests in recei-
vables because under revised Article 9, purchase-money security in-
terests can exist only in "goods" collateral and software closely asso-
ciated with the goods.239
This rule is very similar to that of former section 9-301(1)(c) and
it involves the same distinction. A buyer of chattel paper is treated as
a secured party if the sale is within the scope of Article 9, and the
priority rule does not apply if the second buyer is a secured party. '
The rule would operate against an earlier buyer of tangible chattel
paper only if the sale to the second buyer is not one that Article 9
treats as a secured transaction.2 4'
233. Revised U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(B) (2000).
234. Id. § 9-317 cmt. 4. The sale, by definition is the transfer of title for a price.
The subject of future advances will be more fully discussed later in this article.
235. Id.
236. Id. § 9-317(b). The omissions have been made to focus the application of the
rule on sales of receivables.
237. Revised U.C.C. § 3-103 (1999).
238. Revised U.C.C. § 9-309(4) (2000).
239. Id. § 9-103.
240. See supra note 217.
241. See supra note 217.
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The fourth rule of section 9-317 traceable to former section 9-
301(1) is that "[a] . .. buyer, other than a secured party, of accounts
[or] electronic chattel paper... takes free of a security interest if the.
. .buyer gives value without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected. 2 2 This rule is very much like that of former sec-
tion 9-301(1)(d), except that the revised rule is expanded to include
sales of electronic chattel paper and its explicit application to "buy-
ers," rather than "transferees." The same observation made above
with respect to subsection (b) of revised section 9-317 applies here:
most buyers of receivables would not be able to use this rule to ac-
quire priority over a prior security interest.2 3
Under the revision of Article 9, an unperfected security interest,
though quite vulnerable to third party claims, is not worthless. The list
of persons against whom the unperfected security interest is enforcea-
ble would be much the same as that offered above under former Ar-
ticle 9,2" with the addition of a lien creditor who acquires the lien after
the secured party has filed with respect to the collateral and made a
security agreement satisfying the requirements for attachment.
245
B. Priorities When a Buyer's Security Interest is Perfected
The holder of a perfected security interest is considerably better
protected against third-party claims than an unperfected holder, but
generalizations are difficult to make as to all forms of collateral in all
circumstances.2 6 Perhaps the best approach to the law on this subject
is to deal separately with the several types of receivables, the sales of
which are treated as secured transactions by Article 9.
1. Accounts
Assume that a buyer of accounts has received assignment of them
from the original obligee of the accounts, who is still the owner of
them at the time of the sale, and that the buyer has made a proper
filing of a financing statement covering the accounts, so that the buyer
242. Revised U.C.C. § 9-317(d) (2000).
243. Revised U.C.C. § 9-317 goes beyond the scope of former § 9-301 in laying
down some priority rules for lessees of goods and licensees of general intangibles, but
as they are irrelevant to the topic of this paper, they will not be discussed.
244. See supra note 217.
245. See supra notes 225-234.
246. The closest valid generalization is that the interest of a person becoming a lien
creditor after a security interest was perfected is subordinate to the interest of the
secured party, however, even that proposition has an exception. See infra Part VI.
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has acquired a perfected security interest. What priorities has the buy-
er acquired?
a. Conflicting security interests
After the sale has occurred, there is a possibility that the seller
will undertake to transfer the same accounts to someone else, either as
security for an obligation or as a sale within the scope of Article 9.
(Former Article 9's treatment of the original sale as a secured transac-
tion implied that the seller had a power to do that in some circums-
tances. It must have also meant that the subsequent transferee could
acquire a security interest despite the seller's lack of rights in the colla-
teral, i.e., that the seller's power to transfer rights in the collateral was
the equivalent of having a property interest in the collateral, for pur-
poses of satisfying the requirement for attachment that the debtor
have "rights in the collateral.") 247 A contest might then develop be-
tween the first transferee and the second, posing the question as to
which of them has the better claim to the collateral, which are the ac-
counts.
Section 9-312 of former Article 9 was applicable. It laid down a
general rule, in subsection (5)(a), that,
[c]onflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of
filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first
made covering the collateral or the time the security interest is first
perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there is no period
thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.m
This rule rewarded the early filer. If a person anticipated either
making a loan on the security of another's accounts or becoming a
buyer of such accounts, the prospective secured party could file in ad-
vance of the actual loan or sale, and thereby be assured of priority
over any rival secured party who later filed and perfected, regardless
of when his own security interest attached and became perfected.249
Moreover, knowledge or lack of knowledge of the other party's inter-
est in the collateral at the time of filing or perfection was immaterial."'
A comment explained that "[t]he justification for the rule lies in
the necessity of protecting the filing system-that is, of allowing the
secured party who has first filed to make subsequent advances without
247. See former I 9-203(1)(c).
248. Former U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1994).
249. See id. § 9-312 cmt. 5, ex. 1.
250. See id. § 9-312 cmt. 5, ex. 2.
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each time having, as a condition of protection, to check for filings later
than his."2" As for the losing party, that person could have learned of
a possible prior claim by the other party by searching the records for
filings against the debtor with respect to accounts collateral." 2
There was a type of assignment of accounts within the scope of
former Article 9 that was exempt from the requirement of filing for
perfection: "an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in con-
junction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a signifi-
cant part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor." 3 Security in-
terests arising from such assignments were automatically perfected. 4
Professor Gilmore, in his treatise on the original version of Article 9,
commented on this exemption from the filing requirement and de-
scribed it as "more a line of defense in litigation or bankruptcy pro-
ceedings than a guide to prospective action," since no assignee could
know, at the time an assignment was made, that it would qualify for
exemption from filing."5 Therefore, "all right-minded assignees will
file." 6 The rule served to protect assignees who had both insignificant
assignments and were ignorant of the risk they took in not filing. 7 But
if there was a case within the rule, what priority rule would apply to it?
A comment to Section 9-302 explained the exemption from filing as
designed "to save from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated
assignments," which suggests that the security interest was to have
priority over all subsequent assignments." The applicable priority rule
appeared to be the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-312(5), and
since the assignee's security interest was perfected a soon as it arose,
the assignee would be likely to prevail against any subsequent security
interest as the first to perfect. Still, there was a possibility that a sub-
sequent assignee could take priority by reason of having filed before
the first assignment occurred.
In revised Article 9, the rules governing priorities between con-
flicting security interests, as they apply to accounts collateral, follow
251. Id. § 9-312 cmt. 5.
252. See WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25, § 24-4.
253. Former U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e). See text supra notes 70 & 81. Another exemp-
tion from filing was for assignments for the benefit of creditors "because they are not
financing transactions and the debtor will not ordinarily be engaging in further credit
transactions." Former U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5 (1994).
254. See supra note 81.
255. Gilmore, supra note 3 at vol. 1, § 19.6.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, § 11.9, at n. 26 (2d ed. Little, Brown
1990).
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much the same pattern of those of the earlier version, but there are
some differences. First, it should be noted that the revision spells out
what was only implied by former Article 9, that although a person who
has made a sale of a receivable will have given up title to it, and thus
probably have no remaining interest in the receivable, if the sale is
within the scope of Article 9 the seller is treated by the UCC as if title
had not passed, for purposes of determining rights of creditors of and
purchasers from the seller against the buyer, although the new provi-
sion terminates that power when the buyer's security interest becomes
perfected, and it limits its application to purchasers who purchase for
value. Revised section 9-318 provides:
(a) [Seller retains no interest.] A debtor that has sold an account,
chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not re-
tain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold. (b) [Deemed
rights of debtor if buyer's security interest unperfected.] For pur-
poses of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for
value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an
account or chattel paper, while the buyer's interest is unperfected,
the debtor is deemed to have rights and title to the account or chat-
tel paper identical to those the buyer sold.2s
For contests between a buyer of receivables and another secured
party, these rules of priority are laid down by Section 9-322(a), which
provides that:
(1) [c]onflicting perfected security interests ... rank according to
priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earli-
er of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the se-
curity interest ... is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter
when there is neither filing nor perfection; (2) A perfected security
interest . . . has priority over a conflicting unperfected security in-
terest... ; (3) The first security interest... to attach or become ef-
fective has priority if conflicting security interests are unper-
fected.26
259. Revised U.C.C. § 9-318 (2000). Professors Summers and White have ex-
pressed doubt that the proposition stated in this section (that although the seller has
power to transfer interests in the collateral after the sale, as long as the buyer's securi-
ty interest remains unperfected, the seller retains no property interest in the sold re-
ceivable) will be accepted in bankruptcy cases. See WHITE & SUMMERS 5th, supra note
51 at § 21-6, note 2.
260. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322(a). These rules also applied to "agricultural liens."
Those references have been deleted as not pertinent to the subject of this article.
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Although these rules are quite similar to those of former section
9-312(5)(a), the principal differences are the addition of an express
provision giving a perfected security interest priority over an unper-
fected one261' and the express limitation of the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule to contests between holders of perfected security interests.
The interaction of these rules of the revision is interesting. If a
buyer of accounts perfected his security interest by filing, under the
1998 revision of the Article, no one to whom the seller subsequently
attempts to sell the same accounts or grant a security interest in them
can gain priority over the original buyer. Under revised section 9-
318(b), once the original buyer's security interest is perfected, the sel-
ler no longer has any power to transfer interests to third persons in the
sold accounts. That would be so even though the subsequent transfe-
ree was the first to file, because the first-to-file-or-perfect rule applies
only where a conflict between perfected security interests exists. If the
seller had no power to transfer an interest in the accounts, then no
subsequent transferee from the seller could acquire an attached secu-
rity interest which could be perfected.262 Thus the first-to-file-or-
perfect rule could apply to a contest between a buyer of accounts and
a subsequent purchaser from the seller of an interest in the accounts
only where the original buyer's security interest was unperfected at
the time of the subsequent purchase and both were later perfected. If
one was perfected and the other not, the perfected security interest
would have priority. If both were unperfected, the original buyer
would prevail.
What if, at the time a sale of accounts is made, the seller has al-
ready sold them or granted a security interest in them to another per-
son? The same rules apply. In the case of a prior sale, if the first buyer
had perfected the security interest that arose from the sale before the
second sale was made, the second buyer would acquire no interest in
the accounts by operation of the rule of revised Section 9-318(b). 63
Otherwise, the priority rules of revised Section 9-322(a) would apply.
If both interests were perfected, the first-to-file-or-perfect rule would
determine priority. If one was perfected and the other not, the per-
261. See supra note 223. Cf. Edwin E. Smith, Overview of Revised Article 9, 73 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 1, 24 (1999) (calling the rule one "implicit under [former] Article 9").
262. Recall that attachment requires that the "debtor" have "rights in the collater-
al or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party" (revised U.C.C. §
9-203(b)(2)) and that attachment is a condition of perfection (revised U.C.C. § 9-
308(a)).
263. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (1999).
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fected interest would prevail. And if both were unperfected, the earli-
er transferee would take priority over the later one.
Revised section 9-309(2) continues the rule that an assignment of
accounts which does not alone, or in conjunction with other assign-
ments to the same assignee, transfer a significant part of the transfe-
ror's outstanding accounts is automatically perfected, and filing is un-
necessary. 4 Because the buyer's security interest is automatically per-
fected when the assignment occurs, the seller who made the sale
would thereafter have no power to transfer an interest in the assigned
accounts to anyone else because of the rule of revised section 9-
318(b).2 65 A contest could develop only between a buyer of an interest
of the sort described in section 9-309(2) and a person to whom the
seller had previously sold the account or granted a security interest in
it. If the prior transfer was a sale and the earlier buyer had perfected
his security interest by the time of the second sale, the second buyer
would acquire no interest in the accounts. Otherwise, the applicable
rule would be either the rule that a perfected security interest takes
priority over an unperfected one or the first-to-file-or-perfect rule.
b. Contests with other third parties
Subject to possible qualification where proceeds are involved, a
subject to be addressed later, and in the situation discussed under part
c. below, no rule in either version of Article 9 gives any third party,
other than a rival secured party, priority over the holder of a perfected
security interest in accounts. Hence, if such a secured party has per-
fected the security interest before a lien creditor of the debtor ac-
quires the lien, and before the debtor undertakes to transfer a non-
security property interest in the accounts to a third person, he will be
immune from all such third-party challenges, insofar as Article 9 of the
UCC is concerned.
c. Interrelation between priority rules and rules as to effec-
tiveness of filing
There is an interesting interplay between the rules of revised Ar-
ticle 9 regarding the duration of effectiveness of filing and those apply-
ing to contests between buyers of receivables and creditors or pur-
chasers from the seller. Recall that revised section 9-318 provides that,
264. See also revised U.C.C. § 9-310(b)(2) (2000).
265. See id. § 9-318(b).
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although the seller of a receivable retains no interest in property sold,
for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of or purchasers of
interests in the property from the seller, "while the buyer's security
interest is unperfected" the seller is to be treated as having the rights
in and title to the property that the seller had before the sale.' 6 Sup-
pose the buyer of an account has perfected the security interest in the
account by filing a financing statement but fails to file a continuation
statement in time to continue the effectiveness of the filing beyond the
initial five-year period. Suppose, also, that shortly prior to the loss of
effectiveness of the filing (1) a creditor of the seller acquired a judicial
lien on the account and (2) the seller sold the same account to another
buyer, who immediately filed a financing statement covering the ac-
count.
At the time of the creditor's levy and the second sale of the ac-
count, the original buyer still had a perfected security interest in the
account by reason of the original filing, and neither the levying credi-
tor nor the second buyer would have priority over the original buyer
because, under section 9-318, the seller would not be treated as having
any rights in the account when the original buyer's security interest
was perfected.267 But what would happen when the effectiveness of the
original buyer's filing lapsed? Revised section 9-515(c) provides that
upon lapse the security interest becomes unperfected, and "[i]f the
security interest ...becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed
never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral
for value." ' How would that affect the relations between the original
buyer of the account and (1) the lien creditor and (2) the second buy-
er?
As far as the lien creditor is concerned, although the original
buyer's security interest is now unperfected, the creditor's status is not
improved, for the rule of section 9-515(c) does not treat the loss of
perfection as retroactive to the time of the creditor's levy. Only a cred-
itor acquiring a lien on the account after the buyer's security interest
became unperfected could prevail against the buyer. 9
266. Revised U.C.C. §9-318(b) (1999).
267. Id. § 9-318.
268. Id. § 9-515(c).
269. See Harry C. Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9:
The Rules of the Game Under New Part 5, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 861, 888--89 (1999).
The author suggests that a creditor who levied before the buyer's security interest
became unperfected might prevail if local law treated a judicial lien as a "continuing
levy, i.e., treated as a fresh levy each day." Id. at 889.
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A second buyer from the seller purchasing before the first buyer's
filing lapsed would fare better, because the loss of perfection suffered
by the first buyer when the filing lapsed would be treated as retroac-
tive in favor of a purchaser for value from the seller under section 9-
515(c). 270 The first buyer's security interest would be treated as if it had
been unperfected at the time of the second sale, and the seller would
thus be treated as having power to transfer title at the time of the
second sale. The second buyer would then be treated as having priori-
ty over the first under the priority rule of revised section 9-322(a)(2),
that a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected
one.7 1 The rule of revised section 9-515(c) applies also to a case where
a buyer of chattel paper has perfected by filing and allows the effec-
tiveness of the filing to expire.
It may well be that this rule will seldom have any effect on the
rights of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, because such receivables
are usually of short life and loss of perfection by expiration of the ini-
tial five-year period of effectiveness of a filing is not likely to occur
before the accounts or chattel paper have been discharged by payment
or otherwise.
2. Chattel Paper
Assuming that a buyer of chattel paper has received assignment
of the chattel paper from the original obligee, who still owns the paper
at the time of the sale, and that the buyer has perfected the security
interest in the collateral, what priorities has the buyer acquired?
There is more than one way that a security interest in chattel pa-
per can be perfected. Filing is a permissible method of perfection as to
all chattel paper under both versions of Article 9. In the case of chattel
paper of the traditional type, a writing, an alternative way to achieve
perfection under both versions of Article 9 is for the secured party to
take possession of the paper. In the case of "electronic chattel paper"
(recognized only by revised Article 9), perfection by gaining "control"
of the chattel paper is an available alternative to filing.
a. Conflicting security interests
The general priority rules of former section 9-312(5)(a) is applied
to conflicts between security interests in chattel paper as well as ac-
270. Id.
271. See id. at 889-91.
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counts. If the rival security interest was unperfected, a secured party
with a perfected security interest probably had priority.272 If both secu-
rity interests were perfected, the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule
would govern. Revised section 9-322(a) has similar general rules.273
The discussion above of these rules as they affect security interests in
accounts is equally applicable to security interests in chattel paper.27
The situation was further complicated in former Article 9 by a
special rule, applicable where a security interest in chattel paper had
been perfected by filing. Former section 9-308 provided that
[a] purchaser of chattel paper. . . who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority
over a security interest in the chattel paper ... (a) which is per-
fected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing... ) if he acts without
knowledge that the specific paper... is subject to a security inter-
est.
275
The rule would apply either to a purchaser of a security interest in the
chattel paper or to a buyer of it, as the term "purchaser" is broad
enough to include both. 76
The idea behind this exceptional rule was that if a financer who
took a security interest in or bought chattel paper chose to leave the
paper in the debtor's possession and filed to perfect, the financer
created a situation where prospective buyers of the collateral from the
debtor and prospective lenders to the debtor on the security of the
collateral were likely to assume that the debtor was the owner of the
paper and entitled to deal with it as such. Because collateral of that
sort was usually delivered to buyers or secured parties, the prospective
buyers or lenders were likely to give value to the debtor without first
searching for filings as to the collateral. Hence, the burden was placed
on the earlier financer to see that prospective purchasers were in-
formed of the earlier security interest. If a purchase was made by
another and value given and possession taken without knowledge of
the earlier security interest, the later purchaser was granted priority
over the earlier one. 7
272. See supra note 258.
273. See supra notes 259-260.
274. See supra note 261.
275. Former U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972).
276. See U.C.C. § 1-201(33),(32) (1999). Since 2001 these definitions have ap-
peared in § 1-201(b)(30),(29).
277. See former U.C.C. § 9-308 cmt. 3 (1972).
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This special priority rule was of quite limited application. First, it
applied only where the later purchaser gave "new value," obviously a
narrower term than simply "value," which was defined in section 1-
201(44).278 "New value" was not defined in former Article 9, although
Section 9-108 gave some examples of what would qualify (making an
advance, incurring an obligation, releasing a perfected security inter-
est).279 A comment to that section stated that these examples, and the
definition of "purchase money security interest" indicated "the nature
of the concept," and in other situations it was "left to the courts to
distinguish between 'new' and 'old' value, between present considera-
tions and antecedent debt.""28 If we consider what section 1-201(44)
defined as "value," the most obvious type of value, which would be
"old" value, would be taking property as security for a preexisting
debt without making any new exchange or commitment.
Second, the purchaser of the chattel paper had to have given val-
ue and taken possession of the paper "in the ordinary course of his
business., 281 This is another expression not defined by the UCC. As
used here it seems to mean two things: (a) that the purchaser had to
be in the business of purchasing chattel paper and (b) that the particu-
lar purchase had to be consistent with the usual course of the purchas-
er's business.
Third, the purchaser was required to have acted "without know-




Mere knowledge that there was a security interest was enough to bar
the purchaser from priority! 3 "Knowledge" was defined by section 1-
201(25) as "actual knowledge" and was distinguished from "reason to
know."2' A comment to former section 9-308, however, indicated that
the holder of a prior security interest could protect himself from loss
under this section by "stamping or noting on the paper the fact that it
has been assigned to him," suggesting that the subsequent purchaser
278. See supra note 57. In 2001 Article 1 was revised, and the definition of "value"
was shifted to § 1-204, without substantial change in meaning.
279. See former U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972).
280. Id. § 9-108 cmt. 2.
281. Id. § 9-108.
282. Id. § 9-308(a).
283. Compare the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in § 1-
201(9), where the buyer's knowledge of a preexisting interest in goods being sold is
not enough to bar him from the status and potential priority over the holder of the
preexisting interest; he must be "without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods."
284. In 2001 the definition of "knowledge" was shifted to § 1-202, but it is still
defined as "actual knowledge."
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would be barred from priority even if he did not notice the stamp or
notation on the paper.'
Rather oddly, however, the rule of section 9-308 did not expressly
require that the purchaser act in "good faith" to have the benefit of
the rule, a requirement which did appear in most UCC rules protect-
ing innocent purchasers from preexisting property interests. It is true
that section 1-203 declared that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or en-
forcement," but it is doubtful that the rule would apply to the sort of
fact situation under consideration here.
In the 1998 revision of Article 9, section 9-330(b) replaces former
section 9-308(a) and states a similar, but not identical, rule:
A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in
the chattel paper which is claimed other than merely as proceeds of
inventory subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives new
value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control
of the chattel paper under Section 9-105 in good faith, in the ordi-
nary course of the purchaser's business, and without knowledge
that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
This rule differs from its predecessor in several ways:
First, although the revised rule continues to call for the purchaser
to take the chattel paper for "new value," the term "new value" is de-
fined in revised Article 9, in section 9-102(a)(57). It means "(i) money,
(ii) money's worth in property, services, or new credit, or (iii) release
by a transferee of an interest in property previously transferred to the
transferee. The term does not include an obligation substituted for
another obligation."
Second, action by the transferee "in good faith" is now expressly
required, and although section 1-201(19) in 1998 contained a general
definition of "good faith" as meaning simply "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned," revised section 9-102(a)(43) pro-
vided that in Article 9 "good faith" means "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. "6
285. See former U.C.C. § 9-308 cmt. 3 (1972).
286. In 2001 the definition of "good faith" in revised § 9-102(a)(43) was deleted
and the definition of "good faith" in Section 1-201 was modified by adding a require-
ment of observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. See revised
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2001). In effect, the definition of "good faith" adopted for
Article 9 in 1998 has now become the standard meaning of the term throughout the
Code.
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Third, the purchaser must now be "without knowledge that the
purchase violates the rights of the secured party." ' This involves two
departures from the prior text: First, knowledge that the chattel paper
is subject to a security interest is now not enough to prevent the pur-
chaser from gaining priority; only knowledge that the rights of the se-
cured party are being violated will bar the purchaser from priority.
Second, subsection (f) of revised section 9-330 has the effect of making
an exception to the requirement, by providing that "[f]or purposes of
[subsection (b)] ... , if chattel paper ... indicates that it has been as-
signed to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, a pur-
chaser of the chattel paper . . . has knowledge that the purchase vi-
olates the rights of the secured party."
Fourth, adapting the rule to the expansion of the "chattel paper"
concept to include "electronic chattel paper," the rule now requires
that the purchaser either have taken possession of the chattel paper or
have gained "control" of it, as well as having given new value, all in
good faith, in the ordinary course of the purchaser's business, and
without knowledge of violation of rights of the secured party.
Fifth, section 9-330(b) does not say, as former section 9-308(a)
did, that the priority a purchaser can acquire under this rule is a priori-
ty over a security interest that has been perfected by filing. As stated,
the rule grants priority over any security interest which is not claimed
merely as proceeds of inventory, whether perfected or not and, if per-
fected, regardless of how perfection was achieved. This modification
seems relatively unimportant. If the original security interest was per-
fected by possession or control, a subsequent purchaser will be unlike-
ly to be able to gain priority by taking possession or gaining control. If
the original security interest is unperfected, a purchaser who gains
possession or control will very likely have a perfected security interest
and thus be entitled to priority under the general rule that a perfected
security interest takes priority over an unperfected one. Thus, as a
practical matter, the rule is limited to granting priority over a security
interest perfected by filing.
Suppose the earlier security interest is that of a buyer of chattel
paper and has been perfected by filing before a second purchase oc-
curs of the sort described in section 9-330(b). Would not the rule of
revised section 9-318(b) prevent the second purchaser from gaining
priority on the ground that when the buyer's security interest became
perfected, the seller lost his power to make effective transfers of inter-
ests in the sold chattel paper? An argument could be made that the
287. Revised U.C.C. § 9-330(b) (1999).
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purpose of the rule of section 9-330(b) would be best served by treat-
ing that special priority rule as creating an implied exception to the
rule of 9-318(b). Comment 2 to section 9-330 states that the purpose of
the rule is to enable "secured parties and other purchasers of chattel
paper ... to obtain priority over earlier-perfected security interests,"
and the rationale for such priority is probably the same as that given in
the comment to former section 9-308(a).' Nothing in the text of re-
vised Article 9 recognizes such an exception, nor did the comments as
originally published, but in 2001 comment 4 to section 9-318 was re-
vised. After noting that the usual effect of perfection of the security
interest of a buyer of a receivable is to deprive the seller of power to
transfer interest to third persons, the comment provides:
However, in certain circumstances a purchaser who takes posses-
sion of a promissory note will achieve priority, under Sections 9-
330 or 9-331, over the security interest of an earlier buyer of the
promissory note. It necessarily follows that the seller in those cir-
cumstances retains the power to transfer the promissory note, as if
it had not been sold, to a purchaser who obtains priority under ei-
ther of those sections2 9
Although this comment refers only to purchasers of promissory notes,
a similar interpretation of section 9-330(b) seems equally appropriate
in the light of the purpose of the rule.
Finally, we need to note that the priority rule of revised section 9-
330(b) excludes from its operation a security interest which is claimed
"merely as proceeds of inventory." The subject of security interests in
proceeds is one of considerable complexity, and further discussion of
it will be deferred.
b. Conflicts with other third parties
Except where proceeds are involved and in the situation de-
scribed above in part c21 of the discussion of accounts, there is no oth-
er rule in Article 9 which would give a lien creditor priority over a per-
fected security interest in chattel paper or give priority to any transfe-
ree of chattel paper over a perfected security interest in chattel paper.
288. See supra note 277.
289. Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(a) cmt. 4 (1999).
290. See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
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3. Promissory Notes
Only revised Article 9 treats sales of promissory notes as secured
transactions, so discussion will be limited to the provisions of the revi-
sion.
a. Conflicting security interests
A security interest arising from the sale of a promissory note is
automatically perfected at the time of the sale. 1 Thereafter, according
to section 9-318(b), any attempt by the seller to create a security inter-
est in it or to sell it will be ineffective, and so there can be no problem
of priorities under the general rules of revised section 9-322 insofar as
subsequent claimants are concerned.
If a buyer finds his rights challenged by one who bought the note
at an earlier time, the second buyer would lose under the general rule
of section 9-318(b) if it applies; the seller would have no power to
transfer any rights in the note after the original sale, as the first buy-
er's security interest would be perfected when that sale was made. If
the rival claimant is one who previously purchased a security interest
in the note, the case would be governed by the rule of revised section
9-322(a)(2), that a perfected security interest has priority over an un-
perfected one, or by the rule of section 9-322(a)(1), which is the first-
to-file-or-perfect rule for resolving conflicts between perfected securi-
ty interests.
There are two special priority rules, however, for security inter-
ests in promissory notes that may change the results. One such rule is
found in section 9-331(a): "This article does not limit the rights of a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument ... [Such a holder]
take[s] priority over an earlier security interest, even if perfected, to
the extent provided in [Article 3]." A promissory note is an "instru-
ment,"' and it may be "negotiable," depending on its form, as pre-
scribed by section 3-104 of the UCC.13 A "holder in due course" is a
291. See revised U.C.C. § 9-309(4) (1999).
292. Id. § 9-102(a)(65).
293. Revised U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1999) provides that
Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument" means an un-
conditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest
or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: (1) is payable to bearer or to
order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (2) is payable
on demand or at a definite time; and (3) does not state any other undertaking or in-
struction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the
payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power
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type of innocent purchaser for value, but the requirements for the sta-
tus are quite strict. Section 3-302(a) defines the term as meaning the
following: (1) a "holder" of a negotiable instrument (i.e., one in pos-
session of an instrument that is, because of its original terms or, by
reason of one or more indorsements, payable to that person),294 (2)
that does not bear evidence of forgery or alteration or such irregulari-
ty as to call into question its authenticity, (3) who takes the instrument
(a) in good faith, (b) for value, and (c) "without notice that the in-
strument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an un-
cured default" in payment on another instrument that was issued as
part of the same series, without notice that the instrument bears an
unauthorized signature or has been altered, and without notice of any
claim against the instrument or any defense to it of any party.
One who qualifies as a holder in due course is in a very powerful
position. A holder in due course takes the instrument free from many
defenses that persons who have become obligors on the instrument
may have and also takes the instrument free of preexisting property
interests in it.295 It is the clear-title rule of Article 3 that is being recog-
nized in revised section 9-331(a).
This rule could work for or against a buyer of a promissory note.
A buyer who becomes a holder in due course will have priority over
all preexisting claims to the note, but if someone else becomes a hold-
er in due course of it after the sale, the buyer will lose ownership of
the instrument. Of course, a buyer who has taken possession of the
note can prevent any subsequent purchaser from becoming a holder in
due course of it.
The other special priority rule is in revised section 9-330(d) and
provides that "a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a securi-
ty interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than posses-
sion if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instru-
ment in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates
the rights of the secured party." This rule could apply to a case involv-
to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or
power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a
waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obli-
gor.
Subsection (c), referred to in this rule, is a special rule for checks, not applicable to
promissory notes. Subsection (d) provides that even if the instrument does satisfy the
requirements of subsection (a), it is not negotiable if it contains a conspicuous state-
ment that it is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by Article 3. Id.
294. See revised U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1999). This rule, revised in wording but not in
substance, has, since 2001, appeared in § 1-201(b)(21).
295. See id. § 3-306.
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ing a non-negotiable note, and it could be applicable where a negotia-
ble note was involved but the purchaser did not qualify as a holder in
due course. To be a holder in due course, for example, a purchaser
must take the instrument without "notice" of any preexisting claim to
it, but a purchaser can qualify for priority under this special rule if the
purchaser does not have "knowledge that the purchase violates the
rights of the secured party." 296
A buyer of a promissory note could lose title to the note under
this rule if the buyer relies on the automatic perfection conferred by
section 9-309(4) and does not take possession of the note.2' The rea-
son for the rule is probably much like that supporting the rule of for-
mer section 9-308(a) applicable to chattel paper298 and its counterpart
in revised section 9-330(b).29' According to the revised comment to
revised section 9-318, this rule creates an implied exception to the rule
that once the security interest of a buyer of receivables is perfected,
the seller no longer has power to transfer interests in the collateral to
third persons.3°
b. Conflicts with other third parties
With the possible exception of cases involving proceeds, Article 9
has no other rule which would give a lien creditor priority over a buy-
er of a promissory note or grant priority to a transferee other than a
secured party.
4. Payment Intangibles
Sales of payment intangibles are treated as secured transactions
only by revised Article 9. Like buyers of promissory notes, buyers of
most payment intangibles are treated as secured parties and their in-
terests in the intangibles as security interests. Therefore, those inter-
ests are automatically perfected upon attachment under revised sec-
tion 9-309(3).
296. See revised U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 7 (1999), and compare definitions of "notice"
and "knowledge" in § 1-201(25). In 2001 these definitions, in revised form, were
moved to § 1-202. Section 3-102(b) provides that if there is a conflict between Article
3 and Article 9, Article 9 governs.
297. See revised U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 7 (1999).
298. See supra note 277.
299. See supra note 287.
300. See revised U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4 (1999), as amended in 2001, quoted supra
note 287.
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a. Conflicting security interests
A buyer of payment intangibles need not worry about subsequent
purchasers from the seller, as revised section 9-318(b) terminates the
seller's power to make effective transfers to third parties when the
buyer's security interest is perfected, and that occurs at the time of the
sale.
As to security interests which arise before payment intangibles
are sold, if the earlier security interest arises from a sale of the intang-
ible, the seller would have no power thereafter to make an effective
sale because of the rule of revised section 9-318(b). If the earlier secu-
rity interest was one actually intended for security, the general priority
rules of revised section 9-322(a) would apply. If the earlier security
interest was unperfected, the buyer would take priority. If the earlier
security interest was perfected, the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule
would apply. There is a question as to whether the buyer could gain
priority by filing before there is either filing or perfection as to the
earlier interest because the filing is not needed to perfect the buyer's
security interest when it arises, but it seems probable that the buyer
could gain priority by such a filing before the sale to him occurs, since
the text of the UCC makes no exception to the priority rule for such a
case.
b. Conflicts with other third parties
With the possible exception of cases involving proceeds, revised
Article 9 has no other rule giving a lien creditor priority over a buyer
of payment intangibles or granting priority to a transferee who is not a
secured party.
V. PROCEEDS
Under former Article 9 "proceeds" were defined by subsection
(1) of section 9-306 as including:
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, or other
disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason
of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent
that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security
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agreement. Any payments or distributions made with respect to in-
vestment property collateral are proceeds.3°1
The idea of proceeds that emerges is that the term refers to property
that can be regarded as replacing, substituting for, or growing out of
original collateral, though the definition is stated in a more limited
fashion.
The significance of the concept of "proceeds" was found in sub-
section (2) of former section 9-306, which provided that "[e]xcept
where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof
unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the secu-
rity agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable
proceeds including collections received by the debtor." In other
words, the secured party's interest in identifiable proceeds of original
collateral served as additional collateral if the secured party had not
authorized the disposition of the collateral, and it served as substitute
collateral if the disposition had been authorized; this extension of the
security interest occurred automatically. The authorization referred to
was an authorization to dispose of the collateral free of the security
interest, not a mere consent to disposition without waiver of a continu-
ing security interest.3°
In revised Article 9, section 9-315(a) continues this treatment of
"proceeds" and expressly indicates that the authorization referred to
is one of disposition free of the security interest. The definition of
"proceeds" which appears in section 9-102(a)(64) is broader in scope,
although it embodies the same general concept. It is as follows:
"Proceeds," except as used in Section 9-609(b) [where it is used as
a verb], means the following property: (A) whatever is acquired
upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of colla-
teral; (B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of,
collateral; (C) rights arising out of collateral; (D) to the extent of
the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformi-
ty, or interference with the use of, defects or infringements of
rights in, or damage to, the collateral; or (E) to the extent of the
value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the
secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or noncon-
301. Former U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972).
302. See Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No. 3, Part 1 of Discussion
(1990).
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formity of, defects or infringements of rights in, or damage to, the
collateral .
This definition is both broader and more precise than its predecessor.
It does not say that proceeds of proceeds are included, but a comment
to revised section 9-102 asserts that "[t]hat idea is expressed in the
revised definition of 'collateral' in section 9-102. No change in mean-
ing is intended."3"
A further distinction in the terminology is between the terms
"cash proceeds" and "non-cash proceeds." In former Article 9 section
9-306(1) provided that "[m]oney, checks, deposit accounts, and the
like are 'cash proceeds.' All other proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds."'
In the revised Article, section 9-102(a)(9) and (58) provides nearly
identical definitions of these terms.
Under both versions of Article 9, a security interest in proceeds is
treated as automatically perfected if the security interest in the origi-
nal collateral was perfected at the time the proceeds were acquired,
although the perfection as to the proceeds might be temporary. For-
mer Article 9 described the security interest in proceeds as "a conti-
nuously perfected security interest" but provided that it would be-
come unperfected "ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the deb-
tor unless": (1) the proceeds were identifiable cash proceeds and (a) a
filed financing statement covered the original collateral, 05 or (b) the
original collateral was investment property;3" or (2) the security inter-
est in the proceeds was perfected within the ten-day period by a me-
thod that would be appropriate for perfection as to the type of proper-
ty constituting the proceeds;' or (3) a filed financing statement cov-
ered the original collateral and the proceeds were a type of property in
which a security interest could be perfected by filing in the same office
where the original filing was made; but if the proceeds had been ac-
quired with cash proceeds, it was also necessary that the description of
the collateral in the filed financing statement have included the type of
property constituting the proceeds) °
In revised Article 9 the perfection rules are somewhat altered and
simplified. Again it is provided, in section 9-315(c), that if the security
interest in the original collateral was perfected, a security interest in
303. Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (1999).
304. Id. § 9-102 cmt.13(c).
305. Former U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) (1972).
306. Id. § 9-306(3)(c).
307. Id. § 9-306(3)(d).
308. Id. § 9-306(3)(a).
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proceeds of that collateral is automatically perfected. The section goes
on to provide, however, that perfection is lost on the twenty-first day
after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless: (1) a filed
financing statement covered the original collateral, the proceeds are a
type of collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by fil-
ing in the same office, and the proceeds have not been acquired with
cash proceeds;3" or (2) "the proceeds are identifiable cash
proceeds";31° or (3) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected by
a method other than the automatic perfection provided for in subsec-
tion (c) at the time the security interest attaches or within twenty days
thereafter. n
This version of the rules makes the automatic perfection provided
for in subsection (c) permanent as to all cash proceeds, that simple
rule replaces the narrower rules of former section 9-306(3)(b) and
(c).312
Under the revision, the automatic perfection provided for by sub-
section (c) of section 9-315 continues as to all proceeds for at least
twenty days (a doubling of the period specified by former Article 9).
Except as to cash proceeds, termination occurs at the end of the twen-
ty-day period unless either of two requirements is met.
One requirement is that a filed financing statement covers the
original collateral. The proceeds are a type of property in which a se-
curity interest can be perfected by filing in the same office, and the
proceeds have not been acquired with cash proceeds. This rule essen-
tially mimics former section 9-306(3)(a), except that the additional
language of that rule dealing with cases where the collateral was ac-
quired with cash proceeds has been deleted.3
The other case in which, under the revision, perfection does not
terminate at the end of the twenty-day period of automatic perfection
is if there has been a continuing perfection of the security interest in
the proceeds by some method which would be appropriate for the
type of collateral constituting the proceeds if they were original colla-
teral and that has occurred before the expiration of the twenty-day
period of automatic perfection. This rule duplicates the rule of former
section 9-306(3)(c) 14 (except for the change in the length of the period
of automatic perfection). This rule also absorbs the rule of former sec-
309. Revised U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(1) (1999).
310. Id. § 9-315(d)(2).
311. Id. § 9-315(d)(3).
312. See text supra notes 305-306.
313. See text supra note 308.
314. See text supra note 306.
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tion 9-306(3)(a), insofar as it dealt with proceeds acquired with cash
proceeds.315 If proceeds have been acquired with cash proceeds and
there is a financing statement covering the original collateral on file
that includes in its description of collateral the type of property consti-
tuting the proceeds, and filing in the same office would be appropriate
for the type of property constituting the proceeds, a perfection of the
security interest in the proceeds by filing will occur as soon as the se-
curity interest attaches to the proceeds."6
A. Are Proceeds Rules of Concern to a Buyer of Receivables?
A buyer of receivables whose purchase is treated as a secured
transaction by Article 9 may find the rules as to proceeds important.
The receivables one buys may be proceeds of collateral in which
another person had a security interest, and a question of priorities may
arise from the conflicting interests in the receivables. A very common
source of accounts and chattel paper is from sales of goods that consti-
tute inventory of a merchant. The merchant may have borrowed funds
on the security of the inventory, and if the merchant then sells ac-
counts or chattel paper arising from the sales of the goods, the buyer
of the receivables may be faced with a conflicting claim to the recei-
vables asserted by the inventory financer who claims the receivables as
proceeds of the original inventory collateral. Even if the receivables
are not proceeds in which another has a security interest at the time of
the sale, the debtor's dealings with the receivables after the sale may
produce proceeds to which the buyer wishes to assert a claim, and that
claim may be opposed by another person claiming an interest in the
proceeds either as original collateral or as proceeds.
The Article 9 rules on priorities with respect to proceeds are quite
complex and more so under revised Article 9 than they were under the
former version of the Article. It would unduly lengthen this paper to
attempt an exhaustive survey of the priority rules relating to proceeds,
as most of them work the same way whether a security interest is
based on a sale of receivables or results from a transaction actually
intended to create a security interest. The more general of the rules,
however, will be covered here, as well as a few special rules that seem
likely to be of interest to buyers of receivables.
The basic priority rule under former Article 9 was that a security
interest in proceeds had the same priority as the security interest had
315. See text supra note 308.
316. See Bums, supra note 134.
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with respect to the original collateral. This proposition was not stated
that broadly, but it was reflected in section 9-312(6), which provided
that for purposes of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule for priority be-
tween perfected security interests in the same collateral "[the] date of
filing or perfection as to collateral is also [the] date of filing or perfec-
tion as to proceeds. 3 17 This idea also lay behind the seemingly peculiar
wording of section 9-306(2) in stating that a security interest "contin-
ues in any identifiable proceeds, 318 and of section 9-306(3), which de-
scribed a security interest in proceeds as a "continuously perfected,
319
one for at least ten days. The security interest in proceeds was to be
treated as a continuation of the security interest in the original colla-
teral and not as a new, independent security interest.
The inherited priority of a security interest in proceeds could be
lost, however. The first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule, for example,
was a rule of priority as between perfected security interests. If the
security interest in the proceeds should become unperfected, perhaps
because the ten day period of automatic perfection has expired and
there has been no new perfection of the security interest, the interest
in the proceeds would probably become subordinate to a conflicting
perfected security interest in them under section 9-312(5).32
The basic priority rule was also subject to some exceptions which
will not be reviewed here because they have been superseded by dif-
ferent rules in revised Article 9. In the 1998 revision of Article 9, the
priority rules for proceeds start with the same general rule that, as
between perfected security interests, for purposes of the first-to-file-
or-perfect rule of section 9-322(a)(1), "the time of filing or perfection
as to a security interest in collateral is also the time of filing or perfec-
tion as to a security interest in proceeds. 321 The same section of re-
vised Article 9 states two rules of more limited application which con-
trol over the general rule.
First, revised section 9-322(c)(2) applies to cases where a secured
party has a security interest that, as it applied to the original collateral,
qualified for priority over a conflicting security interest in that colla-
teral by virtue of one of the rules in section 9-327 to 9-331. The rule is
that the security interest in the original collateral confers priority as to
its proceeds if: (a) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected; (b)
the proceeds are cash proceeds or property of the same type as the
317. Former U.C.C. § 9-312(6) (1972).
318. Id. § 9-306(2).
319. Id. § 9-306(3).
320. See supra note 224.
321. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322(b)(1) (1999).
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original collateral; and (c) if the proceeds are proceeds of other
proceeds, all intervening proceeds are cash proceeds, proceeds of the
same type as the original collateral, or an account relating to the colla-
teral.
The other sections referred to in this rule contain special rules for
priority for security interests in deposit accounts,322 investment proper-
ty,3z2 letter-of-credit rights,3 24 chattel paper and instruments, z2 and
rights in collateral given priority by provisions in certain other articles
of the UCC. 26 All of these sections deal with the effect of achieving
perfection by some method other than filing a financing statement.
They also grant priority to a secured party so perfecting as to collater-
al even though a rival secured party has previously filed as to the col-
lateral or achieved perfection in some other way. A comment refers to
these types of collateral as "non-filing collateral," meaning not that
perfection by filing as to such collateral is impossible, but that perfec-
tion by some other method (chiefly, by taking possession or achieving
control) is not only possible as to such collateral but is also customary,
so that secured parties who do perfect by these methods generally do
not expect to need to conduct a filing search.317 The special priority
rule of section 9-322(c)(2) enables a secured party who would have
priority as to original collateral under one of the cited sections to gain
priority as to some proceeds that would not be granted by the first-to-
file-or-perfect priority rule.
For example, suppose that SP-1 buys a non-negotiable promissory
note (an "instrument") from Debtor but leaves it with Debtor to have
Debtor collect payment on SP-1's behalf. SP-1 promptly files a financ-
ing statement covering promissory notes. Debtor then sells the same
note to SP-2, who takes possession of the note in good faith without
knowledge that the sale violates the rights of any third person, but SP-
2 allows Debtor to collect payment of the note when it comes due.
Debtor does not remit the proceeds of the note to either SP-1 or SP-2;
instead the payment is deposited in Debtor's checking account. As
between SP-1 and SP-2, which of them would have the prior right to
the proceeds? (The proceeds would qualify as "cash proceeds," and
assume that they are identifiable proceeds despite being commingled
with other funds in the checking account.)
322. Id. § 9-327.
323. Id. § 9-328.
324. Id. § 9-329.
325. Id. § 9-330.
326. Id. § 9-331.
327. See revised U.C.C. § 9-322 cmt. 7 (1999).
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If the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-322(a)(1) applies, it
would give SP-1 priority in claim to the original collateral, the promis-
sory note, for SP-1 was the first to file and also the first to perfect with
respect to the note. Moreover, section 9-318 would point to the con-
clusion that SP-2 didn't acquire any property interest in the note at all
because SP-I's perfection would have cut off Debtor's power to make
any further transfers of interests in the note thereafter. 3  But section
9-330(d) takes the case out of both of these rules; it operates to give
Debtor power to make transfers of the note as if he were still the own-
er of it,329 and it grants SP-2 priority over SP-1 in claim to the note "as
a purchaser who gave value and took possession of the note in good
faith and without knowledge that the purchase violated the rights of
the [prior] secured party.,
3 °
Does SP-2 have the same priority with respect to the proceeds of
the note? Not necessarily. Section 9-330 does not deal with priority as
to proceeds of the instrument purchased. If we look to the general
rules of priority in section 9-322, and we seek to apply the first-to-file-
or-perfect rule to this case, we would have to conclude that SP-1 has
priority as to the proceeds, since SP-1 was the first to file and the first
to perfect as to the original collateral, and subsection (b)(1) of section
9-322 instructs us to treat the time of filing or perfection of the securi-
ty interest in the original collateral as the time of filing or perfection of
the a security interest in proceeds of the collateral. Here again, how-
ever, we are provided with a special rule to deal with the case, the rule
of section 9-322(c)(2), and it gives SP-2 priority as to the proceeds.
Where a secured party has priority over an earlier security interest
under the rules of several specified sections, including Section 9-330,
that secured party also has priority as to proceeds of the original colla-
teral if the security interest in the proceeds is perfected and the
proceeds are cash proceeds or proceeds of the same type as the origi-
nal collateral. (There is an additional restriction applicable if the
proceeds are proceeds of other proceeds, but we do not have such a
case here.) We have cash proceeds, and SP-2 has a perfected security
interest in them; it was automatically perfected for twenty days, and it
continues to be perfected after that because the proceeds are identifi-
able cash proceeds.331
328. See supra note 259.
329. See supra note 300.
330. See supra notes 296-299.
331. For another illustration see revised U.C.C. § 9-322 cmt. 8, ex. 6 (1999).
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The illustrations to revised section 9-322 indicate that the priority
rule of subsection (c)(2) applies even though the secured party invok-
ing it has filed with respect to the original collateral, provided that the
secured party has also taken such action as would suffice in itself to
perfect the security interest and entitles the secured party to priority
under one of the rules in sections 9-327 to 9-331. One of the examples
given3 1 is that SP-1 perfects a security interest in investment property
by filing, and SP-2 perfects subsequently by filing and also by taking
control of the investment property, a certificated security. Debtor then
receives proceeds of the original collateral consisting of a new certifi-
cated security issued as a stock dividend of the collateral. Does SP-1
or SP-2 have the prior claim to the proceeds? If the general first-to-
file-or-perfect rule applies, SP-1 has the senior claim. SP-1 was the
first to file and perfect as to the original collateral. The perfected secu-
rity interest SP-1 has would continue in the proceeds and be deemed
to date back to the time of filing as to the original collateral, and the
perfection would continue beyond the twenty-day period of automatic
perfection under section 9-315(d)(1) because the proceeds are of a
type in which a security interest could be perfected by filing in the of-
fice where SP-1's filing as to the original collateral was made and the
proceeds were not acquired with cash proceeds.
But SP-2 would claim a security interest in the proceeds that is
entitled to priority. SP-2 has control of the original collateral and, un-
der section 9-328(1), such control entitles SP-2 to priority over SP-1,
who does not have control. That control opens the door for SP-2 to
invoke section 9-322(c) to claim priority as to the proceeds. To use
that rule SP-2 must show a perfected security interest in the proceeds,
and that can be done by using the same reasoning that SP-1 would use
to show a perfected security interest in the proceeds. SP-2 must also
show that the proceeds are cash proceeds or proceeds of the same type
as the original collateral; the proceeds are not cash proceeds, but they
are property of the same type as the original collateral-investment
property. Because the proceeds are not proceeds of proceeds, SP-2
need not worry about the additional requirement that applies in such a
case.
Further complicating the picture is the realization that even if we
have a case that seems to fit neatly into the rule of 9-322(c), it may
turn out not to be the governing rule because it is overridden by some
Article 9 rule of more limited application. Subsection (c) begins with
the words "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (f)." Subsec-
332. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322 cmt. 8, ex. 8 (1999).
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tion (f) subordinates the rules of subsections (a) through (e) to a num-
ber of other specifically cited rules and to "the other provisions of this
part." "This part" covers sections 9-301 through 9-342. If we find in
any of those sections (other than 9-322) a rule which would also fit our
case and would change the result produced by subsection (c), we must
apply the other rule. For example, we have noted before that Section
9-328(1) has a rule that if one secured party has control of investment
property and another secured party does not have control, the one
with control takes precedence. In the example just discussed, this rule
would not change the result. But suppose that SP-1 were able to gain
control of the certificated security constituting the proceeds. If SP-2
lacks control of that security, the result would be that SP-1 would have
the superior claim to the proceeds. The rule of 9-328(1) would trump
that of 9-322(c).333
The other special priority rule for security interests in proceeds in
revised section 9-322 is found in subsections (d) and (e). Subsection
(d) provides that:
[s]ubject to subsection (e) and except as otherwise provided in sub-
section (f), if a security interest in chattel paper, deposit accounts,
negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter-
of-credit rights is perfected by a method other than filing, conflict-
ing perfected security interests in proceeds of the collateral rank
according to priority in time of filing.3
Subsection (e) provides that "[s]ubsection (d) applies only if the
proceeds of the collateral are not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negoti-
able documents, instruments, investment property, or letter-of-credit
rights.,335
These provisions are difficult to understand on first reading. They
begin to make sense when, as the comments point out, it is realized
that the exclusion of subsection (e) has the effect of confining the ap-
plication of the priority rule of subsection (d) to cases in which the
proceeds of "non-filing collateral" are "filing collateral," or property
of a type as to which filing is the only method by which perfection can
be achieved or at least property as to which filing is the usual method
of perfection, so that secured parties who perfect by some method
other than filing nevertheless normally expect and need to conduct a
333. Suggested by revised § 9-322 (1999) cmt. 8 in the paragraph following Exam-
ple 6.
334. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322(d) (1999).
335. Id. § 9-322(e).
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filing search. Such property includes accounts, commercial tort claims,
general intangibles, goods, non-negotiable documents, and payment
intangibles.3 6
The rule of subsection (d), then, is that if a security interest in
"non-filing collateral" is perfected by a method other than filing con-
flicting perfected security interests in proceeds that are "filing colla-
teral" rank according to priority in filing, not priority in filing or per-
fection, either as to the original collateral if there has been no inter-
ruption in the perfection of the security interest, or as to the proceeds.
The comments offer the following illustration of the operation of
the rule:
3 7
SP-1 perfects a security interest in Debtor's deposit account by ob-
taining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against Debtor's equipment,
(presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security
interest, and advances against Debtor's equipment. SP-1 then files
as to Debtor's equipment. Debtor uses funds from the deposit ac-
count to purchase equipment, which SP-1 can trace as proceeds of
its security interest in Debtor's deposit account.338
Which secured party has priority as to the equipment proceeds?
If the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) ap-
plied, SP-1 would have priority. SP-1 was the only one to perfect as to
the deposit account, the original collateral for SP-I's security interest;
that perfection would "continue" as to the equipment proceeds and
the perfection as to the proceeds would be considered to relate back
to the time of perfection as to the original collateral. Furthermore, the
perfection as to the proceeds would not expire at the end of the twen-
ty-day period of automatic perfection because SP-1 had filed as to
Debtor's equipment before the expiration of that twenty-day period, a
proper means of perfecting a security interest in equipment.
The first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule would not apply, because
the special rule of section 9-322(d) would. SP-1's security interest in
the deposit account ("non-filing collateral") was perfected by a means
other than filing-control. The proceeds, "equipment," are "goods," a
type of "filing collateral." Priority as to the proceeds goes to the first
to file, and that was SP-2. The comment asserts that this result "cor-
responds with the likely expectations of the parties, 339 probably be-
cause when "filing collateral" is involved a person considering making
336. See id. § 9-322 cmt. 7.
337. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 9, ex. 12.
338. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 9, ex. 12.
339. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 9, ex. 12.
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an advance against that sort of collateral would expect to find a filing
with respect to that sort of property if there were a security interest in
it that would be entitled to priority.
How does the special priority rule of subsection (d) relate to the
priority rule of subsection (c)? There should be no overlapping. The
rule of subsection (c) applies where the original collateral is "non-
filing collateral" and the proceeds to which conflicting security inter-
ests apply are also "non-filing collateral."3' ° The proceeds must be
"cash proceeds" or proceeds "of the same type as the collateral."
"Cash proceeds" are defined as "money, checks, deposit accounts, or
the like."' ' Money and deposit accounts are "non-filing collateral"
because an original security interest in money can be perfected only
by taking possession,342 and one in a deposit account can be perfected
only by obtaining control of it.33 Checks are "instruments,, 344 and al-
though perfection by filing is possible,345 perfection by taking posses-
sion is also possible.4 6 Instruments are normally delivered when they
are sold or are intended as security and therefore qualify as "non-
filing collateral., 347 The words "or the like,, 348 following the listing of
specific types of property in the definition of "cash proceeds" are a bit
ambiguous, but it seems likely that courts would read this language as
referring to "non-filing collateral" too, and because the original colla-
teral is "non-filing collateral," proceeds "of the same type as the colla-
teral" would be "non-filing collateral" also.
Priority rules found in sections other than revised Section 9-322
which could affect proceeds are varied. Some do not expressly refer to
proceeds but could apply to proceeds. Others are expressly applicable
to proceeds. To try to catalog them all would unduly lengthen this pa-
per, but two are especially notable, insofar as buyers of receivables are
concerned. They concern purchase-money security interests and pur-
chasers of chattel paper and instruments.
Revised section 9-324 contains the rules regarding priority ac-
corded to purchase-money security interests against conflicting securi-
340. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322 cmts. 7 & 9 (1999).
341. Id. § 9-102(a)(9).
342. Id. § 9-312(b)(3).
343. Id. § 9-312(b)(1).
344. Id. §§ 9-102(a)(48) & 9-102 cmt. 5(c).
345. Id. § 9-312(a).
346. Revised U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (1999).
347. See id. § 9-322 cmt. 7.
348. Id. § 9-102(a)(9).
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ty interests. 49 The definition of "purchase-money security interest" in
revised section 9-103 is rather complex, but the basic idea is that it is
an interest in goods that secures an obligation to pay the purchase
price of the goods or secures an obligation to repay an advance made
to enable the debtor to acquire the goods.3 10 Holders of purchase-
money security interests are especially favored in Article 9. The basic
priority rule applicable to such interests is found in subsection (a) of 9-
324. The Rule states that "a perfected purchase-money security inter-
est has ... priority over any conflicting security interest in the same
goods, and ... a perfected security interest in its.. . proceeds also has
priority, if the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the
debtor receives possession of the collateral or within [twenty] days
thereafter.,
31'
A rule of more limited scope, however, applies to a purchase-
money security interest in inventory. Subsection (b) of section 9-324
provides that this sort of security interest has priority over a conflict-
ing non-purchase-money security interest in the same inventory if: (i)
"the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor
receives possession of the inventory"352 (with no grace period for per-
fection); and (ii) before the debtor receives possession of the invento-
ry, the purchase-money secured party has given notification to the
other secured party that he has or expects to acquire a purchase-
money security interest in such inventory.53 Subsection (c) adds that
the purchase-money secured party is not required to give such notifi-
cation to the other secured party if that party has not filed a financing
statement covering the same type of inventory before the date of the
purchase-money secured party's filing."
The reason for this special treatment of purchase-money security
interests in inventory has been a concern about fairness of treatment
of competing secured parties in cases of this sort. Suppose that Deb-
tor, a merchant, makes an arrangement with a bank for SP-1 to make
periodic loans to the merchant to finance Debtor's business opera-
tions, with each loan to be secured by Debtor's inventory. As invento-
ry is sold, the merchant will pay over the proceeds to the SP-1 to re-
duce the outstanding debt, and as new inventory is acquired, SP-1 will
be called upon to make additional advances. SP-1 files a financing
349. Id. § 9-324.
350. See id. § 9-103.
351. Id. § 9-324(a).
352. Revised U.C.C. § 9-324(b)(i) (1999).
353. Id.
354. See id. § 9-324(c).
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statement covering Debtor's inventory. This financer's security inter-
est would probably not be considered a "purchase-money security
interest" because the advances are not made for the specific purpose
of financing the specific inventory that secures the resulting obligation.
Now suppose that Debtor acquires a new lot of inventory by persuad-
ing SP-2 to pay for it, and Debtor grants SP-2 a security interest in the
inventory so acquired. Before SP-2 files, however, Debtor notifies SP-
1 of his acquisition of a new lot of inventory and asks for an advance
against it. The requested advance is made. Then SP-2 files within
twenty days after Debtor's receipt of the inventory. There are two
secured parties, each with a perfected security interest in the same
collateral, but SP-2's security interest is a purchase-money security
interest, while the SP-1's interest is not.
Under the general priority rule of section 9-324(a), SP-2 would
have priority over SP-1 as to the inventory in which SP-2 has a pur-
chase-money security interest, and it could be argued that such priori-
ty is deserved because the inventory was acquired at the SP-2's ex-
pense. But SP-1 has been tricked into making an advance on the secu-
rity of that newly acquired inventory in accordance with a standing
arrangement with the merchant, and SP-1 was unaware that the goods
were already subject to a purchase-money security interest and could
not have found a filing with respect to them if a search for a filing had
been made before the SP-1's advance was made as to those goods. The
drafters of Article 9 thought that one in a position such as SP-1's de-
served some additional protection, and they provided it by condition-
ing the priority of the holder of a purchase-money security interest on
its having perfected the security interest by the time the debtor re-
ceived possession of the collateral, and on the purchase-money se-
cured party having gotten notification to the other secured party be-
fore the debtor received possession of the collateral that the notifier
had or expected to acquire a purchase-money security interest in de-
scribed inventory of the debtor. As a result, before SP-1 made a re-
quested new advance on the security of newly acquired inventory, SP-
1 would have been warned to look for a filing as to that inventory and,
having found the filing, would be able to avoid loss by refusing to
make the advance.
Under this rule, even if the purchase-money secured party is en-
titled to priority as to the inventory, that priority does not extend to all
proceeds of the inventory collateral. It has
355. See id.§ 9-324 cmt. 4.
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priority over a conflicting security interest in chattel paper or an in-
strument constituting proceeds of the inventory and in proceeds of
the chattel paper, if so provided in Section 9-330, and, except as
otherwise provided in Section 9-327 [dealing with conflicting secu-
rity interests in deposit accounts], also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds of the inventory to the extent the identifiable cash
proceeds are received on or before the delivery of the inventory to
356a buyer.
A comment adds that this priority as to proceeds applies only if
the purchase-money secured party=s interest in the proceeds is per-
fected.357 The comment goes on the explain that,
As a general matter . . . the purchase-money priority in inventory
does not carry over into proceeds consisting of accounts or chattel
paper. Many parties financing inventory are quite content to pro-
tect their first-priority security interest in the inventory itself. They
realize that when the inventory is sold, someone else will be financ-
ing the resulting receivables (accounts or chattel paper), and the
priority for inventory will not run forward to the receivables consti-
tuting the proceeds. Indeed, the cash supplied by the receivables
financer often will be used to pay the inventory financing. 35
It is clear, because they are not mentioned in subsection (b), that
the priority of the purchase-money secured party does not carry over
to accounts proceeds of the inventory. 359 Because chattel paper
proceeds are expressly mentioned,361 it is not so clear that the priority
does not apply to them, and it is mentioned in a manner that could be
understood to mean that the priority applies to all chattel paper
proceeds that are not proceeds of chattel paper proceeds. Comment
eight to section 9-324, however, tells us that we are to read the words
"if so provided in Section 9-330" as applicable to "has priority over a
conflicting security interest in chattel paper or an instrument constitut-
ing proceeds of the inventory," as well as to the words "and in
proceeds of the chattel paper." 36' What it appears to mean, insofar as
chattel paper or instrument proceeds are concerned, is that a person
with a purchase-money security interest in inventory can acquire a
356. Id. § 9-324(b).
357. Id. § 9-324 cmt. 8.
358. Revised U.C.C. § 9-324 cmt. 8 (1999).
359. See id. § 9-324(b).
360. Id § 9-324(b).
361. Id. § 9-324 cmt. 8.
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priority as to chattel paper or instrument proceeds only under the
priority rules of section 9-330.
Revised section 9-330 contains rules enabling purchasers of chat-
tel paper and instruments to gain priority over previously perfected or
filed security interests.3 62 Subsections (b) 3 and (d)6 have been noted
previously. Subsection (d) is applicable to purchasers of instruments
and gives a purchaser of an instrument priority over a security interest
in it which has been perfected by a method other than possession
(mainly, by filing), "if the purchaser gives value and takes possession
of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the pur-
chase violates the rights of the secured party." 365 Subsection (b) states a
similar (but not identical) rule for purchasers of chattel paper: a pur-
chaser of chattel paper can gain priority over a conflicting security
interest in the chattel paper by giving new value and taking possession
or control of the chattel paper in good faith, in the ordinary course of
the purchaser's business, and without knowledge that the purchase
violates the rights of the secured party. Subsection (b) has to be read
along with subsection (f), which provides that, for purposes of subsec-
tion (b), "if the chattel paper.., indicates that it has been assigned to
an identified secured party, .... a purchaser of the chattel paper" is to
be treated as having "knowledge that the purchase violates the rights
of the secured party."366
Subsection (b), however, is limited to cases where the conflicting
security interest is in "chattel paper which is claimed other than mere-
ly as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest," so there is
need for a rule dealing with purchasers of chattel paper subject to a
security interest that is claimed "merely as proceeds of inventory sub-
ject to a security interest., 367 That rule appears in subsection (a) of
revised section 9-330. It is that such a purchaser has priority over the
conflicting security interest if:
(1) in good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser's busi-
ness, the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the
chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section
362. See id. § 9-330.
363. See text supra note 274.
364. See supra note 296.
365. Revised U.C.C. § 9-330(d) (1999).
366. Id. § 9-330(f).
367. There is also the question of when a security interest in chattel paper is to be
deemed claimed "merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest." See
Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No. 8 as amended to apply to Revised Ar-
ticle 9 (1991).
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9-105, and (2) the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been
assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.
368
Is there really any difference between the rules of subsection (a)
and subsection (b)? There may be one. Subsection (b) conditions the
priority of the purchaser on his acting "without knowledge that the
purchase violates the rights of the secured party,"369 and subsection (f)
adds that the purchaser is to be treated as having such knowledge if
the chattel paper shows that it has been previously assigned to an
identified secured party.37° Under the rule of subsection (b), even if the
chattel paper does not show an assignment, the purchaser may fail to
gain priority because he actually has knowledge that the purchase vi-
olates the rights of the secured party.371 The rule of subsection (a) does
not expressly require that the purchaser be without knowledge of vi-
olation of rights of the secured party; it requires only that the chattel
paper not show that there has been an assignment of the paper.
372
The distinction is pointed out in a comment to section 9-330. The
comment observes that
subsection (a) recognizes the common practice of placing a 'legend'
on the chattel paper to indicate that it has been assigned. This ap-
proach, under which the chattel paper purchaser who gives new
value in ordinary course can rely on possession of unlegended,
tangible chattel paper without any concern for other facts that it
may know, comports with the expectations of both inventory and
chattel paper financers.
373
But subsection (a) also has the requirement that the purchaser act "in
good faith. 3 74 If a purchaser has actual knowledge that his purchase
violates the rights of an earlier secured party, it is hard to see how the
purchaser could be found to be acting in good faith in going ahead
with the purchase. If he is not, then there appears to be no significant
difference between the priority rules of these two subsections.
To return now to the interrelation between section 9-330 and sec-
tion 9-324(b), the intent of the revisers of Article 9 seems to be that
the holder of a perfected purchase-money security interest in invento-
368. Revised U.C.C. §9-330(a)(1)-(2) (1999).
369. Id. § 9-330(b).
370. Id. § 9-330(f).
371. Id. § 9-330(b).
372. Id.§ 9-330(a).
373. Id. § 9-330 cmt. 5.
374. Revised U.C.C. § 9-330(a)(1) (1999).
UALR LAW REVIEW
ry does not automatically acquire priority over a conflicting security
interest in chattel paper or instrument proceeds of the inventory, even
if the secured party has a perfected security interest in the proceeds.
The secured party, however, can acquire a priority over a competing
security interest in the chattel paper or instrument as a "purchaser" of
the chattel paper or instrument under revised section 9-330. The pur-
chaser would apparently have to establish that subsection (a) or sub-
section (b) of 9-330 would give him such priority, if the proceeds are
chattel paper, or that subsection (d) of Section 9-330 fits the case, if
the proceeds are an instrument or instruments.
For example, assuming that the proceeds are tangible chattel pa-
per and the governing rule is subsection (a), the purchase-money se-
cured party would have to take possession of the chattel paper, acting
in good faith and in the ordinary course of the secured party's busi-
ness, and the chattel paper would have to be free of any indication
that it had been assigned to the rival secured party. Wouldn't the pur-
chase-money secured party also have to give new value? The answer is
no, because revised section 9-330(e) provides that, for the purposes of
the priority rules of subsections (a) and (b), "the holder of a purchase-
money security interest in inventory gives new value for chattel paper
constituting proceeds of the inventory., 375 That is, the purchase-money
secured party is to be treated as having given new value, even if that is
not so in fact.376
The rule of subsection (e), treating the purchase-money secured
party as having given new value for a "purchase" of proceeds of inven-
tory, is limited to chattel paper proceeds.3" It does not apply to in-
struments that are proceeds of inventory, as which subsection (d) go-
verns priority.3 8 Subsection (d), however, requires the purchaser of an
instrument to give "value," not "new value, 379 and the definition of
"value" includes acquiring rights in property "as security for a ...
preexisting claim.,
380
375. Id. § 9-330(e).
376. Since a "purchase" is defined as "a voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property," the consent of the debtor to the secured party's taking possession of the
chattel paper would presumably be needed, but the terms of the security agreement
might be found to authorize the secured party's action. Former U.C.C. § 1-201(32)
(1972). In 2001 this definition was shifted to U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (2001).
377. Revised U.C.C. § 9-330(e) (1999).
378. Id. § 9-330 (e)-(d).
379. Id. § 9-330(d).
380. Id. § 1-201(44) (current version at U.C.C. § 1-204 (2001).
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Another provision in revised section 9-330 relevant to security in-
terests in proceeds is subsection (c). It states that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-327 [which deals with
security interests in deposit accounts], a purchaser having priority
in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) also has priority in
proceeds of the chattel paper to the extent that: (1) Section 9-322
provides for priority in the proceeds; or (2) the proceeds consist of
the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or cash proceeds of
the specific goods, even if the purchaser's security interest in the
proceeds is unperfected. 38
Section 9-322 states the more general rules of priority relating to
proceeds and has been discussed previously.3' An extensive commen-
tary on the operation of paragraph (2) of this rule in the comments to
section 9-330383 indicates that the comment is focused on cases where
goods have been sold by a dealer and the seller has taken chattel pa-
per in exchange from the buyer. Later the dealer reacquires the sold
goods, either because they have been returned to the dealer by the
buyer or because the dealer has repossessed them after the buyer has
defaulted on the obligation represented by the chattel paper. The re-
turned or repossessed goods can be considered proceeds of the chattel
paper.
VI. AFTER-ACQUIRED COLLATERAL AND FUTURE ADVANCES
Section 9-204 of former Article 9 provided that, as a general rule,
"a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered
by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collater-
al,"384 and that "[o]bligations covered by a security agreement may
include future advances or other value whether or not the advances or
value are given pursuant to commitment."385 These rules made no ex-
press reference to possible application to sales of receivables. In re-
vised Article 9, however, section 9-204(c) explicitly authorizes future
advance clauses in agreements for sale of receivables within the scope
of the Article: "A security agreement may provide that collateral se-
cures, or that accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promis-
sory notes are sold in connection with, future advances or other value,
381. Id. § 9-330(c).
382. See text supra Part IV.B beginning in the sixth paragraph.
383. See Revised U.C.C. § 9-330 cmts. 8-11 (1999).
384. Former U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1972).
385. Id. § 9-204(3).
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whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commit-
ment., 386 Furthermore, although subsection (a) of the same section
authorizes after-acquired property clauses without mentioning sales of
receivables , a comment 88 asserts that both subsection (c) and subsec-
tion (a) "expressly validate after-acquired property and future ad-
vance clauses not only when the transaction is for security purposes
but also when the transaction is the sale of accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, or promissory notes, '3 9 and that "[t]his result
was implicit under former Article 9. "'9o
One may wonder why a buyer of receivables would want to stipu-
late in the agreement of sale for a security interest in after-acquired
property or to have the receivables secure future advances because in
a sale, there is no obligation running to the buyer to be secured by the
property sold and the property that would be serving as the collateral
would be the buyer's own property. Professor Charles Mooney, one of
the reporters for the drafting committee that drafted revised Article 9,
has explained, however, the reference to receivables in revised section
9-204(c) as intended simply to indicate that the original sales agree-
ment can be made to operate as a security agreement effective for at-
tachment of security interests in receivables subsequently sold by the
same seller to the same buyer.3 9' Article 9 would treat such subsequent
sales as secured transactions too, and to be enforceable against lien
creditors of and purchasers from the seller, the requirements for at-
tachment of any security interests would have to be satisfied.3 92 Fur-
thermore, to be treated as perfected, the buyer's interest would need
to have become attached to the newly acquired receivables.393If a secu-
rity agreement adequate for attachment has been made with respect to
the first sale and that agreement includes clauses indicating that the
current sale is being made in connection with future sales, there would
be no need for authentication of new records in order to have security
interests attach to similar property sold to the buyer in the future.3 94
386. Revised U.C.C. § 9-204(c) (1999).
387. Id. § 9-204(a).
388. Id. § 9-204 cmt. 6.
389. Id. § 9-204 cmt. 6.
390. Id. § 9-204 cmt. 6
391. E-mail from Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Charles A. Heimbolt, Jr., Professor of
Law, U. Pa. L. Sch., to the author (June 28, 2005, 09:30 a.m.) (on file with author). The






2008] SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9 81
Moreover, with attachment effected, the path would open to imme-
diate perfection if there is a financing statement on file covering such
receivables, or for automatic perfection if the receivables are promis-
sory notes or payment intangibles.395 In view of the demonstrated re-
levance of revised section 9-204 to sales of receivables, some consider-
ation of potential problems that could arise from it is in order.
A. Attachment
Neither version of Article 9 has much to say about attachment or
perfection of security interests when after-acquired collateral or future
advances are concerned. Under both versions of section 9-204, it is
made fairly clear that a security interest will not automatically apply to
after-acquired property unless the security agreement so provides,
since both versions say that the security agreement "may provide" for
such property to be covered.396 That is also consistent with the general
requirement for attachment that the security agreement identify the
property that is to serve as collateral. An after-acquired property pro-
vision might be implied if, for example, the security agreement de-
scribes the collateral as all of the debtor's "inventory" or "accounts
receivable," on the ground that these terms describe changing stocks
of the debtor's property.397
The need for the security agreement to provide for the security
interest to attach to after-acquired property clearly implies that the
type of after-acquired property referred to is property that does not fit
the definition of proceeds. No security agreement claim to an interest
395. Id.
396. The revision says that the security agreement "may create or provide for a
security interest in" such collateral. It should be added that both versions of section 9-
204 provide an exception to the general rule, invalidating an after-acquired property
clause applicable to consumer goods, other than accessions when given as additional
security, unless the debtor acquires rights in the goods within ten days after the se-
cured party gives value. Former UCC § 9-204(2) (1972); revised UCC § 9-204(b)(1)
(1999). Further, the revision also invalidates an after-acquired property clause appli-
cable to a commercial tort claim. Revised UCC § 9-204(b)(2) (1999).
397. See RAY D. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-3, at 206, n.58 (2d ed.West 1979) [hereafter Henson, Secured
Transactions]. Similarly, it may be argued that a description of collateral as all of the
debtor's "equipment" is sufficient to cover subsequently-acquired equipment. How-
ever, courts are divided on the issue under former Article 9, and Comment 3 to re-
vised § 9-108, discussing the description of collateral in a security agreement as it ap-
plies to after-acquired property, says merely that these are questions of contract inter-
pretation, not susceptible to a more precise statutory rule. See WHITE & SUMMERS
5th., supra note 51, § 22-12, n.3.
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in proceeds is necessary for a security interest to attach to proceeds of
collateral, and there is an elaborate set of rules governing perfection
and priorities with respect to proceeds, which has been discussed in
Part V above.
Former section 9-204 did not deal clearly with the question of
whether a security agreement had to contain a future advance clause
in order for the security interest to be automatically applicable to se-
cure future advances. It provided that "[o]bligations covered by the
security agreement may include future advances or other value.""39
Although this wording could be taken to mean that the security
agreement must contain a term making the security interest applicable
to secure future advances, it might also be taken to imply that the se-
curity agreement could be found to "cover" future advances in some
other way.3 9 Such an implication, however, is negated by the changed
wording of revised section 9-204, subsection (c) of which provides that
"[a] security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are
sold in connection with, future advances or other value." 4°
When a sale of receivables is being made and the parties desire to
have their sales agreement serve not only as a security agreement cov-
ering the property being sold, but also as a security agreement ade-
quate for attachment and perfection purposes with respect to recei-
vables sold in the future, there is the question of how they should
word the agreement. Revised section 9-204 offers very little guidance.
It is a matter of contract drafting that will be governed by standard
principles of contract interpretation. Because the focus is on future
sales, however, and the intent is not to provide for a security interest,
but rather to adapt to a law that treats what is not a transaction in-
tended to create a security interest as if it were such a transaction, how
it should be worded presents a nice problem. It may be that the best
way to handle the problem would be to make clear what the problem
is, saying something like the following: This transaction is a sale of
[describing the receivable or receivables sold]. It is anticipated that
under Article 9 of the U.C.C., however, it may be treated as creating a
security interest in favor of the buyer. It is the intent of the parties to
have this agreement serve as the security agreement necessary for at-
tachment of such security interest to the property now sold, and it is
further intended that in the event of any future sale of [describing the
398. Former U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1972).
399. See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 397 at § 5-12, n. 54.
400. Revised U.C.C. § 9-204(c) (1999).
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type or types of receivables contemplated] between us, this agreement
is to serve as a security agreement sufficient for attachment of a secu-
rity interest in favor of the buyer to the property then sold. Care
should also be taken to be clear about what future sales are intended
to be covered by the agreement.
With regard to perfection, it seems logical that even if the terms
of the original security agreement provided that after-acquired prop-
erty was to serve as collateral, there could be no perfected security
interest in any item of after-acquired property until the debtor ac-
quired it. Under both versions of Article 9, a security interest in colla-
teral cannot be perfected until it has attached to the property,4 °' and
(except where the debtor has a power to transfer rights in property in
which he has no property interest) that a security interest cannot at-
tach to any property until the debtor "has rights" in that property.4
Whether the security interest would be perfected when it attached
would depend on the secured party's having taken the steps appropri-
ate for perfecting a security interest in the type of collateral constitut-
ing the after-acquired property. No new filing would be necessary, for
example, where accounts or chattel paper are involved, if a filing had
already been made, that filing was still effective, the filed financing
statement described the collateral by type, and the after-acquired
property was property of that type. If the new sale is of promissory
notes or payment intangibles, perfection would be automatic. If the
perfection is achieved as to the new property, however, it would occur
as of the date of the debtor's acquisition of the property.
Another view of this question has been expressed with regard to
some types of property that become collateral, particularly inventory
and accounts. Where a financer makes advances on the security of a
business debtor's "inventory," for example, the intent of the parties is
typically that the financer is to have a security interest in whatever
composes the debtor's inventory at any time while the advance re-
mains unpaid. The items composing the inventory are expected to
change in the normal course of the debtor's business, with some items
leaving the inventory and others being added to it in a constant pro-
gression. Is it necessary to identify each item of inventory as it is add-
ed to the whole and find a security interest attaching to each item at
the time of the debtor's acquisition of it? The argument is that the
''collateral" in this arrangement should not be thought of as a group of
individual items of collateral, but rather as a body of "inventory," a
401. Former U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (1999).
402. Former U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-203(a)-(b)(2) (1999).
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stream composed of many constantly changing individual items. The
security interest, once established as having attached to the inventory,
should be thought of as a continuing interest in the stream, without
regard to changes in its composition. A financer of a business debtor's
body of "accounts" can be, and arguably should be, thought of the
same way.403
The comments to neither version of Article 9 indicate which
theory is adopted by the Article.4°4 They do explain the after-acquired
property provisions of former and revised section 9-204 as adopting
the principle of a "continuing general lien, 40 5 or "floating lien,"' but
that seems to mean merely that the "lien" of the security interest
"floats" from the original collateral to the new collateral as it is ac-
quired without the need for a new security agreement relating to the
newly acquired property.'
The reason for the failure of either version of Article 9 to endorse
one theory or the other is probably because the priority rules applica-
ble to security interests in after-acquired property are not likely to be
affected by the choice. The principal area of law where the choice of
theories would be of potential significance is bankruptcy law, where
the application of rules as to "voidable preferences" might have been
affected by the theory adopted, and that is no longer true because of
changes in the Bankruptcy Code.'
As to future advances, a security interest in collateral described in
the security agreement could attach to the collateral as soon as some
value was given and the debtor had rights in the collateral. If that se-
curity agreement provided that the collateral was to secure future in-
debtednesses of the debtor to the secured party, it seems that as new
debts arise, the security interest would change only to the extent of
expansion of the amount secured (as it would contract if part of se-
cured indebtedness was discharged). It is still the same security inter-
est in the same collateral, and if it was perfected before a new obliga-
tion arose, it should continue to be perfected afterward. Indeed, the
403. See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 397 at §§ 6-3, 7-8.
404. See former U.C.C. § 9-204 cmts. 1-7 (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-204 cmts 1-7
(1999).
405. Former U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1979); revised U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1999).
406. Revised U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1999). See also WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra
note 25 at § 23-6. Former U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1979), referred to it also as a "floating
charge."
407. See WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25, § 23-5; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACrS, § 11.5 (2d ed., Little, Brown 1990).
408. For a discussion of the history of this phase of bankruptcy law, see WHITE &
SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25 at § 23-6.
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same conclusion could be reached if the original security agreement
did not say anything about future advances but the secured party
made a subsequent advance and the parties agreed that it should be
secured by the same collateral; arguably, this is not creation of a new
security interest but expansion of the scope of the existing one, and if
that security interest is perfected, it should continue as such. Pre-
Code law did not always accept this view. There was a theory that if a
mortgagee made advances after the original advance, unless there was
a contractual obligation to make the additional advances, each new
advance should be treated as a new secured transaction and could not
be treated as covered by the original mortgage.'
Neither version of Article 9 takes a clear position on the theoreti-
cal question of whether a security interest covering an obligation aris-
ing from subsequent advances which the secured party was not con-
tractually obligated to make is a new security interest. Instead, the
rules on future advances deal with the effects that may flow from dif-
fering theories. Both versions of section 9-204 make it clear that if a
security agreement provides that the collateral is to secure future ad-
vances that provision is to be honored without regard to whether the
secured party is contractually obligated to make future advances.410
The effects of such advances on third persons are spelled out in other
sections, those dealing with priorities.
B. Priorities
1. After-Acquired Collateral
Neither version of Article 9 has any special rules relating to prior-
ities as far as after-acquired collateral is concerned. The principal
priority rules applicable to conflicts between security interests in
which the collateral, from the standpoint of at least one of the clai-
mants is after-acquired, would be those of former section 9-312(5) and
revised section 9-322(a), that are: the first-to-file-or-perfect rule for
conflicts between perfected security interests; 411 the rule that a per-
fected security interest has priority over an unperfected one (ex-
409. See Gilmore, supra note 3 at vol. 2, § 35.3. Professors White & Summers
found this theory at work in the view of some authorities construing former Article 9,
in cases where a security interest was perfected without filing (as by possession) and
the secured party made subsequent advances that were not made pursuant to contrac-
tual commitments. WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25 at § 24-4, n. 22.
410. See former U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-204(c) cmt. 5 (1999).
411. Former U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972).
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pressed in section 9-322 and arguably implied by former section 9-
312); 412 and the rule that unperfected security interests rank according
to their order of attachment to the collateral.413 The first-to-file-or-
perfect rule can be a problem for buyers of payment intangibles or
promissory notes. Even though revised section 9-204 may operate to
give such a buyer an immediately-perfected security interest without a
new security agreement having to be made, the buyer could lose out to
a rival secured party who had filed a financing statement covering that
type of collateral and made the filing between the times of the original
and subsequent sales.4 There are also more specialized priority rules
that might apply, such as the rules granting special priority to holders
of purchase-money security interests and those of former section 9-308
and revised section 9-330, which deal with purchasers of chattel paper
and instruments. 5
2. Future Advances
Both versions of Article 9 have a number of special provisions re-
lating to future advances. Some of these rules are concerned with con-
flicts between claimants to goods and can be by-passed here. This dis-
cussion will be limited to the application of the rules to cases where
revised section 9-204(c) would apply because an original security
agreement provided that receivables were being sold in connection
with future advances or other value. In the case of a later sale of more
receivables, there really is no "future advance" but there is a giving of
"other value," the price for the later-sold receivables, and thus there is
a potential problem of applicability of some special rules of priority
related to future advances.
For conflicts between rival secured parties, former section 9-
312(7) provided that
If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by
filing, the taking of possession, or under Section 9-115 or Section 9-
116 on investment property, the security interest has the same
priority for the purpose of subsection (5)... with respect to future
advances as it does with respect to the first advance. If a commit-
ment is made before or while the security interest is so perfected,
the security interest has the same priority with respect to advances
412. Revised U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2) (1999).
413. Id. § 9-322(a)(1).
414. Professor Mooney mentioned this peril in his e-mail to the author. See supra
note 391.
415. See former U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-330 (1999).
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made pursuant thereto. In other cases a perfected security interest
has priority from the date an advance is made.
416
The first sentence of this subsection appeared to lay down a basic
rule for priority as to future advances that only if a future advance was
made while the security interest was perfected would the security in-
terest have the same priority with respect to the future advance as it
would have with respect to the first advance. Moreover, the perfection
had to have been achieved by filing, taking of possession of the colla-
teral, or under rules relating to perfection of security interests in in-
vestment property appearing in sections 9-115 and 9-116 (which al-
lowed for perfection by filing, possession, control, and automatically,
in various contexts). 417 Left out were a number of cases of automatic
perfection not dealt with in sections 9-115 and 9-116, so the rule did
not apply to most cases of automatic perfection. These were among
the "other cases" referred to in the last sentence of section 9-312(7),418
the rule applicable there being that future advances had priority from
the time they were made. The reason for making such a distinction
was perhaps that, in cases of automatic perfection, third persons giving
value on the security of the collateral would not have notice of the
existence of the security interest.419
It appeared that any case in which a future advance was made
while a security interest was unperfected would also be an "other
case," in which the advance would have priority only from the time
the advance was made. This may not have been the intended meaning,
but it certainly could be understood from the subsection as it was writ-
ten.42°
A qualification of the basic rule was that a secured party could
take advantage of it even if the security interest was no longer per-
fected in one of the methods referred to in the first sentence of the
subsection. That was so if, before or while the security interest was so
perfected, the secured party had made a commitment to make a later
advance or advances. In legal theory, the secured party was contrac-
tually bound to make the advance or advances,42' and apparently the
416. Former U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972).
417. See id. §§ 9-115 & 9-116.
418. See id. § 9-312(7).
419. See HENSON, supra note 397, § 5-13 at 171.
420. See revised U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1999).
421. But see Gilmore, supra note 3, vol. 2, § 35.4 (contending that the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary advances is "nonsense," since a contract to lend
money is virtually unenforceable).
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thought was that the secured party should not be penalized for honor-
ing a contractual commitment.
The priority afforded by the basic priority rule of that subsection
did not depend on the original security agreement having provided
that future advances were to be secured by the same collateral. A later
advance made under a new security agreement but describing the
same property as security for the debt would be entitled to the same
priority as the original advance. 2
Another special priority rule for future advances appeared in
former section 9-301(4). It gave some protection to a lien creditor who
acquired a lien on the collateral while a security interest in the colla-
teral was perfected in any manner, and it provided that the lien credi-
tor "takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it se-
cures advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within [for-
ty-five] days thereafter or made without knowledge of the lien or pur-
suant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.'
23
Under this rule the secured party was assured of priority over a lien
creditor as to all future advances made before a judicial lien was ac-
quired as to the collateral or within forty-five days after the creditor
acquired the lien, and also as to advances made more than forty-five
days after the lien was acquired if they were made while the secured
party was ignorant of the lien or made pursuant to a commitment en-
tered into without knowledge of the lien. A comment explained that
the primary purpose of the rule was to coordinate Article 9 with the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 by providing for an initial forty-five day
period of unconditional immunity for advances made after a creditor
had a acquired a judicial lien on the collateral.424
A reworded version of former section 9-312(7) is in revised Ar-
ticle 9, section 9-323(a). It does not state an affirmative rule as to
whether and when a security interest is to have the same priority for a
future advance, as it does with respect to the first advance, because,
says a comment, "a proper reading" of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule
of former section 9-312(5) and revised section 9-322(a)(1) will yield
that result.4" The first-to-file-or-perfect rule is the general rule for de-
termining priorities between perfected security interests. It would ap-
ply with respect to future advances unless some other rule provided
otherwise.
422. See former U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 7 (1972), and HENSON, supra note 397 at § 5-
12, n. 55.
423. Former U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972).
424. See id. § 9-301 cmt. 7; HENSON, supra note. 397 at § 5-15.
425. See revised U.C.C. § 9-323 cmt. 3(1999).
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Section 9-323(a) states an exception to that general rule that is
similar to the exception contained in former section 9-312(7) 426 but
differs from it in wording and, to some extent, in substance. Further-
more, the rewording of the subsection avoids any suggestion that the
general rule applies only if future advances are made while a security
interest is perfected.427 The subsection provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), for purposes of de-
termining the priority of a perfected security interest under Section
9-322(a)(1), perfection of the security interest dates from the time
that an advance is made to the extent that the security interest se-
cures an advance that: (1) is made while the security interest is per-
fected only: (A) under Section 9-309 when it attaches [automatic
perfection without time limit]; or (B) temporarily under Section 9-
312(e), (f), or (g); and (2) is not made pursuant to a commitment
entered into before or while the security interest is perfected by a
method other than under Section 9-309 or 9-312(e), (f), or (g).428
Why is it important to clarify the point that a future advance will
generally have the same priority as the original advance, even if the
future advance is made while the security interest is unperfected? The
motive is to preserve the full operation of the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule for all cases where perfection is not automatic. Under the first-to-
file-or-perfect rule, priority can be achieved as to an original advance
even though the advance is made while the security interest is unper-
fected and perfection follows the advance; that is so where the secured
party has filed before the advance is made and priority is achieved as
the first to file. The thought is that there ought to be the same possibil-
ity of priority with respect to a future advance that is made after a fil-
ing but prior to perfection. 9
The revised rule treating future advances as having priority only
from the time they are made has been extended to apply to all cases of
automatic perfection, presumably because no reason is seen to exclude
any instances of automatic perfection.3' The revised rule continues to
allow the general rule to apply to advances made pursuant to com-
mitments entered into while the security interest is perfected other
426. See supra note 419.
427. See revised U.C.C. § 9-323 cmt. 3 (1999).
428. Id. § 9-323(a)(1)-(2).
429. See id. § 9-323 cmt. 3.
430. Id. § 9-323.
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than automatically.431 Professor Gilmore's criticism of this idea432 has
apparently had no influence on the drafters of the revision.
Subsection (b) of revised section 9-323 is the revised version of
former section 9-301(4), dealing with priority as to future advances
when the rival claimant is a lien creditor. 33 Although differently
worded, it is in substance the same as the former rule.'M
Subsection (c) of revised section 9-323 is new. It provides that
"[s]ubsections (a) and (b) do not apply to a security interest held by a
secured party that is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment in-
tangibles, or promissory notes. 4 35 This leaves the priority of all securi-
ty interests acquired by buyers of receivables to be governed by the
same priority rules, and that is quite appropriate, because any case in
which a buyer of receivables makes a subsequent purchase of other
receivables is not really one in which a "future advance" is being
made, but involves a new sale and creation of a new security interest.
As to conflicts between security interests, the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule will be the principal applicable rule. For conflicts between the
buyer and lien creditors, the rule of section 9-317(a)(2) will apply.436
VII. RIGHT AND DUTIES OF SECURED PARTIES
Former Article 9 had two sections dealing with rights and duties
of secured parties, other than rights and duties arising from defaults by
the debtors. The revision deals with these topics and also contains
some new provisions.
A. Secured Party in Possession of Collateral
Former section 9-207 dealt with situations where the secured par-
ty had possession of the collateral. Section 9-207 could apply to situa-
tions where there had been a default, but it was also applicable to pre-
default situations where the secured party had possession of the colla-
teral.437 There were four subsections.
Subsection (1) required the secured party to "use reasonable care
in the custody and preservation of the collateral in his possession,"
431. Id. § 9-323.
432. See supra note 421.
433. Revised U.C.C. § 9-323 (1999).
434. Id.
435. Id. § 9-323(c).
436. See supra note 225.
437. Former U.C.C. § 9-207 cmt. 4 (1972).
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which included when the collateral was an instrument or chattel paper,
"taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless
otherwise agreed.
438
Subsection (2) provided that, unless otherwise agreed: (a) a se-
cured party in possession could charge the debtor with reasonable ex-
penses incurred in the custody, preservation, use or operation of the
collateral, and such charges would be secured by the collateral; (b) the
debtor bore the risk of accidental loss or damage "to the extent of any
deficiency in effective insurance coverage"; (c) the secured party was
authorized to hold as additional security any "increase or profits...
received from the collateral," except that money so received, unless
remitted to the debtor, was to be applied in reduction of the secured
obligation; (d) the secured party had a duty to "keep the collateral
identifiable," except that fungible collateral could be commingled; and
(e) the secured party had a right "to repledge the collateral upon
terms which [did] not impair the debtor's right to redeem it.
43 9
Subsection (3) provided that, for any loss resulting from failure to
perform the duties imposed by subsections (1) or (2), the secured par-
ty would be liable for the loss but did not lose the security interest."4°
Subsection (4) declared the secured party entitled to use or operate
the collateral for the purpose of preserving it or its value, pursuant to
a court order, or (except in cases of consumer goods collateral) "in the
manner and to the extent provided in the security agreement."' '
A number of these rules were inappropriate if applied to buyers
of chattel paper who were treated as secured parties by Article 9 be-
cause they were rules that assumed that the collateral belonged to
someone other than the secured party. Their purpose was to protect
the interests of the owner, but the statutory language made no excep-
tion for such cases and the official comments did not discuss the ques-
tion.
In revised Article 9, section 9-207 deals with the same general
topic and, with one exception, is not greatly different in substance.
There are four subsections. Subsection (a) is nearly identical to sub-
section (1) of the former version."2 Subsection (b) reproduces the
rules of former subsection (2)(a), (b) and (d) and former subsection
(4) in very similar language."3 Subsection (c) contains the substance of
438. Id. § 9-207(1).
439. Id. § 9-207(2).
440. Id. § 9-207(3).
441. Id. § 9-207(4).
442. See revised U.C.C. § 9-207(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-207(1) (1972).
443. See revised U.C.C. § 9-207(b) (1999), former U.C.C. § 9-207(2) (a), (b), &
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former subsection (2)(c) and (e), although it applies, not only when
the secured party has possession of collateral, but also when the se-
cured party has control of intangible collateral under sections 9-104
through 9-107. ' (Former subsection (3) is omitted because its content
is covered in Part 6, Subpart 2 of revised Article 9.)
Subsection (d), however, is new by making subsections (b) and
(c) entirely inapplicable to buyers of receivables. 4'5 Further, subsection
(d) provides that subsection (a) does not apply to such a buyer unless
the buyer has a right of recourse against the seller or a secondary obli-
gor if the collateral turns out to be uncollectible or there is a default
by an obligor on the collateral. 46 This new provision corrects the over-
sight that occurred in the drafting of former section 9-207.
B. Request for Statement of Account or List of Collateral
Former section 9-208 dealt with the debtor's right to have the se-
cured party either confirm or correct a statement of indebtedness or a
list of collateral. 4'7 A comment to the section explained that it was
aimed primarily at protecting the interests of creditors of and purchas-
ers from the debtor who needed more detailed information about a
security interest than might be disclosed by a filed financing state-
ment. 44 To protect the secured party's interest in not being required to
disclose details of the secured party's business to casual inquirers or
competitors, however, the section gave the right to demand disclo-
sures to the debtor only."9 The debtor would typically make such a
demand in connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors or
purchasers for purposes of establishing credit standing.45 ° These rules
would be of questionable appropriateness to "secured transactions" in
the form of sales of accounts or chattel paper, but no exception was
made for such cases.
In revised Article 9, section 9-210 is the successor to former sec-
tion 9-208.4 11 Although differently worded, it makes few substantive
changes from the former version. One significant change, however, is
(d)(4) (1972).
444. See revised U.C.C. § 9-207(c) (1999), former U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c) & (e)
(1972).
445. See revised U.C.C. § 9-207(d) (1999).
446. See id.
447. See former U.C.C. § 9-208 (1972).
448. See id. § 9-208, cmt. 2.
449. See id. § 9-208.
450. Id. § 9-208 cmt. 2.
451. See id. § 9-208, revised U.C.C. § 9-210 (1999).
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that subsection (b) declares that "a secured party, other than a buyer
of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes"
has a duty to comply with the debtor's demands for information as to
the collateral or the secured obligations.452 The effect of the "other
than" part of this rule is to exclude sales of receivables from the oper-
ation of the section entirely.
C. Other Provisions in Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 contains two new sections dealing with duties of
the secured party. Section 9-208 states some additional duties of se-
cured parties having control of collateral. The section applies to cases
in which there are no outstanding obligations and the secured parties
are not committed to make future advances or to otherwise give val-
ue.453 The only portion of the section that might be of concern to a
buyer of receivables would be subsection (b)(3), which deals with se-
cured parties having control of electronic chattel paper and requires
the secured party, on demand from the debtor, to terminate the con-
trol.4 4 This rule, however, applies only to "a secured party, other than
a buyer, having control of electronic chattel paper," so even this rule
need not worry a buyer of receivables.455
Section 9-209 applies where an account debtor has been notified
of an assignment of the obligation and that payment is to be made to
the assignee, but there is no outstanding secured obligation and the
secured party is not committed to make future advances or otherwise
give value.56 On demand of the debtor, the secured party must send
the account debtor a release from further obligation to the secured
party.457 The term "account debtor" is defined in revised section 9-
102(a)(3) as "a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or gen-
eral intangible," which would include a person obligated on a receiva-
ble other than an instrument.4 8 Subsection (c) of Section 9-209 pro-
vides, however, that "[t]his section does not apply to an assignment
constituting the sale of an account, chattel paper, or payment intangi-
ble," so buyers of receivables whose purchases are treated as "secured
452. Revised U.C.C. § 9-210(b) (1999).
453. Id. § 9-208.
454. Id. § 9-208(b)(3).
455. Id. § 9-208(b)(3).
456. See id. § 9-209(a) (1)-(2).
457. See id. § 9-209(b).
458. See revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (1999).
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transactions" by revised Article 9 are not affected by the requirement
of this section.459
VIII. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF RECEIVABLES
A. Restrictions Arising From the Terms of Security Agreements
Former section 9-311 provided that "[t]he debtor's rights in colla-
teral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of sale,
creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other
judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement
prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default."
6
A comment explained that under pre-UCC law some jurisdictions
held that if the secured transaction was one in which "title" to the col-
lateral was transferred to the secured party, the debtor's remaining
"equitable" interest in the collateral was not subject to the claims of
the debtor's creditors when they proceeded by legal process. 61 The
object of section 9-311 was to repudiate such holdings and make it
clear that in all secured transactions under Article 9 "the debtor has
an interest . . . which he can dispose of and which his creditors can
reach," '462 and also, evidently, to render ineffective contract terms that
would hamper the debtor's freedom to effect transfers of his interest
in the collateral 63
This rule could be read as meaning that if the "security interest"
was the interest of a buyer of accounts or of chattel paper, the seller,
as "debtor," retained a transferable interest in the sold "collateral,"
but it was probably not so intended. The rule seemed to assume that a
case in which it applied was one in which the debtor retained some
sort of property interest in the collateral by operation of the agree-
ment of the parties, whether that interest was "legal" or "equitable."
Although a seller of receivables whose sale was treated by Article 9 as
a secured transaction had power in some circumstances to make trans-
fers of interests in the receivables after the sale and lien creditors of
the seller had a limited power to acquire legal claims to the recei-
vables, this was not on the theory that the seller retained a property
interest in the sold property, but rather that the seller had power to
459. Id. § 9-209(c).
460. Former U.C.C. § 9-311 (1972).
461. Id. § 9-311 cmt. 2.
462. Id. § 9-311 cmt. 1.
463. Id. § 9-311 cmt. 1.
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deprive the buyer of all or part of his ownership interest in the recei-
vables.
In revised Article 9, section 9-401 is the successor to former sec-
tion 9-311."6 It provides that, as a general rule, "whether a debtor's
rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is
governed by law other than this Article."' Subsection (b) of that sec-
tion provides, however, that an "agreement between the debtor and
the secured party which prohibits the transfer of the debtor's rights in
collateral or makes the transfer a default does not prevent the transfer
from taking effect." 67 This rule is quite similar to its predecessor, but it
does not nullify a provision making a transfer a default; it merely
makes it clear that an effective transfer can be made despite such a
term in the security agreement.6 A comment points out that the rule
of subsection (b) has no application to sales of receivables, because
"the debtor has no remaining rights to transfer." 9 Section 9-318(a)
expressly provides that a debtor that has sold a receivable retains no
"legal or equitable interest" in the property sold."
B. Restrictions Arising From the Terms of Contracts Creating Re-
ceivables
It has been pointed out previously that transactions involving
sales of receivables or creating security interests in receivables involve
transfers of interests in collateral that is itself contractual in nature. If,
for example, an account is sold by its original owner, the subject of the
sale is the owner's contract right to payment of a debt. If Article 9
treats the sale as a secured transaction, as it usually does, the buyer of
the account is treated as a "secured party" and the seller as a "deb-
tor," but the right the buyer acquires is a contract right owed to the
seller by a third person, usually called "account debtor" by Article 9.47'
Restrictions on the transferability of the contract right that a receiva-
ble represents may arise from the terms of the contract that produced
the receivable, or perhaps from law applicable to that sort of contract.
464. See Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No. 14 (1994) (which, discussing
the transfer of title entailed in a sale of receivables, does not mention § 9-311 as rele-
vant).
465. Former U.C.C. § 9-311 (1972); revised U.C.C. § 9-401 (1999).
466. Revised U.C.C. § 9-401(a) (1999).
467. Id. § 9-401(b).
468. See id. § 9-401 cmt. 5.
469. Id. § 9-401 cmt. 7.
470. Id. § 9-318(a).
471. Id. § 9-102(a)(3).
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In former Article 9, section 9-318(4) had a rule applicable to re-
strictions arising from the terms of such a contract.4 It provided that
[a] term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor
is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits
creation of a security interest in a general intangible for money due
or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to such
assignment or security interest.473
The subsection implemented a policy of free assignability of con-
tract rights in recognition of an economic need for such rights to be
available as collateral in financing transactions.474 The rule did not,
however, apply to all contract rights that might be used as collateral
for Article 9 security interests. It applied to assignments of accounts,
whether the transaction was one of sale or one intended as security,
and it applied to assignments as security of "general intangible[s] for
money due or to become due, 475 (what revised Article 9 calls "payment
intangibles" 476). Sales of payment intangibles were not within the cov-
erage of former Article 9. Neither chattel paper nor instruments were
mentioned, and general intangibles were not covered unless they were
contracts for the payment of money.
In revised Article 9, the topic is dealt with considerably more
broadly and in a more complex manner. Sections 9-406 through 9-409
are involved. Section 9-407 deals with restrictions on creation and en-
forcement of security interests in lessors's and lessees's interests in
leased goods.47 7 Section 9-409 deals with restrictions on assignments of
letter of credit rights.478 Only sections 9-406 and 9-408 have application
to restrictions on assignments of receivables. 9
Section 9-406(d) provides that, as a general rule,
a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor
or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it: (1) pro-
hibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or
person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or
transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement
of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intang-
472. Former U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1972).
473. Id.
474. See id. § 9-318 cmt. 4.
475. Id. § 9-318(4).
476. Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-318(9) (1972).
477. Revised U.C.C. § 9-407 (1999) is derived from § 2A-303.
478. Revised U.C.C. § 9-409 (1999).
479. Id. §§ 9-406 & 9408.
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ible, or promissory note, or (2) provides that the assignment or
transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of
the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of re-
coupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or re-
medy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
480promissory note.
This rule is a more elaborate statement of the rule of former sec-
tion 9-318(4).81 Much of the new verbiage appears to be intended to
clarify the former rule, but there are changes in content as well. The
application of the rule has been expanded to cover all four types of
intangibles the sales of which are treated as secured transactions by
revised Article 9."82 In addition, the revision nullifies provisions that
would treat an assignment, transfer of, or grant of a security interest
in, any of the four types of receivables as a breach of contract, though
not as a default.
The general rule of revised section 9-406(d) is subject to several
exceptions.' One is that the rule does not apply to accounts that are
health-care-insurance receivables.4' Another is that if law other than
Article 9 would establish a different rule for an individual account
debtor who incurred an obligation primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes that other law controls.485 A third is that the rule is
subject to sections 2A-303 and 9-407, which deal with leases of
goods.4 6 And the rule does not apply to sales of payment intangibles
and promissory notes .4 That leaves it applicable to most sales of ac-
counts and chattel paper and to most transactions intended to create
security interests in all four types of receivables.
Subsection (f) of revised section 9-406 contains another innova-
tion.48 It declares ineffective any law, statute, or governmental regula-
tion other than the Code that "prohibits, restricts, or requires the con-
sent of a government, governmental body or official, or account deb-
tor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation of a security inter-
est in, an account or chattel paper," or that would treat such action as
480. Id. § 9-406(d).
481. Former U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1972).
482. See revised U.C.C. § 9-406 cmt. 5 (1999). But see infra next paragraph of text.
483. Id. § 9-406(d).
484. Id. § 9-406(i).
485. Id. § 9-406(h).
486. Id. § 9-406(d).
487. Id. § 9-406(e).
488. Revised U.C.C. § 9-406(f) (1999).
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a breach of contract.489 This declaration amounts to applying the same
nullification rule that subsection (d) applies to restrictive contract
terms to other laws of the same jurisdiction that has adopted revised
Article 9, which would place restrictions on transfers of interests in
receivables, but its application is limited to accounts and chattel paper.
Furthermore, it is subject to the same exceptions as is subsection (d). '
Revised section 9-408 picks up where 9-406 leaves off and pro-
vides rules for restrictions on most of the assignments of intangibles
that are not covered by 9-406.49t Subsection (a) declares ineffective a
term of a contract which prohibits, restricts or requires the consent of
the person obligated on the contract to the assignment or transfer of
the contract or the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security
interest in it, or that would treat such action as a breach of contract.4
This rule is much the same as that of section 9-406(d), but this one
applies to sales of payment intangibles or promissory notes, 493 to sales
of and transactions intended to create security interests in health-care-
insurance receivables, and to transactions intended to create security
interests in general intangibles other than payment intangibles.494
Subsection (c) of revised section 9-408 declares ineffective a
rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or re-
quires the consent of a government, governmental body or official,
person obligated on a promissory note, or account debtor to the as-
signment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, a prom-
489. Id.
490. There is no express exception for sales of payment intangibles and promissory
notes, but there is no need for one, as subsection (f) doesn't apply at all where those
types of receivables are involved. Revised U.C.C. § 9-406(f) (1999).
491. Revised U.C.C. § 9-408 (1999).
492. Id. § 9-408(a).
493. Although subsection (a) refers to payment intangibles and promissory notes
without distinguishing between sales of such intangibles and transactions intended to
create security interests in them, subsection (b) provides: "Subsection (a) applies to a
security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security inter-
est arises out a sale of the payment intangible or promissory note." Revised U.C.C. §
9-408(b) (1999).
494. These intangibles are referred to in subsection (a) without distinguishing be-
tween sales and transactions intended as security, and there is no other provision in §
9-408 that makes such a distinction. Thus, as far as health-care-insurance receivables
are concerned, the rule of subsection (a) applies to both types of transactions, since
"health-care-insurance receivables" are "accounts" and Article 9 treats sales of ac-
counts as secured transactions. With respect to general intangibles that are not pay-
ment intangibles, subsection (a) would apply only to transactions intended to create
security interests in them, since sales of such general intangibles are not treated as
secured transactions by revised Article 9.
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issory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangi-
ble495
or that would treat such action as a breach of contract. This rule is
virtually the same as that of section 9-406(f), except that it applies to
promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables and general in-
tangibles (including payment intangibles), whether sold or intended as
security, whereas 9-406(f) applies only to accounts (other than health-
care-insurance receivables) and chattel paper.46
Since section 9-408 applies the same rules as does section 9-406,
differing only in the types of intangibles to which they apply, why deal
with them in separate sections? The reason is that section 9-408 con-
tains a modification of its free-assignability rules that does not appear
in section 9-406. 417 Subsection (d) of section 9-408 provides that if a
term in a promissory note or an agreement between an account debtor
and the person with whom the account debtor contracts, or if a law of
the sort described in subsection (c) would be effective under law other
than Article 9, but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c) of this sec-
tion, the security interest created in violation of the contract term or
law is entirely unenforceable against the account debtor or person
obligated on the promissory note, and that person need pay no atten-
tion to it.4 98 A comment explains that subsections (a) and (c), overrid-
ing anti-assignment contract terms and laws, enhance the ability of
some debtors to obtain credit,499 but subsection (d) protects a person
obligated on a note or an account debtor from adverse effects arising
from the security interest if the restriction which subsection (a) or (c)
invalidates would be effective under other law."
What sort of fact situation is the target of this rule? The com-
ments offer the example of an owner of a cable television franchise
who is prohibited by law from assigning the franchise without the con-
sent of the municipality that granted it. A lender is willing to extend
credit to the franchisee, provided that the loan is secured by the deb-
tor's "going business" value. To secure the loan, the debtor grants the
lender a security interest in all of the debtor's existing and future
property. The franchise is the principal source of the value of the
495. Revised U.C.C. § 9408(c) (1999).
496. Id. § 9-406(f).
497. Id. § 9-406, § 9-408.
498. The actual text of the subsection states the proposition much more elaborate-
ly, but the statement made here is believed to be an accurate summary of it. See re-
vised U.C.C. § 9-408, cmts. 2 & 6 (1999).
499. See revised U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 4 (1999).
500. Id. § 9-408 cmt. 2.
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business, but the municipality refuses to consent to its assignment as
collateral. Under subsection (c) of section 9-408, the anti-assignment
law would not prevent creation of a valid security interest in the fran-
chise (a general intangible, in which the franchisee is the debtor and
the franchisor is the account debtor), but the law requiring the muni-
cipality's consent remains in effect to trigger the operation of subsec-
tion (d), and it would protect the municipality by preventing the se-
cured party from enforcing its security interest to the detriment of the
municipality.0 1
Of course, the secured party in this example would have a securi-
ty interest that seems worthless, because it is totally unenforceable
against the account debtor, but the comments to section 9-408 insist
that "under some circumstances a secured party may ascribe value to
the collateral to which its security interest has attached, even if this
section precludes the secured party from enforcing the security inter-
est without the agreement of the account debtor or person obligated
on a promissory note."5"This may be the case where the secured party
sees a likelihood of obtaining that agreement in the future. This may
also be the case where the secured party anticipates that the collateral
will give rise to a type of proceeds as to which this section would not
apply. 3 There may be further advantages for the secured party in the
event that the assignor goes into bankruptcy94
IX. ENFORCEMENT
Part 5 of former Article 9 and Part 6 of the 1998 revision deal
with remedies available to a secured party for default on the part of
the debtor. The term "default" has traditionally referred to a breach
of contract by the debtor of such nature as to justify the secured party
in foreclosing on the collateral to obtain payment of the secured obli-
gation. At common law, a very restrictive concept of default was em-
ployed by the courts being limited to failure by the debtor to pay the
secured debt as promised.505 Neither version of Article 9 defines "de-
fault," though former section 9-501(1) provided that "when a debtor is
in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights
501. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 7, ex. 4.
502. Id. § 9-408 cmt. 8.
503. Id. § 9-408 cmt. 8.
504. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 7.
505. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 9-501:2 at
n.3 (West 2008).
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and remedies provided in this Part"' and that has been taken to mean
that the security agreement is to define what conduct of the debtor is
to constitute a default."7 In revised Article 9, there is a comment stat-
ing that "[a]s did former Section 9-501, this Article leaves to the
agreement of the parties the circumstances giving rise to a default."
'
The remedies for default provided by Article 9 are diverse and
the rules detailed. Only the main features are described here. The se-
cured party is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral and
apply the proceeds to: (a) the expenses of the disposition, (b) the satis-
faction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest, and (c) the
satisfaction of any subordinate security interest in the collateral if de-
mand has been made by the junior secured party. °9 If any proceeds
remain, the debtor is entitled to them,510 and the debtor remains liable
for any deficiency. u This is the most common method of foreclosure
on a security interest."'
Where the collateral takes the form of a right to payment, such as
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes,
the secured party may enforce the security interest by notifying the
account debtor or obligor on the collateral that payment is to be made
to the secured party and, if necessary, may enforce the obligation
represented by the collateral by legal proceedings."' The proceeds of
collection are applied to the cost of collection and the debt secured by
the collateral, and under revised Article 9, to satisfaction of subordi-
nate security interests and liens on the collateral, if the junior creditors
have made demand to share in the proceeds." ' The debtor is entitled
to anything remaining, and if the secured debt has not been complete-
ly discharged, the debtor is liable for the deficiency."5
Under some circumstances the foreclosing secured party has the
option to retain the collateral in satisfaction or (under revised Article
9) partial satisfaction of the secured obligation.5 6 This procedure is
often referred to as "strict foreclosure."5"7
506. Former U.C.C. § 9-501 (1) (1972).
507. HAWKLAND, supra note 505, § 9-501:2 at n.4.
508. Revised U.C.C. § 9-601 cmt. 3 (1999).
509. Id. §§ 9-610(a) & 9-615(a); former U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1972).
510. Revised U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(1) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1972).
511. Revised U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(2) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1972).
512. See WHITE & SUMMERS 5th, supra note 51, § 25-1.
513. Revised U.C.C. § 9-607(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-502 (1972).
514. Revised U.C.C. § 9-608(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1972).
515. Revised U.C.C. § 9-608(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1972).
516. Revised U.C.C. § 9-620(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972).
517. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS 3d, supra note 25, § 25-8.
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In aid of the remedies of strict foreclosure and disposition of the
collateral, the secured party is entitled to take possession of the colla-
teral if he does not already have possession518 (and if the collateral is
tangible or semi-tangible property, so that taking possession is possi-
ble). Instead of proceeding directly against the collateral, the secured
party may bring action on the secured debt, recover judgment, and
then enforce the judgment against any property of the debtor, includ-
ing the collateral for the debt.19
Both versions of Article 9 contain elaborate restrictions on the
manner in which the secured party may proceed to foreclose on the
collateral. These restrictions are designed to protect the debtor from
abuses of the secured party's powers over the collateral, and to offer
reasonable protection of the debtor's interest in maximizing the
amount of the secured debt that is discharged through the foreclosure
proceedings and safeguarding the debtor's right to receive any surplus
recovery. As an example, former section 9-504(3), dealing with the
secured party's right to dispose of the collateral after default,52 al-
though it was fairly liberal about the methods of disposition that could
be employed, sternly insisted that "every aspect of the disposition in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commer-
cially reasonable,""52 and it went on to deal in more specific terms with
the sort of advance notice of disposition that had to be given to the
debtor. Revised Article 9 has similar but more detailed provisions in
sections 9-610(b) and 9-611 through 9-614.522
Another type of debtor-protection that may also be used by other
secured parties is a right to redeem the collateral by tendering full
payment of the secured obligation as well as the secured party's forec-
losure expenses to date. The tender has to be made before the foreclo-
sure process has gone too far "i.e., before the secured party has col-
lected on receivables collateral, disposed of the collateral or con-
tracted to do so, or completed the process of strict foreclosure.
5 23
Superficial as this survey of Article 9 default rules has been, it is
sufficient to demonstrate that the rules are largely inappropriate for
application to the case of a buyer of receivables whose purchase is
within the scope of Article 9. The very concept of "default" fits awk-
wardly the relationship between the buyer and the seller of recei-
518. Revised U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972).
519. Revised U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (1999); former U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1972).
520. See former U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990).
521. Id.
522. Revised U.C.C. §9-610(b) & §§ 9-611-9-614 (1999).
523. Id. § 9-623; former U.C.C. § 9-506 (1972) was similar.
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vables. The traditional meaning of the term, failure to pay the secured
debt when due, is inapplicable. The seller ("debtor") has no debt to
the buyer ("secured party"); if there were a debt arising from the sale,
it would be more likely to run the other way, with the buyer owing the
seller a future payment of the agreed price. Moreover, the main focus
of the remedies for default is on the secured party's ability to collect
payment of an amount owed by the debtor by foreclosing on the colla-
teral, and that would not be the objective of any enforcement action
brought by a buyer of receivables against the seller, nor would the
buyer wish to foreclose on the buyer's own property. Finally, why
should a buyer of receivables be bound by restrictive rules designed
for the debtor's protection when the buyer deals with property of
which he is full owner?
The buyer of receivables may have some legitimate concerns. In
the case of a buyer of tangible chattel paper or promissory notes, if the
buyer has left the property in the hands of the seller, to have the seller
collect payment on the buyer's behalf, the buyer may learn that the
seller has been collecting payments on such receivables without ac-
counting to the buyer for the amounts collected or that the seller has
failed to live up to some other commitment the seller has made. The
buyer may then wish to take possession of the paper and to hold the
seller liable for the withheld collections, and the buyer may need legal
support to do so. Even if pure intangibles are involved, the buyer may
not have notified the account debtors of the sale, the arrangement
with the seller being that the seller will collect payments and remit
them to the buyer, and the seller may keep collections which should
have been turned over to the buyer. Moreover, the UCC's treatment
of sales of receivables as secured transactions has the effect, in some
circumstances, of empowering the seller to deprive the buyer of title to
the receivables that have been sold or to subject them to security in-
terests that would be entitled to priority over the buyer's claim to
them. If the seller does engage in such conduct, the buyer needs reme-
dies against the seller. Indeed, even the seller may need legal protec-
tion, especially if the buyer has a right to charge back to the seller un-
collectible collateral or to hold the seller responsible for failure of the
collateral to bring an adequate resale price.
The former version of Article 9 made no distinction in most of
the default rules between outright sales of property which are treated
as secured transactions and transactions actually intended to create
security interests. It did, however, contain a few provisions which
made such distinctions.
Section 9-502 was the section which authorized a secured party,
after a default, to demand that the account debtors or obligors on re-
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ceivables serving as collateral make payments to the secured party,
and to enforce such receivables against the account debtors and obli-
gors.524 Subsection (2) provided as follows:
A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge back un-
collected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against
the debtor and who undertakes to collect from the account debtors
or obligors must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and
may deduct his reasonable expenses of realization from the collec-
tions. If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the se-
cured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the
underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the
debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only
if the security agreement so provides.525
Section 9-504 was the section of former Article 9 which dealt with
the secured party's right to sell or otherwise dispose of collateral after
default.5 26 Subsection (2) was a word-for-word copy of the second and
third sentences of section 9-502(2).' 27 Its requirement of commercial
reasonableness in every aspect of the disposition, however, appeared
in subsection (3)28 As worded, it would require commercial reasona-
bleness in all cases of disposition of the collateral after default. 9
Professor Gilmore commented on these passages, which also ap-
peared in the original version of Article 9.53 0 He wrote that
a better way of making the point would have been to say that the
default provisions of Part 5 do not apply to non-recourse sales of
accounts ... and chattel paper. If there is no right to a surplus, no
liability for a deficiency and no provision for recourse, neither the
debtor nor any of his creditors has a legitimate concern with what
the secured party does with his own property. That is what the pro-
visions of [section] 9-502 and [section] 9-504 . . . were meant to
531say.
524. Former U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1972).
525. Id.
526. See id. § 9-504.
527. See id. §§ 9-504 & 9-502.
528. Id. § 9-504(3).
529. See id.§ 9-504(3).
530. The original passages differed from those described above in that they re-
ferred also to sales of "contract rights," a reference which was later dropped from the
Article.
531. Gilmore, supra note 3 at vol. 2, § 44.4, n.6.
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In the 1998 revision of Article 9, section 9-601(g) provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section 9-607(c), this part imposes
no duties upon a secured party that is... a buyer of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes." '532 The provision
"otherwise" in section 9-607(c) is that a
secured party shall proceed in a commercially reasonable manner if
the secured party: (1) undertakes to collect from or enforce an ob-
ligation of an account debtor or other person obligated on collater-
al; and (2) is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or oth-
erwise to full or limited recourse against a debtor or a secondary
obligor.533
Two other provisions of Part 6 of the revised Article refer to sales
of receivables. Section 9-615(e) provides that after disposition of the
collateral, "[i]f the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes: (1) the debtor is not
entitled to any surplus; and (2) the obligor is not liable for any defi-
ciency. '"" Section 9-608(b) contains a similarly worded exclusion for
buyers of receivables in dealing with the application of proceeds of
collection or enforcement of collateral against an account debtor or
other obligor on the collateral."'
The revision thus does not follow Professor Gilmore's recom-
mendation of a provision that the default rules of Article 9 do not ap-
ply to buyers of receivables, but it does clearly relieve buyers in most
instances from the burdens placed on secured parties by the default
rules. Further, it makes it clear that the debtor is not liable for a defi-
ciency nor entitled to a surplus after disposition of the receivable or its
enforcement by the buyer. The exceptional cases where duties to the
seller are imposed on the buyer are unusual cases536 where the sale has
included terms allowing the buyer to have recourse against the seller if
the buyer is unable to collect from the account debtor or a person ob-
ligated on the receivable or has other difficulties with the receivable.
In this case, the seller would have a legitimate interest in requiring the
buyer to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner in his handling
or enforcement of the receivable. The revised Article confers that pro-
tection. Beyond that, it is probable that the drafters of the revision felt
that there was no need for further reference to sales of receivables in
532. Revised U.C.C. § 9 -601(g) (1999).
533. Id. § 9-607(c).
534. Id. § 9-615(e).
535. Id. § 9-608 (b).
536. See id. § 9-607 cmt. 9.
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the default rules because buyers of receivables would simply not try to
use the default remedies described because they would see no advan-
tage in their actions.
A buyer of receivables may, of course, see fit to sell the recei-
vables he has bought, but no special rule of law is needed since the
right of sale is a normal incident of ownership. The buyer may wish to
sue on a receivable bought from its prior owner, but no default rule is
needed to justify the action; what the buyer has bought is an enforcea-
ble legal right and the right to enforcement is a natural incident to that
right.
It is conceivable that a buyer of tangible chattel paper or a prom-
issory note who has left the paper in the hands of the seller may wish
to have legal assistance to gain possession of the paper if the seller
does not live up to the seller's obligations as bailee. To use the default
rule dealing with the right to take possession of the collateral, howev-
er, the buyer would need to have had the foresight to define the sel-
ler's misconduct as a "default" in the terms of the agreement of sale. If
the buyer had sufficient foresight to act, the buyer would probably
have realized that a simpler, more effective way of gaining protection
would be to reserve the right to take possession on demand. Surely,
such a term would be legally valid, and the seller has no superior in-
terest to be protected.
In a case in which the seller has been allowed to make collections
on sold receivables on behalf of the buyer and the seller has proved
faithless in his handling of the proceeds, the buyer would surely have
remedies against the seller under the law of contracts or, perhaps, the
law of torts. Therefore, the default rules are not needed.
As to the possibility that the seller would sell the receivables to
another person or grant a security interest to another person, and the
second purchaser would gain priority over the original buyer, nothing
in the default rules of Article 9 offers useful protection for the original
buyer. The buyer must again find a remedy in the law of torts or of
contracts. As early as possible, of course, the buyer should perfect the
"security interest" that Article 9 treats the buyer as having acquired to
minimize the seller's power to transfer rights to others that would be
superior to the buyer's under the rule of revised section 9-318(b). As
we have seen, however, that rule does not provide complete protec-
tion, so it would be wise to include in the agreement of sale a com-
mitment of the seller not to make sales or grant security interests in
the sold receivables.
The default rules can be somewhat more useful to the seller in the
event that the buyer has a right under the sales agreement to require
the seller to make good on receivables that turn out to be uncollectible
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or not fully so. The UCC expressly requires that in such a case the
buyer must proceed in a "commercially reasonable" manner in collec-
tion efforts against the obligors on the receivables. "Commercial rea-
sonableness" is not defined in the UCC. The idea is that in enforcing
obligations represented by the receivables, the secured party must
take whatever steps are appropriate to achieve the maximum recovery
realistically possible.537 For failure to comply with this requirement, the
buyer can be held liable for damages.538
The "commercial reasonableness" requirement does not apply
under revised Article 9 when a buyer of receivables undertakes to sell
them. Since the seller normally has neither liability for a deficiency,
nor any right to a surplus recovery under the default rules, the out-
come of the sale would normally be of no concern to the seller. How-
ever, no express exception is made to the general rule that a buyer of
receivables is not subject to the duties imposed by the default rules for
a case where the buyer has a contractual right of recourse against the
seller if the sales attempt turns out to be disappointing. Perhaps the
drafters of the 1998 revision considered such a term in an agreement
for sale of receivables to be too rare to require explicit treatment in
the default rules.
X. CONCLUSION
This analysis of Article 9's treatment of sales of receivables leads
to no grand conclusion on the topic. Accepting the finding of the draf-
ters of difficulty in predicting court rulings on whether transactions
involving receivables are really intended to create interests in the
property as collateral for obligations, or rather intended as outright
sales of the property, it is understandable that it is felt that it would be
wise to provide potential creditors of or purchasers from the "seller"
of receivables with notice of the "buyer's" interest as a condition of
attaining priority over such creditors and purchasers, even if an out-
right sale may be involved. That is obviously the primary objective of
the rules treating sales of receivables as "secured transactions," with
the buyers as "secured parties" and the sellers as "debtors." There is
little basis for quarreling with the decision to extend the coverage of
the article to all, or nearly all, types of receivables on the basis that
they are frequently found to be used in financing transactions.
537. See Gilmore, supra note 3 at vol. 2, § 44.5.
538. See revised U.C.C. § 9-625(b) (1999).
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If a true sale is involved, however, it would be overkill to apply all
of the Article 9 rules governing secured transactions to transactions
which are not truly of that nature (involving debts secured by protec-
tive interests in property of the debtors). There is a need to recognize
the reality of the transaction when it can be proved and provide dif-
ferent treatment when appropriate for true sales than for transactions
actually intended for security.
Revised Article 9 goes further than its predecessor to make such
distinctions when they are appropriate. In the process, it has created
some new problems of application of the rules, and it has not dealt
with all logically appropriate distinctions. It is expected that in the
coming years, these problems, which are far from monumental, will be
resolved.
